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Abstract / Lay Summary 
 Concurrent with a bloom of interest in the archive within academic discourse, an 
intense cultural fascination with museums, archives, and memorials to the past has 
flourished within the United States. The ascendency of digital technologies has 
contributed to and magnified this “turn” by popularising and habituating the archive as a 
personal memory tool, a key mechanism through which the self is negotiated and 
fashioned. This dissertation identifies a sustained exploration of the personal archive and 
its place in contemporary life by American novelists in the twenty-first century. Drawing 
on theories of the archive and the collection, this dissertation analyses the parameters of 
the curated self through close-readings of recent novels by five US authors. The first two 
chapters read Paul Auster’s Sunset Park through trauma theory and Siri Hustvedt’s What 
I Loved through psychoanalysis, noting that in each the system of archiving generates 
moments of catharsis. The two chapters argue that, for the subject shattered by trauma, 
archiving activates and fulfils psychoanalytic processes that facilitate the self’s 
reintegration and prompts a discursive revelation about the painful past. The texts, thus, 
discover in the archive strategies for achieving, however provisionally, a kind of 
stability amongst unexpected change. The next two chapters reveal the complicity of 
archival formations with threats posed in the digital age and articulate alternative forms 
of self-curation that counteract these pernicious forces. To ward off information 
overload, E.L. Doctorow’s Homer and Langley advocates the ethical flexibility of 
“blind” narration that, wending through time, accommodates a broad range of 
perspectives by refusing to fantasise about its own ultimate and total claim to accuracy. 
Jennifer Egan’s A Visit from the Goon Squad, meanwhile, diagnoses the cultural anxiety 
over increasingly invasive surveillance measures. While the novel situates the digital 
archive, or database, at the heart of this new dataveillance, it recommends investing the 
self in material collections, where personal meaning is rendered in the inscrutable patois 
of objects that disintegrate over time. For Egan, the material archive thereby skirts the 
assumed readability and fixity of data on which this surveillance thrives. The conclusion 
analyses Dana Spiotta’s Stone Arabia, observing within it and the other novels a 
consistent concern with archival destruction, erosion, and stagnation. Together, the texts 
suggest that the personal archive is persistently stalked by disintegration and failure. 
Yet, within this contemporary moment in which curation has become a widespread 
means of self-fashioning, they also show how these hazards can be creatively 
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 Without realising it, I began rehearsing for this dissertation almost a decade ago, 
when Facebook first permitted university students where I studied in Canada to sign up 
for its then-fledgling social networking website. Like so many early users, I shared my 
likes, thoughts, and photographs without deeply scrutinising what defining myself online 
achieved intellectually and emotionally. The popularity of social networking websites, 
and the now-ubiquitous practice of rendering the self according to their museum 
interfaces, elicits several questions about contemporary subjectivity. How does self-
consciously gathering and displaying personal information inhere in the notion of the 
self, what it is composed of and how it changes over time? What personal work takes 
place on online profiles: narcissistic exhibitionism, public performance, psychological 
self-analysis, personal diarising, or temporal anchoring? Facebook is just one of a 
multiplicity of platforms on which modern-day people assemble records of themselves. 
The fascination with self-documentation through diaries, photographs, and videos seems 
to have intensified in recent years with the propagation of digital technologies and the 
Internet. An array of digital applications allows users to monitor their everyday lives, 
from the vagaries of their moods to a daily count of their footsteps, in an effort to 
harvest data and, from it, extract self-knowledge that would otherwise go unmeasured. 
Together, these programmes form a movement known as Quantified Self, whose 
practitioners unite around ‘a belief that gathering and analysing data about their 
everyday activities can help them improve their lives’.1 While the name ‘Quantified 
Self’ is sparsely known, its premises infuse the cultural consciousness and its activities 
pervade the behaviour of people in the West. 
 Both Facebook and Quantified Self incorporate acts of assembling, arranging, 
and examining an archive of data into the process of actualising the self and registering 
knowledge about it. The emergence of digital self-archiving has a relevant prehistory in 
the rise of personal collections in the 1980s, when Susan Pearce and Paul Martin date 
the emergence a ‘new’ populist and inclusive form of collecting. It is during this decade, 
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they suggest, that the dominant object of personal collections moves from the rare or 
exotic item towards typical, everyday wares, making collecting accessible to a broader 
reach of people.2 The widespread appeal of collecting, they conclude, shows that ‘it is 
undeniably an integral part of how we relate to the contemporary world.’3 Leah Dilworth 
similarly notes a ‘collecting mania’ in twenty-first century America, with a history that 
extends back two hundred years, but she curiously omits the kinds of archives typically 
housed on digital devices.4 This dissertation attests to an overlapping fixation on 
material and digital archives in recent American culture and literature. Alongside 
quilting, Kenneth Goldsmith unites material and digital archiving under the rubric of 
folk art.5 For Goldsmith, curating objects, organising saved documents on a computer, 
and arranging mp3s into playlists engage individuals in the self-expressive activity of 
fashioning a personal system or tableau out of common materials. Joanne Garde-Hansen 
similarly indicates the digital archive’s predominance as a personal memory apparatus,6 
while Dubravka Ugrešić describes the present moment as one of ‘archivomania’:  
In this private Big Brother show, this public Big Brother show, we record everything: the 
hypothetical moment of conception, the embryo, the baby in utero, birth, first steps, first words, 
first birthdays. And we do not stop there. If we have got the money we hire personal historians 
[...].7 
We might say, then, that people have become curators of their own lives, and this 
cultural shift has served as the focus of much recent artistic and literary work as well.  
 Cultural analyses of the past few decades recurrently focus on the ubiquity of 
memory institutions and their penetration into the performance of personal life. Andreas 
Huyssen argues that, whereas modernism critiqued the museum as a site of mainstream 
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2 Susan Pearce and Paul Martin, ‘Introduction’, in The Collector’s Voice: Critical Readings in the Practice 
of Collecting, Vol. 4 Contemporary Voices, ed. by Pearce and Martin (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. xii-
xxii (p. xii). 
3 Ibid., p. xxi. 
4 Leah Dilworth, ‘Introduction’, in Acts of Possession: Collecting in America, ed. by Dilworth 
(Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003), pp. 3-15 (p. 5). 
5 Here, Goldsmith is expanding on writing by Rick Prelinger and Walter Benjamin. Kenneth Goldsmith, 
‘Archiving is the New Folk Art’, Poetry Foundation, 19 April 2011 
<http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2011/04/archiving-is-the-new-folk-art/> [accessed 29 July 
2014]. 
6 Joanne Garde-Hansen, Media and Memory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), p. 74. 
7 Dubravka Ugrešić, ‘The Elusive Substance of the Archive’, Comparative Critical Studies, 8.2-3 (2011), 




cultural ossification, the abundance of museums founded since the 1980s demonstrates 
its evolution into a mass medium: ‘Indeed, a museal sensibility seems to be occupying 
ever larger chunks of everyday culture and experience.’8 This development, Huyssen 
suggests, has generated shifts in public museums as well as in person memory practices, 
employing the term ‘self-musealization’ to describe the surge of self-documentation by 
‘video recorder, memoir writing and confessional literature’.9 Pierre Nora argued, in 
late-1980s France, ‘Modern memory is, above all, archival’, functioning through the 
creation and accretion of material fossils instead of public narratives that morph over the 
course of time.10 Nora posed a query that could just as easily have been asked in 
contemporary America: ‘But who, today, does not feel compelled to record his feelings, 
to write his memoirs—not only the most minor historical actor but also his witnesses, his 
spouse, and his doctor.’11 Erika Doss similarly observes a rise in the construction of 
memorials in present-day America, what she calls a ‘memorial mania: an obsession with 
issues of memory and history and an urgent desire to express and claim those issues in 
visibly public contexts.’12 Alongside the frenzied interest in public commemoration, 
Doss highlights a surge in non-government sanctioned memorial sites, in personal and 
impermanent ‘performances of grief’, like the temporary displays at Columbine.13  
 This dissertation argues that, reflecting this general cultural turn, recent 
American fiction casts the personal archive as a predominant site where subjectivity is 
constructed, analysed, and controlled, where insights into the self crystallise to be 
addressed, narrated, or even destroyed. Although the sharing of data on digital 
apparatuses forms an underlying impetus and a historical marker for this project, I 
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8 Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Making Time is a Culture of Amnesia (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1995), p. 14. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Pierre Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire’, trans. by Marc Roudebush, 
Representations, 26 (Spring 1989), 7-24 (p. 13). 
11 Ibid., p. 14. Dave Eggers mocks his own uneasiness about having written a memoir in A Heartbreaking 
Work of Staggering Genius: ‘the author, and those behind the making of this book, wish to acknowledge 
that yes, there are perhaps too many memoir-sorts of books being written at this juncture, [...] but would 
like to remind everyone that we could all do worse, as readers and as writers.’ Dave Eggers, A 
Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius (London: Picador, 2000), p. xix. 
12 Erika Doss, Memorial Mania: Public Feeling in America (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 2010), p. 2. 




investigate personal curation in a broader field that includes both virtual and material 
collections. I make these arguments through close readings of novels by five American 
authors: Paul Auster’s Sunset Park (2010), Siri Hustvedt’s What I Loved (2003), E.L. 
Doctorow’s Homer and Langley (2009), Jennifer Egan’s A Visit from the Goon Squad 
(2010), and Dana Spiotta’s Stone Arabia (2011).14 My arguments draw significantly 
from the canon of archive and collection theory, most significantly from work by Walter 
Benjamin, Jean Baudrillard, Susan Stewart, Krzysztof Pomian, and Jacques Derrida. 
This dissertation engages with these theorists to analyse the workings of the personal 
archive in each fictional text. My chapters also argue that archive novels reflect back on 
these theories, developing them in new ways and adapting them to new environments. 
That is to say, knowingly or not, these novels animate archive and collection theory but 
they also challenge it by investigating how it plays out diachronically in a temporal 
setting and how it interacts with other intellectual traditions, like trauma theory, 
psychoanalysis, realism, and theories of the digital. 
 This dissertation treats the archive as what Michel Foucault calls a ‘technology 
of the self’. These are structures or discourses, he writes, that ‘permit individuals to 
effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on 
their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform 
themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or 
immortality.’15 I suggest that the archive similarly drives a form of self-knowledge and 
self-production, and this dissertation inquires into the parameters of this knowledge and 
the processes that generate it. Archivisation, the first two chapters suggest, can facilitate 
a psychoanalytic encounter with the self: objects manifest the collector’s internal 
landscape, and archival actions—selection, arrangement, display—activate and 
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14 There are, of course, many other novels that could have taken centre stage in this thesis. Several of these 
are briefly integrated into the individual chapters as supporting texts. Others include: Michael 
Cunningham, By Nightfall (London: Fourth Estate, 2010); Jonathan Safran Foer, Extremely Loud and 
Incredibly Close (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005); Don DeLillo, Falling Man (New York: Scribner, 
2007) and Point Omega (New York: Scribner, 2010); Karen Russell, Swamplandia! (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 2011); Leanne Shapton, Important Artifacts and Personal Property from the Collection of Lenore 
Doolan and Harold Morris, Including Books, Street Fashion and Jewelry (London: Bloomsbury, 2009); 
Jonathan Franzen, Strong Motion (New York: Picador, 1992). 
15 Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self, ed. by Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton 




externalise psychic mechanisms that generate and consolidate the self. The archive, as 
the next two chapters address, can also endanger the subject that it seeks to buttress, 
flooding it with a surplus of signification or facilitating its co-option by surveillance 
institutions. These are troubles that seem particularly potent in a digital space where 
archivisation has become the default procedure for self-fashioning. Contemporary 
novels diagnose archival hazards while proposing different methods of curation that 
tranquilise these dangers. As such, this dissertation discovers in contemporary American 
literature a sustained inquiry into the effects of archival self-fashioning, an attempt to 
understand its consequences, to analyse its promise and its menace, and, ultimately, to 
guide its installation in social and personal life.  
 
Terminology: Curate, Archive, Personal Archive 
 The title of this dissertation employs two terms, ‘curator’ and ‘archive’, for their 
respective currencies in cultural and academic discourses. In her review of Spiotta’s 
Stone Arabia, Kathryn Schulz notes, ‘In the last few years, “curate” has become the 
reigning metaphor for how we organize virtually every aspect of our lives.’16 Schulz 
argues that ‘curate’ has become a dominant term for the way American culture considers 
the self in the digital age: as something that can be quantified and, once recorded, 
understood. Simon Reynolds observes that the language of rock music began borrowing 
the term ‘curation’ from art historians in the 1990s. He cites the music producer Brian 
Eno, who wrote, in 1991, ‘Curatorship is arguably the big new job of our times: it is the 
task of re-evaluating, filtering, digesting, and connecting together. In an age saturated 
with new artifacts and information, it is perhaps the curator, the connection maker, who 
is the new storyteller, the meta-author.’17 For Reynolds, this comment reflects and 
anticipates the development in the 1990s of ‘record-collector rock’, music groups that 
‘assembled their identity within a kind of economy of influences.’18 Contemporary 
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16 Kathryn Schulz, ‘Trickster Makes the World’, New York Magazine, 3 July 2011 
<www.nymag.com/arts/books/reviews/stone-arabia-schulz-review-2011-7/> [accessed 3 July 2014]. 
17 Brian Eno qtd. in Simon Reynolds, Retromania: Pop Culture’s Addiction to Its Own Past (London: 
Faber and Faber, 2011), p. 130. 




musicians, Reynolds argues, construct their public identities by self-consciously 
mobilising allusions and nods to earlier artists into an identifiable profile. 
 The significance of the curator to literary practice is integral to Jonathan 
Lethem’s essay, ‘The Ecstasy of Influence’, which advocates for the value of plagiarism 
and the unfettered flow of ideas. At the essay’s conclusion, Lethem reveals that its own 
contents have been stolen from several texts that he then enumerates.19 Like Reynolds’s 
rock musicians, who shape themselves around a constellation of influences, Lethem sees 
his essay as the manifestation of his own history of cultural engagement: ‘I’m basically a 
curator. [...] It’s literally an anthology of writings I cared about, writings that flowed into 
me, then flowed literally onto the page.’20 While it is not itself a digital text, Zara Dinnen 
argues that ‘Ecstasy’ takes shape around certain possibilities enabled by new 
technologies, affiliating the essay with a recent cultural emphasis on the remix or mash-
up. While Dinnen relates it to a longer history of texts composed of excerpts, she notes 
that ‘Ecstasy’ reveals the ease with which works of quotation and sampling can be 
created, or curated, using digital technologies that hide the dissonances between their 
source material. On the computer, she notes, ‘all information is, at base, abstract and 
equal (digitized data)’, and so the curated text need not reveal itself to be a plagiarism or 
an arrangement of cut-ups.21 Lethem, in his defence of the essay, relates its ethos to an 
economy of self-fashioning: ‘Let a million canons Bloom. Only, canons not by 
authoritarian fiat but out of urgent personal voyaging. Construct your own and wear it, 
an exoskeleton of many colors.’22 Evoking Schultz’s curated self, Lethem imagines 
readers delineating and displaying a personalised catalogue of literary favourites 
evocative or definitive of their own self-image. While not limited to the digital moment, 
this kind of thinking becomes particularly widespread at this time, with musicians, 
writers, and many Web-users participating in a culture of self-curation. 
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19 Jonathan Lethem, ‘Ecstasy of Influence’, in The Ecstasy of Influence: Nonfictions, Etc. (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 2012), pp. 93-120. 
20 Jonathan Lethem, interviewed by Peter Andrey Smith, Believer, May 2012 
<http://www.believermag.com/issues/201205/?read=interview_lethem> [accessed 28 June 2014]. 
21 Zara Dinnen, ‘In the Mix: The Potential Convergence of Literature and New Media in Jonathan 
Lethem’s “The Ecstasy of Influence”’, Journal of Narrative Theory, 42.2 (2012), 212-230 (p. 214). 
22 Jonathan Lethem, ‘The Afterlife of “Ecstasy”’, in The Ecstasy of Influence: Nonfictions, Etc. (London: 




 If ‘curate’ has entered social and artistic parlance, the ‘archive’ has gained 
particular purchase in academic circles. Marlene Manoff notes an upsurge of writings on 
the archive in a vast array of academic disciplines beyond their typical location within 
curatorial and historical discourses.23 Ann Laura Stoler terms this shift in academic work 
an ‘archival turn’, whereby the archive itself has become the object of analysis rather 
than the source for historical narrative or data.24 Thinking critically about the personal 
archive as a tool for self-fashioning, this dissertation contributes to this shift in academic 
focus. Although it makes use of the terms ‘collection’, ‘archive’, and ‘museum’ almost 
interchangeably, by spotlighting the ‘archive’ in its title, this dissertation acknowledges 
its engagement with this bounty of scholarly interest.  
 I also employ the term ‘archive’ because of the breadth of its usage and meaning, 
its capacity to house other collecting practices and institutions under its rubric. Jacques 
Derrida writes, ‘Nothing is less reliable, nothing is less clear today than the word 
“archive.”’25 Despite the archive’s opacity, Derrida defines it in terms of its residence in 
a physical location and its submission to a law that brings into harmony its corpus of 
items. Derrida thus delineates the archive according to ‘the commencement and the 
commandment’, the establishment and the consolidation of social authority.26 Carolyn 
Steedman, however, critiques the scope of Derrida’s definition, arguing that it functions 
as ‘a metaphor capacious enough to encompass the whole of modern information 
technology, its storage, retrieval and communication.’27 For Steedman, Derrida loses 
touch with the physical realities of working with historical documents. Yet this supposed 
inadequacy allows a more generous application of the ‘archive’ and theories about it to 
locations and practices outside the historian’s purview. As such, J.J. Long notes that, 
despite its shortcomings, the indecisiveness of Derrida’s definition opens up the concept 
to include libraries, museums, and other repositories, and admits ‘the need for a more 
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23 Marlene Manoff, ‘Theories of the Archive from Across the Disciplines’, portal: Libraries and the 
Academy, 4.1 (2004), 9-25 (p. 9).  
24 Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 44. 
25 Jacques Derrida, ‘Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression’, trans. by Eric Prenowitz, Diacritics, 25.2 
(1995), 9-63 (p. 57).  
26 Ibid., p. 9. 




inclusive notion of the archive.’28 This dissertation takes advantage of the archive’s 
haziness, specifically in order to see how a broad array of archival writings sheds light 
on personal collections in the contemporary moment.  
 G. Thomas Tanselle extols the benefits of outlining the archive, or in his case, 
the collection, in broad strokes. Defining collecting flexibly as ‘the accumulation of 
tangible things’, he suggests that ‘only by linking all forms of collecting can we 
illuminate the fundamental nature of the myriad directions it can take.’29 Whereas 
Tanselle posits a universal explanation for the collecting impulse, this dissertation 
operates with an inclusive understanding of the archive to broaden its range of critical 
resources. This dissertation testifies to the related concerns of theoretical writing on the 
archive, the collection, and the museum and insists on the relevance of each body of 
thought to the dissection and consideration of personal memory assemblages. Tanselle’s 
definition does, however, prove slightly too exclusive by limiting the collection to 
material objects. This dissertation requires a definition that encompasses both physical 
and virtual items. At this juncture, then, we might define the archive as a series of 
artefacts, terms, or data linked by a common theme, system, or purpose. 
 The final critical term that requires elucidation is ‘personal archive’. On the one 
hand, this expression can be defined simply as an archive gathered, administered, and 
controlled by an individual rather than by an institution. Personal archives could, 
seemingly, be distinguished by whether the archivist is the subject of his or her own 
display, which would differentiate personal records, like Facebook profiles, from 
traditional collections of antiques or art. Jean Baudrillard, however, muddies this 
boundary when he indicates that, no matter the objects one focuses on, ‘what you really 
collect is always yourself.’30 Baudrillard is hardly alone in suggesting that the 
subjectivity of the collector always expresses itself through the selection and 
manipulation of his or her objects. Sing-chen Lydia Chiang similarly argues, ‘By 
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30 Jean Baudrillard, The System of Objects, trans. by James Benedict (London and New York: Verso, 2005 




selecting, ordering, and re-presenting the objects of desire, the collecting subject re-
creates the self.’31 All archives overseen by an individual, then, are imbued with personal 
content and stage the work of self-formation. This dissertation inquires into how this 
process takes place, what kind of subject forms within the boundaries of the collection, 
and what benefits or dangers are produced by different styles of archivisation.  
 Before contemplating the subjective economy of personal archives, I first want to 
sketch out the relationship between these individual spaces and their institutional 
counterparts and, in doing so, indicate the cultural and political significance of 
conferring personal archives with historical weight. Stoler has noted, in light of the 
multidisciplinarity of the ‘archival turn’, that the archive in academic discussion is not 
always consistent across scholarly fields:  
One could argue that “the archive” for historians and “the Archive” for cultural theorists have been 
wholly different analytic objects: for the former, a body of documents and the institutions that 
house them, for the later, a metaphoric invocation for any corpus of selective collections and the 
longings that the acquisitive quests for the primary, originary, and untouched entail.32 
Although she acknowledges that studies often blur the two domains together, Stoler’s 
tentative distinction separates the historian’s archive and the cultural theorist’s Archive 
in two ways: while the former is material and presided over by institutions, the latter is 
metaphorical and conceptually inclusive. The personal archive, I suggest, strains Stoler’s 
dichotomy by resting on the interstices between the institutional and the individual and, 
within archival fiction, between the tangible and the metaphorical. 
 Although moderated by the organising consciousness of a private individual 
rather than an administrative body, personal archives frequently overlap with or become 
subsumed by larger institutional structures. Jeremy Braddock argues that modernism 
entered into mainstream culture through ‘the privately assembled, but publicly exhibited, 
art collection and the interventionist literary anthology.’33 Braddock terms these 
collections ‘provisional institution[s]’, groupings contoured by the distinctive 
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33 Jeremy Braddock, Collecting as Modernist Practice (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 




proclivities of their owners, serving as challenges against official historical culture and 
competing to become the arbiter of modernist culture’s canonisation.34 In doing so, they 
functioned not just as privately-authored compendiums but, eventually, as 
institutionally-recognised assemblages of documents, literatures, and artworks. Digital 
technologies and the Internet have changed, and in many ways intensified, the trajectory 
of personal records into the space of authorised history. As Christopher Lee notes, 
‘Professionals engaged in web archiving must often consider annual reports, 
organizational publications, blogs, wikis, and YouTube videos all in the same set of 
selection activities, rather than insisting on a stark line between the official and 
unofficial.’35 In Lee’s account, contemporary archivists blur the distinction between 
institutional and personal archives by engaging with both forms of documentation. 
 While personal collections and effects sometimes gain the certification of official 
archives, so too do they offer a robust resource for historical and cultural analysis. By 
confining the historian’s archive to institutional structures, Stoler risks belittling or 
ignoring other archival sites. José van Dijck coins the term ‘mediated memories’ to refer 
to cherished materials, a shoebox of photographs or a folder of digital .JPGs, through 
which people frame their identities and their relationships to the past. Van Dijck sets 
these object landscapes at the heart of what she terms ‘personal cultural memory’, as 
sites where individual agency rubs up against acculturated habits and norms, together 
determining what should be remembered and what form that memory should take.36 
Personal archives, then, permit an act of self-assemblage and display, marking the 
confrontation between personal desire and cultural convention. John Berger, like van 
Dijck, positions the personal archive—here, bulletin boards plastered with cuttings, 
pictures, and letters—as an alternative form of museum: ‘On each board all the images 
belong to the same language and all are more or less equal within it, because they have 
been chosen in a highly personal way to match and express the experience of the room’s 
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(Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 2011), pp. 1-26 (p. 11). 





inhabitant. Logically, these boards should replace museums.’37 Berger suggests that the 
reproducibility of canonical images has freed art history to be deployed by any person 
and, specifically, by those people without inherited cultural authority. This shift has 
enabled marginalised people, through their collections, to re-inscribe the canon of art 
with new meanings by organising images in new arrangements and appending them with 
alternative descriptions.  
 Both van Dijck and Berger position personal archives as subjective platforms 
that can adapt the aesthetic form and the material content of the museum while 
challenging their hegemonic narratives. The novels analysed in this dissertation at times 
underline both the personal archive’s investment in collective memory and its potential 
to compose and challenge historical narratives. If personal archives interact with 
institutionalised structures, so too are they speculative spaces where the cultural 
theorist’s suppositions come alive. Stoler, as we have seen, attempts to distinguish the 
historian’s from the theorist’s archive based on their relationships to materiality: while 
the historian deals in specific tangible documents, the theorist offers a conceptual and 
abstracted examination of the archive in general. The novels analysed in this dissertation 
insist on the relationship between theories of the archive and their tangible, material 
instantiations. The personal archives I consider are real compendiums of items or of 
data, not the murky metaphorical spaces that, Stoler suggests, are the purview of cultural 
theorists. Within these materialised sites, the novels put philosophical concepts into 
action, demonstrating how theorists’ conceptual, and at-times nebulous, claims about the 
archive resonate with and apply to real personal collections. The novels, thus, bridge the 
two domains of archival writing—the historian’s and the theorist’s—by animating 
theory within the space of fiction.  
 This dissertation possesses a family relationship with Richard Wendorf’s ‘The 
Literature of Collecting’. Wendorf argues that novels and theories of collecting 
‘illuminate each other’, and he ends his essay with an assertion of the collection’s status 
as a tool through which the self takes shape: ‘I see personal collecting in particular as 
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part of the complicated project of self-projection, self-fashioning, and self-fulfilment.’38 
This dissertation investigates Wendorf’s conclusion at length, interrogating the kinds of 
subjective labour that occur within the archive and questioning how various forms of 
archive invoke different possibilities and dangers. Whereas Wendorf strives to 
illuminate a general theory of collecting, this dissertation is specifically interested in 
scrutinising how this mode of self-formation functions within the digitised, late-
capitalist, contemporary American environment. Limiting my inquiry to this particular 
location similarly distinguishes my project from Jonathan Boulter’s Melancholy and the 
Archive. Boulter notes that recent fiction frequently views the traumatised subject in 
conjunction with the archive, navigating through archives or, indeed, coming to embody 
them. These novels, he suggests, voice an ethical dilemma—‘history must be preserved; 
history cannot be preserved’—that dooms every archival venture to melancholy.39 By 
positioning the contemporary subject within ‘a globalized economy of the archive’, 
Boulter’s study provides a salient point of comparison and a useful resource for this 
project.40 Indeed, we both begin in the same place, with novels by Paul Auster and 
thoughts on the system of mourning. However, whereas Boulter is principally interested 
in exhuming the archive’s melancholy associations within an international body of 
fiction, my own project argues that the archive functions multifariously as a site of self-
enunciation that can mobilise different forms of subjectivity and operate alternatively as 
a harbinger or redeemer of loss.  
 
Archive Fiction and Art 
 These recent novels must be considered within a long history of archival fiction. 
Recent criticism tends to find in archival fiction a commentary on the question of 
historical veracity: does the novel affirm the archive’s validity, or does it undermine its 
purchase on historical truth? Marco Codebò argues that fiction’s concern with the 
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archive extends back to the earliest novels but that only in the postmodern context do 
authors become aware that they are writing within a genre of archival fiction.41 He splits 
the archival novel’s lineage into two predominant eras: realism, when the novel upheld 
the archive’s authority, and postmodernism, when the novel challenged it. In the 
nineteenth century, Codebò suggests, realist novels and centralised state archives 
‘participate in the same project: making the industrial city dweller visible through the 
storing of individualized knowledge.’42 However, the tide turns in the twentieth century, 
and particularly during postmodernism, when ‘novelists relate their work to archival 
practices not to support the verisimilitude of their texts, but to detect the errors, frauds, 
and/or (ab)uses of power that have led to the creation and storage of records.’43 Thus, 
Codebò suggests that, whereas earlier novels fortify the archive’s cultural authority, 
postmodernism complicates these claims.  
 Codebò situates at the heart of his genealogy a concern with the archive’s access 
to cultural truth, and this same issue frames Linda Hutcheon’s discussion of 
postmodernism, which she similarly imbues with cynicism towards the archive. 
Hutcheon, writing in the late 1980s, defines postmodernism not as a historical moment 
but as the fictional genre of historiographic metafiction, to which she attributes two 
paradoxical strategies: ‘It reinstalls historical contexts as significant and even 
determining, but in so doing, it problematizes the entire notion of historical 
knowledge.’44 This pattern—where the past is shown to be both formative and 
inaccessible—similarly underlies postmodern archival fictions. Hutcheon asserts: ‘In 
postmodern fiction, there is a contradictory turning to the archive and yet a contesting of 
its authority.’45 When Hutcheon talks about novels becoming archival, she is specifically 
focused on the tendency for postmodern writers to insert documentary forms, such as 
photographs and clippings, into their texts. She argues that postmodern novels, whose 
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narrative surrounds and explains their archival insertions, reveal that records require 
textual interpretation to be meaningful. For Hutcheon, these novels show the archive to 
be a cloudy and contentious place where history’s meaning is inferred and imagined, 
withholding the past rather than revealing it with clarity and precision.46 Max Saunders 
argues that this incredulity towards the archive and its reliance on narrative structures 
predates postmodernism. As evidence of this historicisation, he delineates the genre of 
‘autobiografiction’, ‘works that use the form of autobiography, but that fictionalize some 
of the content, so that the narrator’s story is not the same as the author’s.’47 Saunders 
argues that such works, popular from the late-nineteenth century, aspire to resemble 
archives, sometimes forming the corpus of a supposedly dead (but, in reality, an 
invented) author. In so doing, they imbue real archives with an underlying economy of 
fiction: ‘To write fictions like archives is to suggest that archives already sound like 
fiction.’48  
 Codebò, Hutcheon, and Saunders argue that postmodern fiction, and sometimes 
its precursors, contest the authority of the archive and reveal it to require narrative to 
become intelligible. Suzanne Keen, however, notes an alternative group of recent texts 
that insist on the possibility of accessing the past and correcting misinformation about it 
through material traces. Keen outlines a genre prevalent in the past three decades, which 
she coins ‘romances of the archive’, in which researcher-adventurers travel to dusty 
archives to seek out and discover the truths of the past, to solve historical mysteries and 
return historical objects to their rightful owners.49 In a recent article, Keen observes the 
permeation of this genre into twenty-first-century writing by American women.50 Keen 
sets ‘romances of the archive’ against the ontological-scepticism typical of 
postmodernism, in their suggestion that historical truths can be contacted and mistakes 
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righted within the setting of the archive.51 In sketching out one of its subgenres, Keen 
testifies to archive fiction’s prevalence within the contemporary scene. So too does her 
analysis envision the central question of archival novels of recent decades as a matter of 
historical authority and of accessing the truth of the past. 
 In her initial monograph, Keen argues that, in addition to evoking postcolonial 
anxieties, ‘romances of the archive’ respond to the digital turn.52 With their insistence on 
returning to material records and on bodily pleasure, these novels, including her 
contemporary American examples, avow the enchantment of real documents after 
historical research has withered to sitting in front of a computer screen. Despite the 
different relationships that they illuminate between recent fiction and archival 
verisimilitude, Codebò offers a congruent explanation for the ubiquity of archival 
novels, linking their popularity with both postcolonial and digital moments.53 Max 
Saunders, however, disputes that the increase of interest in the archive can be traced to 
the culture of digitisation:  
While it remains a compelling argument that internet research alters the nature of the archive and 
our relation to it, the existence of such pre-digital archive fictions undermines the attempt to 
establish a causal link between the digital revolution and such narratives. There is, however, 
evidence that such work was shaped by anxieties about transformations in communication 
technology, the technologies involved being pre-digital ones such as the typewriter and the 
telephone, both of which were in production from the 1870s.54 
This dissertation does not contend that archive fiction is a new phenomenon that springs 
from a digital moment where real objects have recently become pieces of fetishistic 
fascination. It does suggest that, largely in light of digital technology, many twenty-first-
century archival novels foreground different questions and tropes than the majority of 
their predecessors.55 That is, even though they possess historical antecedents, 
contemporary archival novels are driven by the present-day context and pose questions 
resonant with its cultural scaffolding. These questions tend to focus on the ways the 
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archive generates or imperils the self rather than scrutinising its relationship to the real 
content of history. This dissertation contends that, considering the ubiquity of self-
archivisation in contemporary culture, reading contemporary archival novels for their 
commentary on self-fashioning forms a necessary and revealing mode of inquiry. 
 While I find in these recent novels a progression from the concerns of 
postmodern archival novels, this is not to make the case for an entirely new historical 
paradigm of fiction. There are, however, several accounts that suggest that contemporary 
fiction comprises a new aesthetic moment. Stephen J. Burn, chief among these theorists, 
sees in ‘post-postmodernism’ not a turning away from the previous movement but a 
style that reflects back, cites, and riffs on its precursor.56 Similarly, Timotheus 
Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker, theorists of metamodernism, argue that today’s art 
balances modernist naivety and postmodernist doubt in searching for truth and meaning 
that it knows it can never find.57 Peter Boxall attributes a transformation in ‘the 
mechanics of narrative itself’ to digital technology and, specifically, to the speed of 
electronic processing.58 I make the case that an insistently personal inflection informs 
contemporary archival novels and affiliate this shift, in part, to the ever-presence of 
digital technology. I nevertheless employ theories of the postmodern—as well as the 
digital—when they are relevant, treating what might be a new aesthetic moment as 
possessing a porous relationship with its past. 
 While Codebò, Hutcheon, Keen, and Saunders disagree about the particular 
relationship between recent fiction and historical truth, it is nevertheless this question of 
veracity or authority that each highlights as the reigning issue within recent archival 
texts. Whereas those previous novels grapple with the archive’s contact to the past, the 
contemporary novels addressed in this dissertation instead focus on the particular 
valences of the archive as a mode of personal discovery and self-fashioning. These 
novels frequently take for granted that the past presented by the archive is composed and 
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contrived rather than natural and accurate. Jeffrey Eugenides’s The Virgin Suicides is an 
instructive text for tracing this shift.59 Although it appears to offer a typical 
postmodernist critique, the novel also embeds the personal archive within the memory 
and psychology of its owners. The Virgin Suicides is framed by references to a battered 
collection of artefacts that a group of boyhood friends maintain in an attempt to decode 
the lives and suicides of their childhood neighbours, the Lisbon sisters. The documents, 
however, refuse to offer up a key to the girls’ deaths even as the collection appears on 
the cusp of decomposition. In The Virgin Suicides, the collection is not just the place 
where history goes to hide. Rather, the novel hints at a link between the boys’ childhood 
fetishisation of the Lisbons, their sexual fixation on the sisters, and their archival attempt 
to determine the reasons for their deaths. Throughout the novel, the imperilled Lisbons 
appear as the content for a childhood adventure, the objects of the boys’ fascination and 
desire. The gravity of the sisters’ confinement finally registers when the boys discover 
their corpses during their ultimate rescue attempt. The boys’ potential culpability in the 
Lisbons’ deaths, their inability to view the girls as more than mysterious objects, seems 
to be the true secret they veil from themselves within their collection: they seek in the 
archive the truth of the painful past to distract from their own responsibility for its perils. 
 While affirming postmodern incredulity towards archival truth, The Virgin 
Suicides also implicates the collection in the complicated psychology of its owners. This 
movement beyond critiquing the archive’s purchase on revealing history has been, as I 
noted above, the subject of studies by Wendorf and Boulter, but it has also been 
investigated within contemporary artistic practice. In a 2004 article, Hal Foster argues 
that an archival art with a distinctive flavour predominates in the contemporary art 
scene.60 These works, he notes, are distinct from their postmodern predecessors in their 
desire to create meaningful interconnections, rather than employing fragmentation as a 
means to explode the hegemonic symbolic whole: ‘On the contrary, [the work] assumes 
anomic fragmentation as a condition not only to represent but to work through, and 
proposes new orders of affective association, however partial and provisional, to this 
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end, even as it also registers the difficulty, at times the absurdity, of doing so.’61 Sven 
Spieker argues that a quality of playfulness characterises recent archival art, similarly 
stressing the impulse to undermine authorised curational arrangements: the artists he 
writes of, ‘tentatively abandon the archive’s immunity from tampering, as they allow 
visitors to their archives to interact more or less freely with the holdings in ways that 
fundamentally affect their configuration.’62 While Foster sees the artist’s emphasis on 
creating, sometimes paranoiacally, new archival relations as part of a distinctly 
materialistic movement, Spieker relates his artists’ attempts to overthrow archival 
systemisation to the digital archive, or database. More than revealing the archive to be 
composed around a fiction, these artworks complicate dominant stories by creating new 
associations and systems. They ponder what can be gained by composing and 
recomposing the archive even with the foreknowledge that it is not historical fact that is 
being contested.  
 
Between Posthumanism and Humanism 
 This section locates in the archive a particularly apposite mechanism for 
moderating between the dispersed posthumanist and the unified humanist self. Neil 
Badmington defines humanism in terms of the belief in ‘a basic human essence.’63 
Taking the Cartesian maxim ‘I think therefore I am’ as its classic axiom, he argues that 
humanist subjects trust their own capacity for rational thought and the possibility of self-
knowledge. Badmington identifies two thinkers who initially troubled the human 
subject’s capacity to know, understand, and control itself: Karl Marx and Sigmund 
Freud. Marx undermined the humanist belief in a common human nature by suggesting 
that social conditions produce and contour subjectivity.64 Freud intensified this attack on 
humanism by describing internal forces and drives that elude the subject’s conscious 
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awareness yet trigger its behaviour.65 For Badmington, the arrival of posthumanism 
announces an understanding that the self is shaped by the surrounding environment, 
composed of a variety of often-unknowable components, and animated by sometimes-
contradictory motivations. This complication of humanism has made the self a zone of 
contestation for contemporary theory. Nick Mansfield notes, ‘It is this ambivalence and 
ambiguity—the intensification of the self as the key site of human experience and its 
increasing sense of internal fragmentation and chaos—that the twentieth century’s 
theorists of subjectivity have tried to deal with.’66 
 New technologies of the past few decades have re-orientated old assumptions 
about the self and provided an anchor for conversations about posthumanism. Donald E. 
Hall argues: ‘Subjectivity, once considered potentially knowable and conceptually one-
dimensional, has been rendered various, fractured, and indefinite in recent theorizations, 
largely because of a new recognition of the complexity of our social roles and the 
multiplicity of our interactions.’67 He stresses that new technological augmentations and 
amendments to the body strain easy accounts about the bounds of the self, taking Donna 
Haraway’s writing as a prime example. Haraway offers the figure of the cyborg as a 
salient metaphor for present-day humans, seeing in its undifferentiated mixture of 
organic and machinic components a corollary for human bodies entwined with and 
enhanced by technological parts. In the cyborg, Haraway suggests, human and machine 
are rendered indistinct, an amalgamation she celebrates because, unlike humanism, ‘it 
does not seek unitary identity and so generate antagonistic dualisms without end’.68 For 
Haraway, the cyborg’s sundry body admits to the tumultuous and contradictory 
composition of the self, rather than fantasising about a universal and unified theory of 
the subject that could only be limiting and damaging. N. Katherine Hayles similarly 
emphasises internal partition in her reading of the posthuman, which she contrasts with 
the theory of possessive individualism. Whereas the possessive individualist conceives 
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of freedom through the ownership of his or her own capacities, the posthumanist mixes 
with others, often though not always through computing technology, in a way that 
renders individual desire and action incomprehensible. Hayles writes: ‘The posthuman 
subject is an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-
informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and 
reconstruction.’69 
 Both Hayles and Haraway cast the posthuman as a non-unified series of parts 
whose multiplicity skirts a humanist order that overrides internal difference and 
contradiction. The collection, like the cyborg, seems an apt representation of this 
distributed self. Boulter argues that, fractured by trauma, ‘the archival subject [...] stands 
as a stark negation of the humanist claims for subjectivity as such.’70 While the self-
archive does, on the one hand, acknowledge the subject’s many conflicting pulls and 
influences, it can also, like the humanist model, override internal discord. Jacques 
Derrida, as I have already noted, argues that the archive works by ‘consignation’, the 
process that ‘aims to coordinate a single corpus, in a system or a synchrony in which all 
the elements articulate the unity of an ideal configuration.’71 For Derrida, then, the 
archive drains its components of heterogeneity, unlike the cyborg whose body is 
defined, above all, by its diverse assemblage. Baudrillard, similarly, suggests that the act 
of collecting buttresses a neurotic need for omnipotence and control, reinforcing the 
collector’s authority rather than emphasising his or her conflictual makeup. For 
Baudrillard, each object ‘contribut[es] to the creation of a total environment, to that 
totalization of images of the self that is the basis of the miracle of collecting.’72 
Baudrillard, as we have seen, is not alone in suggesting that the collector’s self is always 
the latent content of a collection. Yet the look of that collected self, its relative unity or 
strength, remains contested territory.  
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 Other theories admit that the singularity of the collection’s objects can push 
through its homogenised veneer. Susan Stewart, like Baudrillard, argues that collected 
objects, shorn of their use value, transform external space into an extension of the self. 
She also suggests that bringing objects together in a collection creates a unifying 
narrative that overwrites the unique histories of the individual pieces. Nevertheless, 
Stewart declares that disagreement can sometimes bubble to the collection’s surface: 
‘the fetishist’s impulse toward accumulation and privacy, hoarding and the secret, serves 
both to give integrity to the self and at the same time to overload the self with 
signification.’73 Continual collecting, Stewart implies, at once asserts the self’s power 
while distributing it across an enlarging field of objects, gradually straining the 
consistency of the archive’s narrative. Stewart’s argument hints that, rather than a space 
in absolute accord with itself, within the collection there can occur both unity and 
discord, or, what Walter Benjamin terms, ‘a dialectical tension between the poles of 
disorder and order’ in the life of the collector.74  
 Benjamin took an immense interest in the bourgeois cult of collecting—and was 
himself a collector—at a time when he felt the pastime was fading into obsolescence. 
Like Baudrillard and Stewart, Benjamin argues that collected objects combine into a 
total world, but unlike these other theorists, he sees this movement towards self-
enclosure less as a style of discipline than a creative reckoning. Rather than eliding the 
objects’ unique qualities, Benjamin suggests that their individual histories and 
metonymies come together in a ‘magic circle’, or ‘a whole magic encyclopedia, a world 
order’.75 The collection, then, provides a stage on which to ponder the surrounding social 
arrangement and historical moment, a comprehension that develops by organising 
objects ‘according to a surprising and, for the profane understanding, incomprehensible 
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connection.’76 Benjamin, thus, argues that rather than claiming a position of 
organisational omnipotence, the steward can uncover the concealed social order by 
sensitively probing and engaging with his or her objects. The collection’s ‘magic’ 
quality, its ethos of creative discovery, emerges from what Benjamin calls its 
‘productive disorder’, the tension between multiplicity and consistency.77   
 Mapping these opposing pulls onto the archived subject, we might say there 
exists in the collection a tug-of-war between humanist and posthumanist versions of the 
self, an impulse that strives for completeness and harmony of subjectivity and another 
that acknowledges internal confusion. Mike Featherstone, in his description of reading 
an archive, acknowledges this movement between fission and fusion:  
Archive reason is a kind of reason concerned with detail, it directs us constantly away from the big 
generalization, down into the particularity and singularity of the event. Yet this singularity is itself 
produced through a discriminating gaze and entails an ‘aesthetics of perception’ to enable the 
significant to be lifted out from the mass of detail.78 
Interacting with an archive means both treating its objects individually, and thereby 
foregrounding multiplicity, while at the same time striving to reveal a constant thread 
that unifies the whole into an analysable form. The personal collection, then, coordinates 
the moderation between humanist coherence and posthumanist dispersal, facilitating the 
subject’s contemplation and organisation of their own distributed being. 
 On the one hand, then, the personal archive provides a template that, 
acknowledging subjective disharmony, permits a self to be envisioned and moulded 
across a multiplicity of items. Yet, it also manifests an opportunity for thinking these 
disparate parts into an arrangement that appears to cohere, however momentarily. In this 
sense, the archive facilitates, on the level of the individual subject, the examination and 
interrogation of humanism, rather than its total dismissal, which Badmington argues 
should be the current work of posthumanism.79 In the novels analysed in this dissertation, 
when an integrated self emerges from the archive, it is never out of belief in a naive 
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humanism but with a firm awareness of the wealth of drives at work within the subject: 
the self’s integration within the archive is never total, infallible, and eternal. Sometimes, 
then, the archive enables a temporarily smoothing over of fragmentation that brings the 
various pieces of the self into a system of agreement. At other times, the diversity or the 
ambiguity of the collection overpowers the possibility of uniformity. In the novels 
analysed in this dissertation, the collection’s refusal of stability is either condemned for 
destroying the subject or it is celebrated for releasing the subject to radical posthumanist 
opportunities. 
 The novels that I analyse do not treat the personal collection as a space of 
personal mastery or a means of asserting control or power over oneself. Unlike 
Baudrillard, they see the collection as a locale for continual self-analysis and self-
formation, a contemplative and creative engagement rather than a means of self-
domination.80 Treating collecting as an assertion of power and discipline, a solitary and 
willed pursuit, has led commentators to associate it with typically masculine behaviour. 
Philipp Blom writes:  
It takes this mind-set, its voluntary seclusion and single-minded pursuit of one goal and one goal 
only, to keep on going oblivious of the consequences. Men seem to be more comfortable with, or 
more in need of, the hunt, and with the business of conquest and possession, with the loneliness of 
this task and with submission to its demands, with social and intellectual hierarchies.81 
Naomi Schor, furthermore, identifies a sexist language coded into Benjamin’s and, in 
particular, into Baudrillard’s writing on the collector. In Baudrillard’s account, where 
the pleasure of collecting is equated with overseeing a harem, there is no room for a 
female collector: Schor writes, ‘The paradigmatic collector [...] is a man whose extreme 
castration anxiety leads him to a pathological need to sequester the love-object or loved 
objects’.82 If the obsessive or imposing collector has been traditionally thought of as 
male, this dissertation could be seen as discovering an alternative, non-phallocentric 
mode of collecting in contemporary literature. These are self-archives that foreground 
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the object-world as a resource for thinking through the self, its internal mechanisms or 
its outward fashioning, rather than using it as a screen for the narcissistic projection of 
meaning.  
 Domietta Torlasco has, similarly, strived to delineate a feminist theory of the 
archive, based around the story of Antigone. Torlasco explicitly challenges Derrida’s 
reading of the archive, which, taking Oedipus as its central character, argues that the 
archive is always subject to a law that determines its organisation. Derrida suggests, by 
instituting a system that maintains consistency over time, this law dooms the archive to 
destruction according to the dynamics of the Freudian death drive.83 Torlasco strives to 
delineate, through Antigone’s disobedience of the law, an alternative vision of the 
archive ‘where the death drive (the path it takes in a patriarchal order) is diverted, 
detoured, given more than one route, so that the house that constitutes its domicile can 
be other than a funeral chamber[.]’84 She identifies within digital memory a new archival 
modality that rests not on the immutable law but on the expectation of disruption. In the 
digital space, archival materials are more feasibly tampered with, quoted, and put in new 
orientations—recall Lethem’s ‘Ecstasy of Influence’. As such, Torlasco suggests, 
digitised memory opens up an art that constantly renovates the previous order, 
refashioning old materials into stories that have thus far gone without voice.85 The 
resistance of digital archives to a stable order or law has been noted by Arjen Mulder 
and Joke Brouwer, who write: ‘Digital archives are unstable, plastic, living entities, as 
stories and rituals were in oral cultures.’86 Frequently, the novels I analyse, whether or 
not they focus explicitly on digital technology, advise the necessity for the archive to 
accept change over time, to slacken its rigidity, and even to embrace its own eventual 
obsolescence or collapse. This can mean treating the archive as a necessarily temporary 
point of stability in an ever-changing late-capitalist moment, or a dynamic space that 
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prospers with the addition of new objects. It can also mean seeking out modes of 
curation more transient and flexible than archival law, or welcoming the self-destruct 
impulse that brings an archive to its end.  
 
Chapters, Themes, Tropes  
 Mansfield notes that recent theories of subjectivity agree that ‘the subject is 
constructed, made within the world, not born into it already formed.’87 He divides these 
accounts of the subject into two schools, the psychoanalytic and the Foucauldian. The 
psychoanalytic school argues that the subject takes shape against the family environment 
in which it is born, splitting into conscious and unconscious parts. Psychoanalytic 
theories rest on the assumption that the subject possesses ‘a fixed structure, operating in 
knowable and predictable patterns.’88 The Foucauldian model, conversely, sees the 
subject as the product of societal power and ideology. Foucault argues that social 
infrastructures and discourses generate and contour subjectivity, determining the 
delineating components basic to the subject’s constitution. As such, coming to be a 
subject requires conforming to recognised modes of self-knowledge or self-performance, 
the confession being a prime example: Foucault argues that the notion that the truth of 
the self lies within, awaiting excavation and revelation, has been historically 
acculturated, functioning as the vessel for the subject’s co-option by medical and legal 
establishments.89 The self-archive, I suggest, interacts with both the psychological and 
the Foucauldian notions of the subject, and it is through their differentiation that I will 
track the development of this dissertation’s chapters. 
 The first two chapters investigate the psychological underpinnings of archival 
practice. Paul Auster’s Sunset Park, which I discuss in Chapter One, finds in archiving a 
strategy for rehabilitation following a traumatic event. In the repetitious acts of 
recording it locates a mechanism for encountering—seeing for the first time—the event 
of trauma that could not be witnessed at the moment of its initial occurrence. Acts of 
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archiving thereby enable the subject to contemplate and come to terms with the 
traumatic event. The novel recommends, amidst the turbulent backdrop of the recent 
financial collapse, embodying the archive, as exemplified by the actor’s catalogue of 
roles or the novelist’s corpus of texts. Within a historical era of rapid, unexpected 
change, internalising a pool of possible people or narratives, and thereby habituating 
adaptation, becomes a prudent pursuit. Siri Hustvedt’s What I Loved, the subject of the 
second chapter, sees in the archive of objects the potential for a psychoanalytic 
encounter with one’s own self. The objects in Leo’s drawer stand in for his internal 
landscape, functioning as a mirror in which he can lay eyes on and interact with the 
usually occluded interior self. In the chapter, I define the concept of ‘archival play,’ 
developing the psychoanalytic theories of D.W. Winnicott and Christopher Bollas. By 
reshuffling his collection and inspecting different arrangements for meaning, Leo turns 
the archival domain into a space for dream analysis, where the self comes into view and, 
most importantly for Hustvedt, can be translated into narrative—the decisive sign of the 
subject’s vitality.  
 Auster’s and Hustvedt’s novels share an interest in the archive as a means of 
instigating, externalising, and enacting psychoanalytic procedures. In both texts the 
objects are tethered to the archivist’s internal psychology: in Auster’s they are 
metaphorically linked to the event of trauma that the archive is implicitly confronting; in 
Hustvedt’s they provide the content for a dream analysis, the various affiliations 
uncovered becoming the very substance of the novel. Just as significant as the objects 
themselves are the processes of archiving: recording, gathering together, arranging, and 
displaying. The novels’ focus on archiving as a practice is mirrored in recent theoretical 
writing: Michael O’Driscoll and Edward Bishop stress that archives are ‘spatio-temporal 
processes’, series of events that take place over time, and Sue Breakell and Huyssen 
suggest that the verbal forms ‘to curate’ and ‘to archive’, respectively, are contemporary 
terminologies.90 Auster’s and Hustvedt’s novels lend a psychoanalytic essence to this 
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recent interest in the procedures of archiving, suggesting that maneuvering the collection 
mimics the internal dynamics that generate catharsis. In foregrounding archival 
practices, these novels also suggest that there is something performative that occurs in 
archival self-formation.91 Judith Butler has argued that the gendered self is performative, 
that it is fabricated through a routine of coded actions rather than the expression of an 
internal essence.92 Recording and arranging an archive similarly functions as a cycle of 
related performances within which a subject takes shape. However, self-performance 
through the archive features an elevated quality of self-consciousness, the subject 
simultaneously gazing upon and acting upon its materialised doppelganger reproduced 
in the collection that lies before it.  
 In Hustvedt’s and Auster’s novels, these archival processes ultimately illuminate 
a speech act, the revelation of the traumatic moment, for Auster, or the composition of 
an autobiographical account, for Hustvedt. Frequently, the archive has been imbued with 
the quality of narrative. Antoinette Burton writes that ‘archives are always already 
stories: they produce speech and especially speech effects, of which history is but one.’93 
I similarly contend that the archive is shot through with language and can generate 
narrative accounts, but I insist that limiting the textual qualities of the collection strictly 
to narrative obscures its more complicated linguistic network. Foucault has argued, ‘The 
archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of 
statements as unique events.’94 For Foucault, the archive is a figurative site that 
determines the parameters of discourse within a given society and, as such, it manifests 
the ideological underpinnings and political configurations of that setting. Foucault’s 
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conceptual account of the archive engorges its linguistic properties to contain a whole 
universe of statements. Displaced onto the personal archive, Foucault’s statements 
helpfully suggest that these collections produce a landscape of potential utterances about 
the self and its history. It is in this linguistically ripe setting, in the complex discourse 
concealed within and entangled between its items, that the archive induces cathartic 
disclosures. The personal archive, then, becomes a force that governs language but also 
enables the revelation and enunciation of otherwise opaque statements. 
 In the third and fourth chapters, this dissertation moves on to analysing different 
archival forms and comparing their efficacy within the digitised environment. In this 
sense, they acquire a Foucauldian quality, demonstrating that the form self-fashioning 
takes, in turn, determines and contours the subject that emerges from it. E.L. Doctorow’s 
Homer and Langley, I argue in the third chapter, arranges itself around a particular 
paradox: how to represent the past from as many angles as possible without 
overwhelming the symbolic apparatus with too much information. Whereas the archive, 
with its strict design and impulse to categorise, cannot handle the diversity of history, 
Doctorow’s text suggests that a more suitable, and indeed ethical, curational mode is the 
blind narrative, a strategy employed by the novel itself. This style of writing refuses to 
view itself as definitive and totalising and weaves through time without exact route. As 
such, it leaves its account open to addendum and complication by refusing to submit the 
past to a final ordering, and thereby acts as a balm for the threat of information overload 
instead of buckling under its weight.  
 Jennifer Egan’s A Visit from the Goon Squad, the subject of Chapter Four, 
thematises the digital archive more explicitly than the preceding novels. Through its 
formal qualities and its narrative content, the novel offers a stridently Foucauldian 
critique of the database as a technique of subjection. Manuel DeLanda summarises 
Foucault’s thinking on police and medical records as surveillance technologies, which, 
he argues, intensify with the primacy of digital records: ‘It is not a matter of interiorized 




compulsorily fabricate an objective identity for us.’95 Just as Goon Squad shears its 
characters of agency through what I define as its database form, within the narrative 
itself the digital archive stages the subject’s capture by institutional structures. As the 
novel hints, this move relies on an acculturated belief in data as the dominant stuff of the 
self so that, once someone’s information has been captured within their databases, 
institutions possess that person in a seemingly elemental sense. Against database 
surveillance, its persistent mapping of human geography, the novel advocates for the 
necessity of silence and of gaps for creative thinking. Goon Squad undermines the 
notion that the simplistic grammar of digital data can legitimately capture human 
subjectivity and advises a return to material collection. Objects, the novel implies, 
provide an inscrutable and perishable memory bank, a location where the owner’s 
biography and personality can hide within hieroglyphics that decompose over time. As 
such, the novel suggests that material collections undercut the clarity of data and the 
theft of personal information through which database surveillance operates. 
  Doctorow’s and Egan’s novels both warn of possible dangers presented by 
digital technologies and archival structures. These threats of information overload and 
database surveillance, they suggest, can also be neutered through the creative application 
of alternative curational methods that either accommodate the wellspring of data or 
obscure the ever-penetrating lens of panoptic structures. These novels, then, instead of 
recommending the wholesale abandonment of self-archiving, propose specific modes of 
participation in response to the particularities of contemporary digitised life. 
 A series of common tropes can be traced throughout all of the chapters, and I 
will conclude this introduction with a discussion of two of them: vision and domesticity. 
A curious similitude binds Auster’s, Hustvedt’s, and Doctorow’s novels: they all 
orientate the archive in relation to blindness. In Auster’s text, archiving provides a 
means of making seeable the traumatic event that initially could not be witnessed or 
understood, while Hustvedt’s and Doctorow’s novels are narrated by blind men, their 
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diminished eyes accenting their curational styles. Theories of the archive frequently 
meditate on its visual qualities. Esther Leslie notes that Walter Benjamin considered 
collecting as a kind of telescope, a means of ‘revisioning’ the past, ‘seeing more closely 
and seeing anew.’96 Meanwhile, Krzysztof Pomian argues that the collection renders the 
invisible—the distant or the conceptual—present and visible.97 The texts in this 
dissertation show the archive to light up hidden details or information while, at the same 
time, critiquing the limits of visual knowledge. The archive, in Auster’s and Hustvedt’s 
novels, functions as a corrective for the eye’s failure to see the moment of trauma or the 
internal self. The blind narrational style employed by Doctorow purposefully refuses 
visual knowledge, finding in the absence of its verification a strategy for archiving that 
repudiates the fantasy of total knowledge. Egan’s Goon Squad, although it does not 
consider blindness as such, does structure its analysis towards undermining the 
burgeoning surveillance apparatus of the database. It advocates the opacity of material 
collection as a form of resistance, arguing that, unlike fields of data, which we have 
imbued with a false clarity, objects cannot be easily inspected and read by outside 
sources. If the archive can illuminate, Egan also recovers in it a strategy to hide.  
 Derrida argues that the archive always dwells under ‘house arrest,’ and the 
novels analysed in this dissertation similarly organise their personal archives around the 
health or decline of the domestic space.98 Daniel Miller and Peter Schwenger both point 
out that the interior design of a home crystallises the personality of its owner, giving 
shape to the subject who organises it.99 Jean-François Lyotard, however, situates the 
home and the archive at cross-purposes. The domus, his figure of the ideal family home, 
forms an idyll where memory, left uninscribed, disseminates through narratives, 
gestures, and routines.100 The city, or megalopolis, uproots this family haven, while the 
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public archive it brings with it denudes memory, managing the past by transcribing it.101 
For Lyotard, then, the arrival of the archive signals the end of organic memory and the 
vibrancy of the domus. These theories, taken together, establish a dialectic between the 
archive as home-producing and home-destroying, one which recurs across in this 
dissertation. Setting his novel after the housing crash, Auster establishes the archive as a 
temporary memory site when the home can no longer be relied upon for stability. Egan, 
in a digital moment when intimacy spirals more and more outside of the physically 
proximate, reinstates the domestic archive, although, like Auster, she does so as a 
purposefully temporary location. Whereas in Hustvedt’s novel, the collection provides a 
means of ordering the house and the self, Doctorow reveals the hazard it can bring to 
both, killing the brothers while dismantling their mansion. These novels suggest that, at 
a time when the stability of the home is under threat—by globalisation, by the housing 
crisis, by digitisation—the archive might form an alternative anchor for the subject and 
its memories. At the same time, they contemplate the purpose of a site that fixes the 
subject in space, troubling its ability to adapt over time.  
 The presentation of the archive in these novels as both a pernicious and a 
productive source for home-making overlaps with their treatment of the archive as a 
technology of self. Novels of the contemporary American milieu vouch that turning 
towards the archive can produce an array of subjective effects, shoring up or 
endangering the self, integrating or overloading it, revealing, hiding, or even destroying 
it. In their analyses, these novels acknowledge the critical role that the personal archive 
plays in fashioning the contemporary self, on and off digital platforms. They offer up a 
catalogue of warnings and recommendations for self-curation, and it is the project of this 
study, in the pages that follow, to decode their counsel.  
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Archiving Trauma and Financial Collapse 
in Paul Auster’s Sunset Park 
 In a 2008 article, Paul Reyes documents his time working with his father’s 
‘trashing out’ crew in Florida, hired to empty vast numbers of houses foreclosed during 
the recent ‘credit crunch’. Reyes approaches these homes as texts to be deciphered, 
attempting to decode from their often-decrepit interiors the stories of the evicted: 
I begin to pick, sweating nearly every item we throw away, creeping among gadgets and notes and 
utility bills and photographs in order to decipher who lived there and how they lost it, a life 
partially revealed by stuff marinating in a fetid stillness. It is a guilt-ridden literary forensics, 
because to confront the junk is to confront the individuality being purged from a place.102  
In each case, the owner’s biography fills up their objects even as they lose possession of 
them, abandon them, even disavow them: one man refuses help retaining any of his 
possessions, calling that stuff—pictures and letters—‘trash.’103 Paul Auster’s Sunset Park 
begins in the same Florida wasteland, its protagonist Miles employed in the same 
‘trashing out’ profession, forming a photographic archive of the objects he encounters. 
Auster’s novel is similarly concerned with the status of the object as a carrier for the self 
at a time when things, the physical structures that house them, and the financial 
structures that enable their accumulation, have all become vulnerable. It casts the 
significance of collecting as a process of memorialisation rather than simply the 
accretion of objects themselves, and explores archival forms that self-consciously 
eschew the material world and challenge consumer capitalism. Writing just before the 
publication of Sunset Park, Jonathan Boulter argues that ‘Auster’s late novels figure the 
archive as the central site, or affect, where loss is catalogued and (possibly) 
metabolized.’104 Sunset Park returns to this central theme, highlighting the significance 
of the archive to shelter objects, to make sense of the past, and to address unsettling 
events in a traumatic moment when the familiar milieu of the home has been ravaged. 
 Within the realities of the financial crisis, Auster discovers a historical setting in 
which his long-term interest in the tropes of the Freudian uncanny play themselves out. 
Freud defines the unsettling feeling of uncanniness as the coincidence of the homely 
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(heimlich) and the unhomely (unheimlich), flickers of familiarity in the unfamiliar, the 
haunted house providing its most literal embodiment. Freud decides: ‘this uncanny 
element is actually nothing new or strange, but something that was long familiar to the 
psyche and was estranged from it only through being repressed.’105 The uncanny return 
of the repressed, in Freud’s essay, constellates around a series of figures that recur in 
Sunset Park: eyes, coincidence, houses, the unhomely, and the return home. Auster 
explicitly calls upon Freud’s uncanny in ‘The Invention of Solitude’ to explain the 
feeling of unhomeliness that results from serendipitous occurrences. These moments of 
unexplainable coincidence, he suggests, momentarily expel us from habituated 
perception, hinting at a latent worldly order while concealing its workings.106 Scott 
Dimovitz argues that this early engagement with the uncanny contours Auster’s 
treatment of chance in the novel Leviathan, in which the uncanny also facilitates 
viewing subjectivity as neither wholly unified nor fully decentred.107 Roberta Rubenstein, 
likewise, calls Freud’s essay ‘an influential intertext’ to Auster’s The New York Trilogy, 
in whose tripartite structure she sees a process of doubling and repetition emblematic of 
the uncanny.108  
 Sunset Park contains a surfeit of uncanny symbols, with its emphasis on broken-
down homes and returning home from exile, on lustrous eyes and eyes that fail to see, 
and on eruptions of contingency and disaster. The novel also contemplates an uncanny 
replacement instrumental to the functioning of capitalism: the replacement of the subject 
by its objects. Freud’s essay calls upon the writing of Ernst Jentsch, who argues that the 
uncanny arises in ambiguous moments when inanimate objects appear animate and 
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animate beings appear object-like.109 Bill Brown, quoting Marx and reflecting on Jentsch, 
notes, ‘the commodity form itself depends on “the conversion of things into persons and 
the conversion of persons into things”’.110 The novel literalises this subject-object 
replacement when Miles convinces the sisters of his underage lover, Pilar, to allow her 
to move in with him by gifting them luxury objects from his ‘trashing out’ job: ‘In other 
words, Pilar now lives with him because he bribed the family. He bought her.’111 Sunset 
Park ponders the uncanny slippage between subject and object attendant to capitalism, 
its melancholic moorings made apparent when owners are no longer there to speak for 
themselves, their possessions forced to stand in for the evicted and the dead. This 
subject-object confusion surfaces most readily in the possessions that litter the 
foreclosed houses, which Miles decides to photograph and archive. Scattered amongst 
the uncanny, abandoned structures, objects no longer arrange the memory of their 
owners into a meaningful system. Miles, I argue, turns his camera on them to re-imbue 
the crumbling structures and crumbling lives with order while commemorating the 
traumas of the financial crisis that might otherwise go unseen. 
 The archive, as Boulter suggests in Auster’s other recent novels, is 
predominantly invoked in order to contend with trauma.112 If Miles’s photographic 
archive sheds light on the financial collapse, so too does it provide a means of 
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addressing his own personal trauma, his stepbrother’s death, for which he feels an 
ambiguous sense of responsibility. Within Sunset Park, all traumas, personal and 
communal, create an uncanny milieu, spoiling the previous security and familiarity of 
the home, and the housing crisis is paradigmatic of this trope. Whereas the crisis evicts 
people from their homes, Miles’s personal trauma sours his relationship with his father, 
Morris, and stepmother, Willa, and he devotes himself to a life of exile. In the novel, 
personal traumas, like Miles’s, contain the added uncanny element of compromised 
eyes: Freud links the fear of losing one’s eyes to the repressed anxiety over castration.113 
Miles’s photographic archive, when reviewed alongside the archive of his Brooklyn 
squat-mate Ellen, approaches the traumatic event through the visual mode. Trauma, I 
argue, threatens the eyes both because the accident cannot be viewed in the moment that 
it occurs and because, in causing the victim to withdraw into themselves, it complicates 
the possibility of face-to-face encounters. The archive, for both Ellen and Miles, 
redeems the eyes, galvanising a new understanding of the past and the reinvigoration of 
communal life.  
 The archive, I argue, forms a temporary home, a haven in which to encounter and 
come to terms with the traumatic past, to re-familiarise uncanny surroundings and to 
heal corrupted eyes. Walter Benjamin, in his essay on book collecting, compares the 
collector’s library to ‘one of his dwellings, with books as the building stones’.114 While 
here the collector takes refuge in his objects, the temporal logic of Sunset Park undoes 
the archive’s stability. Rita Felski notes a pervasive ‘vocabulary of anti-home’ within 
theoretical writing on modernity, questioning the ethics of maintaining a stable and 
enclosed milieu, particularly in a post-World War II historical era.115 The financial crisis, 
by throwing the house into crisis, registers this critique and necessitates finding flexible 
sites to use as anchors of the self, the archive providing one possibility. Threatened by 
change and marked by death, the collection’s sanctuary can exist only temporarily. In a 
financial-collapse era of unpredictable change, where the future seems especially 
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opaque, Sunset Park considers the prudence of conceptualising subjectivity as an 
archival form. The artists Renzo and Mary-Lee, each embodying the archive of their past 
works, move anxiously from project to project, wary of the future but unmoored from 
the past and its various disasters. Their talent for changing roles, evinced by their 
archive of work, reaches fulfilment in the young Pilar, who is figured both as the 
uncanny return of others’ squandered hopes and an embodied archive with camera-like 
eyes. Pilar poses two potential modes of struggling through an era of persistent crisis: to 
form relationships only for them to traumatically crumble, or to remain inaccessible to 
others and ricochet from performance to performance. The novel, then, figures archival 
malleability as the only way to contend with the traumatic temporality of the 
contemporary moment while simultaneously admitting and revealing its melancholy 
core.  
 
Broken Homes and the Terrain of Trauma 
Within the contemporary environment of Sunset Park, the home and the family 
find themselves in constant peril. The endangerment of the home coalesces most overtly 
around the representation of the financial crisis, with Miles hired to empty out 
foreclosed residences, many of which have been vandalised by their former owners. 
These dilapidated and vacant structures, which index the home’s degradation materially, 
mirror the novel’s many broken families. Moments of trauma within the novel, both 
personal and collective, throw the domestic unit into crisis and demand either re-
establishing an orderly home-space or learning to do without the comforts of familiarity. 
The novel’s focus on the broad crisis of the home after the housing crisis, emphasises 
the question: if the home stands as a basic site of belonging, what happens when we are 
forced to abandon it? With the family and the house in ruins, Sunset Park turns to the 
archive as site of temporary stability, where the self can be contemplated and, more 




There has been some debate about Auster’s representation of the domestic space. 
Mark Brown cites family as a primary, albeit unstable, locus for the forging of self.116 In 
The New York Trilogy, for instance, Brown identifies two ‘[s]ites of familial calm and 
stability, [...] the apartment of ‘Paul Auster’ and his wife ‘Siri’, [which] operate as oases 
of hope for alienated characters.’117 Writing more generally about his early oeuvre, 
however, Charles Baxter identifies pessimism about the capacity for identity-formation 
to occur around the family unit, arguing that, for Auster, ‘family is more a source of loss 
of identity.’118 Both the forging of the domestic sphere and its loss are themes common to 
Auster’s work. Richard Patteson, reflecting on Baxter’s article, notes that ‘homelessness 
goes hand in hand with the unraveling of identity in several of his most important works, 
including The New York Trilogy, Moon Palace, and Timbuktu.’119 This precarious 
positioning of the self in relation to the home, the loss of the external space becoming 
the loss of interior identity, is frequently seen as indicative of Auster’s deconstruction of 
the idea of the home. Richard Swope argues that The Trilogy ‘critiques an entire cultural 
logic whose production of space hinges on its very notion of “home.”’120 Swope aligns 
his own argument with Steven Alford’s suggestion that the belief in home as a specific 
place is an ‘original misunderstanding’ possessed by some of the characters in The 
Trilogy.121 Theirs is a failure to identify home as ‘an anchoring point, but one whose 
spatial location depends on the other of “awayness” (and its spatial location, like our 
selfhood, may change through time without losing its character as “home”).’122 For 
Alford, the notion of home as a moveable site facilitates the healthy adaptation and 
evolution of identity that permits its continuation across time.  
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In Sunset Park, the domestic sphere—the house and the family—is atomised and 
uncontained. The novel’s various families are almost all fractured by divorce, death, or 
spatial dislocation, breaks that for the most part predate the financial collapse. Miles’s 
parents are divorced, his mother living in California and his father in New York, while 
he nomadically wanders the United States. The deaths of her first-husband and, later, her 
son have demolished Willa’s family, and Pilar’s is similarly divided. After her parents’ 
deaths, Pilar leaves the family house to live with Miles while her sister’s husband lives 
in danger as a soldier serving in Iraq. Angela, another of her sisters, threatens to turn 
Miles into the police for his illegal relationship with the underage Pilar when he refuses 
to steal more objects for her from his ‘trashing out’ job. Of Morris’s friends, Renzo has 
two failed marriages behind him, while Marty and Nina suffer the suicide of their 
daughter. Miles dooms Willa and Morris’s union because it is ‘an artificial family, a 
constructed family’ (21). Willa’s now-dead son Bobby retained his birthfather’s 
surname, making him, to Miles, ‘both a brother and not a brother, both a son and not a 
son, both a friend and a foe’, in other words a definitively uncanny set of relations (22). 
When stranded on a rural highway, Miles pushes Bobby into the road where he is struck 
by a car and killed. This accident, which ultimately sends Miles into self-imposed exile, 
registers as an assault on their unsteadily built family. It sits as one of the novel’s two 
primary traumatic events, the other—Ellen’s pregnancy by a sixteen-year-old and her 
subsequent abortion and suicide attempt—likewise confuses her relationship with her 
parents and terminates the advent of a potential family that would have arrived too soon. 
Moreover, the financial crisis becomes explicitly responsible for the separations of two 
families. Mary-Lee’s third husband must reside on the West coast, where he teaches 
film, because the economic climate has undone the independent movie market in which 
he used to participate (193). Meanwhile, Alice cannot rely on her parents for financial 
help, because they are ‘living on their Social Security checks and clipping coupons out 
of the newspaper in a perpetual hunt for bargains, sales, gimmicks [...]’ (89).  
In Sunset Park, the financial crisis shares with the personal wounds suffered by 
Miles and Ellen comparable traumatic symptoms and strategies for renewal: it catalyses 




which are addressed, I shall argue, through a process of archiving. Paul Crosthwaite 
suggests that, according to Jacques Lacan’s definition, financial crises qualify as 
traumas, horrifying and inconceivable because they are at once built into the human-
made capitalist infrastructure yet operate outside of human control. Financial crises, he 
argues, erupt from ‘a “third nature” that we have constructed but that we cannot touch, 
see, master, or, frequently, comprehend.’123 Crosthwaite notes, however, that financial 
crises are unique, and particularly difficult to represent symbolically, because they lack 
overt physical destruction, ‘being disasters in which no thing is destroyed.’124 Dominick 
LaCapra differentiates between structural trauma, which is built into the process of 
subject-formation, and historical trauma, which results from a particular occurrence of 
violent loss. While the financial crisis would, alongside other epochal events, qualify as 
a historical trauma, LaCapra notes the tendency to think of major events as structural 
traumas proper to an entire people or community. Indeed, the eventless-ness of financial 
crises, theorised by Crosthwaite, does strain this rubric, but LaCapra argues that while it 
is tempting to think of large-scale historical traumas as structural to the self’s 
organisation, they ‘might instead be seen as posing the problematic question of identity 
and as calling for more critical ways of coming to terms with both their legacy and 
problems such as absence and loss.’125  
Within Sunset Park, the financial crisis, as a historical trauma, broadly threatens 
familiar orientations of the self and demands the re-examination of social structures that 
surround it. Alice, one of Miles’s squat-mates, provides an extended analysis of trauma 
through her commentary on the film The Best Years of Our Lives, which portrays the 
collapse of social conventions when soldiers returned from World War II. Her 
dissertation argues ‘that the traditional rules of conduct between men and women were 
destroyed on the battlefields and the home front, and once the war was over, American 
life had to be reinvented’ (96). In the aftermath of the War, soldiers ‘have lost their 
appetite for domesticity, their feel for home’ (98). In this newly strange setting, the 
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configuration of relationships needs to be re-imagined, the traditional structures of 
domesticity having become unfamiliar. While the return from combat has transformed 
the national home uncannily into alien terrain, particular wartime ordeals render the 
soldiers traumatically speechless. Alice recognises this condition in her own grandfather, 
who, she notes, ‘speaks only in the foggiest generalities, it simply isn’t possible for him 
to talk about those years’ (103). The struggle to communicate after being wounded 
repeats in Miles and Ellen. Alice later notices that Miles ‘is incapable of making small 
talk, and refuses to share his secrets with anyone’, indicating ‘that he walks around with 
an inner wound that will never heal’ (236). Within Sunset Park maturity comes from a 
process of wounding. Miles, as a child, observes as much in his reading of To Kill a 
Mockingbird: ‘until you are wounded in some way, you cannot become a man’ (185). 
Alice construes age similarly, identifying Miles as a ‘man’ and her boyfriend Jake as a 
‘boy’, discerning Miles’s traumatised status—that he ‘has been to war and has grown 
old’—even though she has no knowledge of his past or the death of his stepbrother (237-
38).  
Alice notes that silence seems distinctly absent from her contemporaries, 
specifically Bing and Jake, even if they are suffering the aftershocks of the financial 
crisis and struggling to establish a stable domestic space amid the financial crunch (104). 
Yet, the financial crisis does produce a voiceless population. Andrew Lawson notes, 
‘Sunset Park charts a newly revealed landscape of class, where a precariously located 
middle class begin to sense their own economic vulnerability and structural affinity with 
the working class. But the poor are still not accurately seen, contextualized, or regarded 
for very long.’126 Like the ‘crash fiction’ classified by Daniel Mattingly, Sunset Park 
demonstrates a sustained focus on the middle class at the expense of an in-depth 
portrayal and consideration of working-class struggles.127 Rather than view this critical 
absence as a representational failure, I suggest instead that, when viewed alongside the 
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novel’s own meditations on the silencing effects of trauma, the evicted cannot appear to 
narrate their despair precisely because they are the most violently affected by the market 
downturn. Although they go unrepresented within the novel, their stories are approached 
through their abandoned objects. Miles photographs the object remains of the 
dispossessed to access and to capture their stories when they are not themselves present 
to speak them. The absence of the working class from Auster’s novel can be read as 
highlighting their unspeakable, traumatic position following the financial collapse, their 
stories approachable not through narrative language but the visual impact of their 
objects. 
As in Alice’s reading of the post-World War landscape, the financial collapse 
undoes the home’s stability and produces the effect of traumatised silence. The collapse 
of the previous social order manifests itself not only in the atomisation of the family but 
similarly in the literal destruction of the home, and we shall see that Miles’s archive 
performs the work of saving their stories of loss and lending some cohesion to the 
destroyed homes. The houses that Miles is hired to empty are sites of abjection, ravaged 
by their previous owners out of frustration, and even when they are left in pristine 
condition they nevertheless register an uncanny effect: ‘even if he is not always gripped 
by revulsion when he enters a house, he never opens a door without a feeling of dread’ 
(4). David Harvey insists that, within a chaotic postmodern culture of ceaseless 
innovation, ‘The home becomes a private museum to guard against the ravages of time-
space compression.’128 Rita Felski in turn argues that, filled with mementos and 
memories, the home ‘in its very familiarity becomes a symbolic extension and 
confirmation of the self.’129 Pilar leaves the family house following her parents’ deaths 
for precisely this reason, because it ‘is filled with too many memories of her mother and 
father’ (10). Indeed, it is the very feeling that domestic objects bear evidence of their 
owners’ lives that brings Miles to document the foreclosed homes he trashes out. 
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The houses that Miles encounters, however, have often been vandalised by their 
owners, who frequently deface the objects evocative of their former lives. Miles is 
struck, upon entering, ‘by the disarray and the filth, the neglect’ (4). He finds everything 
‘from the open taps of sinks and bathtubs overflowing with water to sledge-hammered, 
smashed-in walls or walls covered with obscene graffiti or walls pocked with bullet 
holes’ (4). The homes Miles trashes-out lack any semblance of arrangement, their 
destitution and abjection denoting the demolition of familiarity instigated by the 
financial crash. Gillian Whiteley describes waste as ‘the equivalent of Bataille’s spittle. 
It offends our desire to categorise and classify the world which, of course, is one strategy 
for keeping the world under control.’130 Overflowing with water, their walls levelled, the 
foreclosed homes do not organise what they are meant to house, resonating explicitly 
with Julia Kristeva’s definition of the abject as that which ‘does not respect borders, 
positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite.’131 ‘[T]he piles of shit 
deposited on the living room floor’, emblematic of the Kristevean abject, stress both the 
ruination of these homes and their resistance to order (4). As the rubble of the financial 
crisis, they fittingly embody Tim Edensor’s description of the ruin as a site of ‘disorder 
and hybridity’ that can both house melancholy and energise ‘new forms, orderings and 
aesthetics’.132!Thus we see in the ruined, unheimlich houses an echo of the atomisation of 
the family unit. Both domestic space and filial structure no longer function to contain the 
family and its possessions. The aftershocks of financial collapse, then, require new 
structures for belonging, including the Brooklyn squat that Bing, Miles, Ellen, and Alice 
inhabit.  
Juxtaposed against these visions of uncontrolled dispersal is what Alison Kelly 
terms the novel’s ‘reiterative itemization’, its many lists, archives, encyclopaedias, 
filmographies, and ‘[n]umerous further catalogues’.133 These archival forms are all 
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technologies of containment and categorisation, beginning where the house and the 
family has failed, organising and shielding the subject in the wake of the domestic crisis. 
Most obvious of these catalogues is Miles’s self-termed archive of photographs taken of 
objects left behind in the houses he is hired to empty:  
Each house is a story of failure—of bankruptcy and default, of debt and foreclosure—and he has 
taken it upon himself to document the last, lingering traces of those scattered lives in order to prove 
that the vanished families were once here, that the ghosts of people he will never see and never 
know are still present in the discarded things strewn about their empty houses. (3) 
Whereas the evicted ‘have all fled in haste, in shame, in confusion,’ Miles’s photographs 
denote the narratives of collapse hidden in the scenes left behind (3). I want to suggest 
that Miles’s archive comes about as a response to the destruction of the home, instituting 
order where the house is now impotent to control its contents.  
Susan Sontag argues that, emerging during the ascendency of the nuclear family, 
the family photo album displays a larger, extended domestic unit ‘to memorialize, to 
restate symbolically, the imperilled continuity and vanishing extendedness of family 
life.’134 Photographs, for Sontag, provide the last breath of extended family cohesion, 
struggling to display broad familial intimacy against its historical loss. Miles’s archive 
acts as a family album in absentia, resisting the physical destruction of the domestic 
space by photographing and memorialising its remains. The archive is by its very 
definition a technology of containment and categorisation. Paul Voss and Marta Werner 
note that an archive ‘confers order on its contents and creates a system whereby an 
official record of the past may be preserved and transmitted intact.’135 Framing and 
preserving objects within the borders of the photograph and the archive, Miles works 
towards restoring the boundaries of the ruined houses he encounters in Florida, to 
provide the sense of order that has been lost in the housing crisis. While he sees no 
underlying purpose to this venture, Miles’s impetus to photograph, his sense that a story 
can found within the objects left behind, hints that he is, however inadequately, trying to 
preserve and display the traumatic story of the financial collapse that its victims cannot 
speak themselves.  
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Miles’s archive, in addition to addressing these collapsed homes of the financial 
crisis, also psychologically contends with the destruction of his own family life. Years 
after the death of his stepbrother, Miles exiles himself from family after overhearing his 
father and stepmother ruminate over his cold, unfeeling demeanour.136 Miles leaves 
home due to the belief that he has corrupted his family unit, and he produces his archive 
in Florida when a sense of being at home is not possible, where ‘his apartment is a 
shabby little nothing of a place’ (10). Upon his move, Miles likewise thinks of his stay 
in Brooklyn ‘as a six-month prison sentence’ from Pilar who remains in Florida, and 
there he produces his second archive, photographing the Greenwood Cemetery ‘to forget 
that he is a prisoner serving out his time in a dreary part of Brooklyn’ (121, 135). Thus 
we see the personal archive arise out of a need left bare by the destruction of the home, 
its ruination elicited by communal and personal traumas alike. In the next section I 
address the personal archive as a means of confronting trauma, of rebuilding the home 
by, crucially, healing the eyes of the traumatised. 
 
Archival Working-Through  
 Miles’s archive provides one means of buttressing the crumbling homes of the 
financial crisis, offering a platform to remember and order their various objects. The 
photographs, however, must also be treated as a response to Miles’s own traumatic past 
and the relinquishment of home that it catalysed. I argue that the archive, by mirroring 
the repetitive temporality of trauma, presents a mechanism for addressing the traumatic 
past. In her interpretation of The Best Years of Our Lives, Alice notes that after years of 
battle the returned soldiers ‘have been cut off from their civilian past, crippled, trapped 
in nightmare repetitions of their experiences, and the women they left behind have 
become strangers to them’ (98, my emphasis). The repetition of wartime events is 
indicative of the Freudian repetition compulsion, the unconscious drive to reenact a 
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traumatic event that cannot be integrated into memory. Cathy Caruth explains: ‘the 
experience of a trauma repeats itself, exactly and unremittingly, through the unknowing 
acts of the survivor and against his very will.’137 The status of melancholic repetition, 
however, remains somewhat obscure in Freud’s writings. LaCapra notes that 
melancholic attachment to the lost object appears, for Freud, to be both a necessary part 
of and an obstruction to mourning.138 For Freud, the repressed past can be accessed, and 
thus dealt with, by providing the repetition compulsion ‘some sovereignty’ in the space 
of psychoanalysis, allowing its expression ‘to reveal to us everything in the way of 
pathogenic drives that have hidden themselves away in the patient’s psyche.’139 LaCapra 
develops Freud’s concept of ‘working-through’ trauma by situating ‘acting-out’—that is, 
compulsive repetition—as an inseparable part of the process of social rejuvenation that 
often never ceases to exert itself.  
 LaCapra defines his process of ‘working-through’ against the tendency to see 
only two results from traumatic repetition: achieving total mastery over the event, 
thereby surpassing and even forgetting it, or remaining ceaselessly stuck amongst the 
damaging repetition compulsion. Against this binary, LaCapra posits a system of 
‘working-through’ in which ‘acting-out’ is often never fully exceeded: ‘Possession by 
the past may never be fully overcome or transcended, and working-through may at best 
enable some distance or critical perspective that is acquired with extreme difficulty and 
not achieved once and for all.’140 LaCapra argues that mourning, as one form of working-
through, functions through habituated and controlled repetition: 
In line with Freud’s concepts, one might further suggest that mourning be seen not simply as 
individual or quasi-transcendental grieving but as a homeopathic socialization or ritualization of the 
repetition compulsion that attempts to turn it against the death drive and to counteract 
compulsiveness—especially the compulsive repetition of traumatic scenes of violence—by re-
petitioning in ways that allow for a measure of critical distance, change, resumption of social life, 
ethical responsibility, and renewal.141  
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Rather than offering total redemption and separation from the traumatic event, working-
through facilitates the return to communal life and the evacuation of the traumatic event 
to a past historical moment. If, during melancholic attachment, the traumatic event still 
feels bound up with the present moment, working-through signals its consignment to the 
past even if it continues to exert pressure on the subject. This form of working-through 
is consistent with the transformations undergone by Miles and Ellen. Debra Shostak, 
employing LaCapra’s schema, argues that many of Auster’s novels reveal an 
engagement with narrating and overcoming trauma, the narratives structured ‘according 
to the psychoanalytic pattern of acting-out and working-through associated with the 
process of mourning.’142 Shostak lists The Red Notebook’s collection of ‘true stories’ as 
one instance in which an Auster character attempts to analyse and control trauma after 
its occurrence.143 The collection, I suggest, becomes the predominant site of traumatic 
working-through in Sunset Park, Miles’s and Ellen’s archives facilitating a cathartic 
cycle of repetition.  
 Both Jean Baudrillard and Jacques Derrida highlight the repetitious temporality 
of the archive. Baudrillard affiliates the collection with ‘“habitual” patterns’, which, by 
breaking time into repeatable and discontinuous routines, ‘dispel the anxiety-provoking 
aspect of the temporal continuum and of the absolute singularity of events.’144 By 
imbuing sequences of objects with historical resonances, the collector can repeatedly 
replay the past and, thereby, achieve mastery over time’s seemingly inexorable forward 
movement. Derrida argues that, housed according to a governing principle, the archive is 
premised on the condition of repetition and remembrance. Derrida couches his 
exploration in Freudian theory, linking the archive with the repetition compulsion, 
which, he contends, condemns the archive to eventual destruction.145 Herman Rapaport 
argues that, in Derrida’s account, the archive repeats the traumatic event ‘in such a way 
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that the trauma can be mastered.’146 The archive permits the articulation of trauma but, 
because it is doomed to collapse, Rapaport concludes that it also ensures the eventual 
erasure of that traumatic reenactment. I explore Baudrillard’s and Derrida’s theories at 
length in Chapters Two and Three, respectively. Here, however, I want to emphasise 
their shared conceptualisation of the archive as an arena where the past is self-
consciously repeated and reorganised to contend with its latent anxieties. As such, I 
propose that the archive can provide a theatre for working-through the traumatic past 
through its considered and staged reenactments. 
 Sunset Park positions the archive’s rehabilitative potential in its relationship to 
vision. The novel presents a sustained focus on eyes—Ellen’s lustful eyes, Angela’s 
contemptuous eyes, Pilar’s unblinking eyes, Herb Score’s injured eye—evoking the 
uncanny fear of losing eyes that Freud links to the anxiety over castration. This threat to 
the eye is literalised in Score’s and Miles’s grandfather’s devastating eye injuries. Like 
Mark ‘the Bird’ Fidrych, whose baseball career ends ‘in the blink of an eye’ (43), Herb 
Score’s career is unpredictably cut short by a baseball that strikes his eye (32). While 
Score’s vision does return, his baseball career never recovers. The damage done to the 
eye at the moment of trauma corresponds to the belated temporality of the traumatic 
event. Caruth argues that the event of trauma is never fully discernible at the moment of 
its sudden occurrence but can only be known through its subsequent reenactments.147 As 
a theatre for traumatic repetition, the archive permits a form of working-through 
precisely because it allows the subject to engage with, and thus to come to terms with, 
that which was previously hidden. In Sunset Park, the moment of trauma, we shall see, 
throws the sufferer’s relationship to vision into disarray, and the archive provides for 
both Miles and Ellen a means of retraining and stabilising their degraded eyes. In 
restaging their traumatic symptoms, the archive, as LaCapra writes of working-through, 
allows them to achieve a new distance from their past.  
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 Miles’s photographic archives—first, of the material residue of the financial 
crash and, later, of gravestones in the Brooklyn cemetery—both respond to his uncertain 
involvement in his half-brother’s death and the ensuing unrest within his family. The 
novel invests Bobby’s death and Miles’s implication in it with an enveloping blindness. 
Stranded on a country road, the two boys get into an adolescent spat that ends with 
Miles’s shoving his stepbrother into the road where he is hit by a passing car. At the 
moment when Miles pushes his stepbrother, he is blind to the approaching car: it ‘was 
suddenly visible after rounding a sharp curve at fifty miles an hour, visible only when it 
was already too late to prevent his brother from being hit’ (25). Miles’s involvement in 
the crash and his inability to witness it with any certainty comprise the traumatic hold 
that the event has over him: ‘The entire story of his life hinges on what happened that 
day in the Berkshires, and he still has no grasp of the truth, he still can’t be certain if he 
is guilty of a crime or not’ (18). Like the unfamiliar home front following the War and 
the ravaged Florida houses following the Crash, the traumatic event of Bobby’s death 
registers as an assault on the family. The accident literally injures the family unit, but it 
also fractures the relationships between Miles, Willa, and Morris. Several years after the 
accident, Miles overhears his father and stepmother diagnosing his cold and shut-down 
demeanour: ‘They were chopping him into pieces, dismembering him with the calm and 
efficient strokes of pathologists conducting a postmortem, talking about him as if they 
thought he was already dead’ (29). This non-encounter, in which Miles remains out of 
sight, results in his decision to desert his parents and functions as the culmination of 
Miles’s earlier trauma. 
 Miles’s impetus to repeat the moment of trauma is observable in a variety of 
forms. Just before Bobby dies, he announces his intention to abandon the family: ‘he 
was through with them and wouldn’t be coming back’ (24). It is precisely this decision, 
however, that Miles courts after hearing his parents discuss his detached introspection. 
Remaining out of contact with his parents for years, Miles performs the desires that his 
dead brother could never achieve. It is in the archive, however, where these repetitions 
surface most fervently. In his review of the novel, André Alexis observes that Miles’s 




provocative observation at any length.148 I argue that Miles’s confrontation with trauma 
is enacted primarily in the mode of the visual, his wounds resulting from a failure to see 
and his archive in turn founded as a way to rehabilitate the gaze. Unable to witness the 
oncoming car or to know with any certainty his responsibility for Bobby’s death, the 
accident throws Miles’s vision into crisis. This crisis repeatedly produces encounters 
with asymmetrical gazes, the first of which is Miles’s non-encounter with Morris and 
Willa. If Miles could not adequately observe the moment of Bobby’s demise, he 
similarly cannot see Morris and Willa as they dissect his behaviour, and their failure to 
lock eyes facilitates what feels to Miles to be a personal attack. Miles decides, then, ‘to 
disappear’ because ‘he didn’t have the courage to face them again’ (29). The novel is, in 
many ways, a story of learning again to ‘face’ people, to meet their gaze, and it is 
precisely the failure to do so that characterises Miles’s depressed nomadism.  
Throughout his photographic venture, Miles is, for various reasons, wary of 
being seen by others, repeating the asymmetry of vision that animates the non-encounter 
with his parents. He is cautious, for instance, of dropping Pilar off at school or showing 
her affection in public, fearing onlookers will alert the police of his illicit relationship. 
Of Angela, Pilar’s sister, Miles admits, ‘He doesn’t like how she keeps looking at him, 
scrutinizing him with that odd combination of contempt and seductiveness in her eyes’ 
(40). Miles is similarly suspicious of the brightness of the Florida sun, whose 
illumination he characterises as harsh and damaging: ‘It is a Machiavellian sun in his 
opinion, a hypocritical sun, and the light it generates does not illuminate things but 
obscures them’ (7). When he arrives in Brooklyn, Miles remains wary of Ellen’s eyes, 
which betray her erotic interest: ‘If only she wouldn’t stare at him so much, he might be 
able to warm up to her a little, but her eyes have been on him ever since they sat down at 
the table’ (128). Miles’s desire to remain out of sight emerges most fully in the form of 
his ongoing engagement with Morris and Willa through the intermediary of Bing. 
Although he refuses to contact his family, Miles continues to receive updates on the 
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goings-on in New York through his friend, keeping an eye on them but from an 
indiscernible distance. Bing, unbeknownst to Miles, also informs Morris and Willa of 
Miles’s whereabouts. This set-up repeats the dynamics of the non-encounter that initially 
sent Miles into exile. In neither case do parents and child ‘face’ each other, and this 
becomes most explicit in Morris’s journey to reconnect with his son, observing Miles 
from the safety of his car seat. This pattern recurs as Morris continues to track his 
movements through Bing’s tips, ‘always watching from a place where he couldn’t be 
seen’ (178).  
Sunset Park makes explicit the optical dimension of Miles’s archive. While 
Miles does not provide a coherent meaning behind his photographic venture, ‘he senses 
that the things are calling out to him, speaking to him in the voices of the people who are 
no longer there, asking him to be looked at one last time before they are carted away’ 
(5). While the objects beckon to be gazed upon, they also provide a conduit for Miles to 
revisit psychologically his parents from the distance of his exile. Krzysztof Pomian 
argues that, by displaying objects from distant places and times or by materialising 
intangible concepts, a collection’s predominant function is to act as a conduit between 
the visible world and invisible world.149 While in Pomian’s account the collection can 
mediate contact with a distant setting through the transportation and curation of objects 
from that time and place, Miles’s archive achieves a similar wormhole effect through 
items metaphorically linked to the home he left behind. Miles’s archives significantly 
feature scenes of abandonment: ‘There were the abandoned things down in Florida, and 
now he has stumbled upon the abandoned people of Brooklyn’ (133). Just as he stays 
abreast of his parents’ struggles through his informant, photographing abandoned objects 
functions as a stand-in and a preparation for actually contacting his parents. In this 
sense, Miles is photographing the ruins of his own family, the people abandoned when 
he ran away. Each picture addresses another thing deserted by owners who have, like 
Miles, ‘fled in haste, in shame, in confusion’ (3).  
Attempting to make sites of familial abjection and abandonment visible, to 
restore order to destitute dwellings, Miles appears to be psychologically readdressing his 
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own damaged family through these Florida substitutes. His project is, on the one hand, 
invested in rendering the usually occluded traumatic moment visible through its material 
remnants and in psychologically revisiting his distant parents through a material 
telescope. Yet, his photographic endeavour remains couched in an archival form that 
repeats the lopsided vision that trails his post-trauma psyche. Baudrillard conjoins sight 
and the archive when he suggests that what appeals to many collectors is the ability to 
fashion, and thereby to control absolutely, the collection’s meaning. While human 
relations involve confrontation, objects, for Baudrillard, cannot resist the personal 
identifications projected onto them: ‘you can look at an object without it looking back at 
you.’150 Composing the blind archive, for Miles, becomes an attempt to regain control 
over the faculty of vision whose failure in the moment of crisis, the ‘blind corner’ 
around which the car appeared, produced his trauma. Thus, Miles’s archive arises as a 
comfortable location where he can determine what he sees while evading the eyes of 
spectators. 
In Miles’s archive we witness an attempt to rehabilitate the gaze, thrown into 
crisis by a traumatic occurrence that could neither be seen nor known. This crisis 
unbalances his family and brings about a scalding moment of asymmetrical vision, an 
uneven optical configuration that recurs in the archive. While the archive functions as a 
repetition of this traumatic vision, it also enables other kinds of sight, the registration, 
for instance, of traumas of the financial crash and a removed point of view on the family 
he left behind. The repetitive process of archiving, I suggest, ultimately permits Miles to 
meet the gazes of others once more. The success of his archival project to memorialise 
abandoned objects and forgotten people, to recover lost vision, is made clear in the 
novel’s conclusion. After assaulting a police officer, Miles, under the guidance of his 
father, determines not to run away again but ‘to stand up and face the music,’ to meet 
with Morris and ‘hash it out in person, face to face’ (306). This comment emphasises 
Miles’s transformed vision and his renewed capacity to face others, to meet their eyes.  
 Ellen is the novel’s other principal archivist, creating a collection of drawings 
through which she routes her sexual energy. An affair with an underage boy leads to an 
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abortion and suicide attempt, leaving Ellen depleted and uncertain of her future, keen for 
a return to her lost vibrancy but unsure of how to counter her psychological malaise: 
‘She wants her senses to be awake, to think thoughts that don’t vanish the moment they 
occur to her, to feel alive in all the ways she once felt alive’ (106). Like Miles, Ellen 
reawakens socially—that is, works through her trauma—through recourse to an archive, 
composing a series of drawings whose nature changes as she becomes increasingly in 
touch with her desires. Before eventually composing erotic sketches, Ellen’s paintings, 
like Miles’s pictures, focus on objects in isolation, attempting to ‘evoke the mute wonder 
of pure thingness’ (115). Ellen’s turn away from objects and towards erotic scenes 
distinguishes her project from Miles’s archive. Ellen insists on the creativity of her 
project because unlike photography, which ‘leaves nothing to the imagination’, drawing 
‘dwells exclusively in the realm of the imagination’ (218). The status of the hand 
demonstrates another distinction between the two characters: whereas Ellen’s hand 
embodies her creativity—‘the essence of the work resides in her hand’—Miles’s hands 
bring destruction and trauma, shoving Bobby to his death and, later, punching a police 
officer (215). Despite these differences, Ellen’s archive mirrors Miles’s in its restoration 
of her vision. 
 Ellen characterises her traumatised listlessness in terms of overwhelming lust 
and loneliness. Ellen’s hunger for physical contact emerges in uncontrollable and 
undesirable sexual fantasies that crowd her vision when in public, her eyes involuntarily 
stripping people of their clothing: ‘Sometimes she even goes so far as to imagine herself 
pausing to slip her tongue into the mouth of each passerby, each and every person who 
falls within her sight [...] in an orgy of indiscriminate, democratic love. She doesn’t 
know how to stop these visions. They leave her feeling wretched and exhausted’ (109). 
Whereas Miles could not stand being looked at, Ellen’s traumatised position is one of 
obsessive and uncontrollable voyeurism. Not only does Miles avoid Ellen because her 
enduring stare so obviously betrays her erotic interest in him, but her insistent eyes also 
disrupt her sleep, seemingly opening of their own volition: ‘She can’t remember the last 
time she managed to sleep for six full hours, six uninterrupted hours without waking 




compensates for her longing through masturbation, and her system of mourning can be 
tracked from the solitude of her sexual activity to the rediscovery of a partnership. 
 The origin of Ellen’s melancholy, her sexual encounter with her sixteen-year-old 
tutee, registers as an unobservable moment in which she abstains from participation: 
she was beginning to feel drowsy, drowsy enough to lean back her head and close her eyes for a 
few seconds, perhaps ten seconds, perhaps twenty seconds, and before she was able to open them 
again, young Mr. Samuels had moved over to her side of the sofa and was kissing her on the 
mouth. She should have pushed him away, or turned her head away, or stood up and walked away, 
but she couldn’t think fast enough to do any of those things, and so she remained where she was, 
sitting on the sofa with her eyes closed, and allowed him to go on kissing her. (112) 
Ellen, like Miles, cannot properly encounter the traumatic moment through her visual 
faculty. Whereas Miles precipitates the event through a violent outburst, Ellen passively 
sanctions intercourse when she could have, and feels retrospectively that she should 
have, put a stop to it. Indeed, it is precisely the action that killed Bobby—pushing—that 
Ellen says she failed to perform to put an end to the encounter. This discrepancy in the 
moment of trauma explains the distinctive repercussions to Ellen’s vision. Her 
impotency to control the sexual scenes that overload her field of vision mirrors her 
passive authorization of her encounter with Ben. Whereas the sexual contact with Ben 
was illicit but desired, her erotic mirages turn towards the grotesque. 
 Ellen’s trajectory of working-through and her archival pursuit both centre on 
recovering a compromised relationship to her body, which invokes a new relationship to 
sight.151 Miles infers Ellen’s depression from her muted exterior appearance:  
Ellen was not an unattractive woman. Her body was trim, her face was pleasant to look at, but she 
projected an aura of anxiety and defeat, and with her too pale skin and flat, lusterless hair, he 
wondered if she wasn’t mired in some sort of depression, living out her days in an underground 
room at the Hotel Melancholia. (79)  
Ellen’s archival working-through registers in both a renewed intimacy with her own 
body and a rejuvenated sexual life: she ‘overhauled the outward trappings of her person 
in order to express the new relation she has developed with her body, which is a product 
of the new relation she has developed with her heart, which in turn is a product of the 
new relation she has developed with her innermost self’ (291). Ellen’s mourning process 
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reflects Elizabeth Grosz’s treatment of the body as ‘the very “stuff” of subjectivity.’152 
Grosz employs the figure of the Möbius strip to describe the relationship between mind 
and body, for its aptitude at showing ‘the passage, vector, or uncontrollable drift of the 
inside into the outside and the outside into the inside.’153 Ellen’s archiving achieves its 
desirable endpoint by repeating the overwhelming sexual imagery of her promenades on 
the contained space of the sketchpad. If her trauma and its subsequent repetitions are 
characterised by an inability to control sight, I argue that Ellen’s collection harnesses her 
vision.  
 Ellen’s archive is comprised of sexual pictures that she quickly sketches, based 
on photos she gleans from pornography magazines and the inspection of her own body 
with a mirror, imaginatively refashioned according to her own impulses. These scenes 
develop from an initial aesthetic fragmentation of the body to its recomposition in 
intimate combinations. The initial, atomised stage of this process evokes the description 
of Miles’s impetus to leave home, when Morris and Willa perform their symbolic 
dissection of his personality. Similarly, when Miles is forced to leave Pilar, he tells her, 
‘You mustn’t go to pieces’ (121, emphasis in original). This process of fragmentation 
appears as a prerequisite for Ellen to rebuild herself and her sketches into coherent 
entities.  
 Ellen begins her artwork by alienating herself from her body, symbolically 
slicing it into parts. This in-depth contemplation involves breaking down the hand into 
‘its slender fingers and rounded nails, the half-moons above the cuticles, the narrow 
wrist with its small bump of bone sticking out on the left side,’ and so on (117). In her 
later sessions, Ellen works up to copulative depictions by drawing the body’s parts in 
isolation—‘A page of hands. A page of eyes. A page of buttocks’—before ‘mov[ing] on 
to whole bodies’ (217). From there, she sketches highly sexualised scenes reminiscent of 
the fantasies that previous barraged her on the street. Whereas in real life Ellen haplessly 
endured their bombardment, through the engine of the archive she devises these tableaux 
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imaginatively and adapts her artistic style to capturing the frenzied rush with which they 
arrive: ‘There is no time for painting now. Drawing is faster and more tactile, better 
suited to the urgency of her project, and she has filled sketchbook after sketchbook this 
past month with her attempts to break free of her old methods’ (217). Unlike her 
previously unassertive conduct, she commits to ‘forc[ing] her strokes to become bolder 
and more expressive, more gestural, more wild if need be, as wild as the wildest thought 
within her’ (116). Here, the archive revisits the erotic visions that previously 
overwhelmed Ellen but equips her with the resources to channel those scenes onto the 
sketchpad. 
 Crucially, like Baudrillard’s collection, whose blindness I linked to Miles’s 
photographs, Ellen’s drawings are incapable of returning or confronting her gaze: ‘These 
are intimate portraits, she tells herself, not erotic drawings, human bodies doing what 
human bodies do when no one is watching them’ (218). As such, the archive appears to 
fulfil the voyeurism that plagues Ellen on the street and when interacting with Miles, but 
it does so in the mediated archival environment in which her obsessive gaze can be 
managed. After drawing from magazines and from her own body, Ellen finds a human 
subject for her work in Bing, who poses for her in the nude. Whereas her fervent eyes 
troubled Miles, Bing revels in being the object of Ellen’s focus: ‘he trusted her, he 
hadn’t known how much he would enjoy being looked at in this way’ (222). Ellen 
submits eroticism to scrutiny, tracing Bing’s increasing self-stimulation until she allows 
him to ejaculate into her mouth. This arrangement, wherein Ellen trades sexual contact 
with Bing for the opportunity to draw him, seems ideologically troubling; however, 
Ellen notes that ‘the contact is comforting to her, and she takes pleasure in it as well’ 
(223). This modicum of bodily pleasure, coupled with its investment in her artistic work, 
appears as the ultimate stage before Ellen makes over her body and achieves a return to 
sexual fulfilment. 
 Shostak suggests that the characters of Auster’s Moon Palace overthrow the 




epitomised in the act of walking.154 Ellen achieves this return to embodiment through her 
pictorial investigations of the body and of sexuality. When she initially commits herself 
to the study of the body, Ellen observes her own hand, ‘studying it until it no longer 
seems attached to her body’ (117). This self-alienation leads her to discovering ‘a new 
way of thinking. The human body is an instrument of knowledge’ (217). This return to 
embodiment comes from the dislocation of vision from the eyes to the creative hand: 
‘whenever she manages to lift herself out of herself and put her mind in abeyance, she 
can will that hand to see’ (215-6). This collision of the subjective and the objective—the 
object that can see—ultimately premises a return to bodily pleasure through a reunion 
with Ben Samuels, the young boy who had impregnated her. Their relationship is 
squarely based on corporeality: ‘he isn’t terribly bright’, but she ‘can’t get enough of his 
body’ (296). Ellen’s renewal is, somewhat troublingly, energised by and shaped around 
the sexual desires of someone else. She credits the renovation of her attire with Ben’s 
return, and she has her hair cut ‘because Ben is aroused by the back of her neck’ (293).  
 The reanimation of a melancholic woman by a savior-man is, of course, 
ideologically problematic. However, here I would emphasise that Ellen rebuilds herself 
not so much for the sake of her partner but for the sake of her own sexual pleasure, 
and—to repeat—this can only occur because ‘of the new relation she has developed with 
her innermost self’ (291). Indeed, the pleasure that she derives from Ben matches the 
comingling and confusion of corporeality and subjectivity that occurs in her archival 
contemplations: ‘He turns me inside out’, she narrates (296). Ellen’s newfound relation 
to the body brings with it a changed sense of the visual. The embellishment of her body 
indicates her overarching revitalisation: she ‘no longer projects an aura of victimhood 
and skittish uncertainty’ (292). Whereas Ellen was previously whittled down to her 
involuntarily oppressive, voyeuristic eyes, she now takes pleasure in being the object of 
the gaze: ‘heads turn when people walk past her, and she exults in the attention she 
receives, exults in the knowledge that she is the most desirable woman in the room’ 
(292). Like Miles, who at the end of the novel learns to re-face his parents and the 
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police, Ellen, too, having reigned in her uncontrollable eyes, learns to re-engage in 
intimate encounters, to be both the owner and the subject of the gaze.  
 Ellen’s traumatic cycle, like Miles’s, involves the destruction of and then return 
to a kind of home. While her suicide attempt throws her relationship with her parents 
into disarray, Ellen’s pregnancy and abortion stem from a family that arrived too soon: 
sex with a desirable partner who was underage and a pregnancy that came at too young 
an age. Her return home is to the same family, to the partnership with Ben, but years 
later when their age difference no longer seems significant: ‘Those four years are a lot 
less important today than they were back then’ (296). Shoshana Felman, over the course 
of ‘Education and Crisis, Or the Vicissitudes of Teaching’, demonstrates how testifying 
to traumatic events, while never comprehensive or complete, can reach towards a form 
of catharsis.155 Alongside the visual renovations that I detailed above, the process of 
working-through undergone by both characters lead to moments of testimony that, while 
demonstrating what LaCapra terms ‘critical distance’ on the past, nevertheless fail to 
completely come to terms with it. For Miles, this means remaining unable to uncover his 
own responsibility for Bobby’s death. Morris responds to Miles’s revelation that he 
pushed Bobby into the road: ‘is there anything that needs to be forgiven? Probably not. 
But still, he must be forgiven’ (277). The clemency that Miles seeks must come with full 
recognition of the past’s indecipherability. Ellen, similarly, confesses the identity of her 
aborted child’s father to Alice but recognises that despite their reunion Ben should still 
never learn of the pregnancy: ‘There’s no point in telling him, is there?’, she asks (296). 
These two moments of testimony evince forms of working-through by denoting a turn 
towards accepting the past’s inscrutability. Miles and Ellen, I have suggested, realise this 
shift in different but related ways through recourse to the repetitive archive, which 
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The Crisis of Futurity 
 The temporal framework of Sunset Park is one of unpredictable change, in which 
damaging events might occur at any moment. Not only, as I have shown, do these 
traumatic changes compel the production of archives but they also threaten their 
integrity. Ann Cvetkovich argues that trauma ‘demands an unusual archive, whose 
materials, in pointing to trauma’s ephemerality, are themselves frequently ephemeral.’156 
The archive, in Sunset Park, can only exist as a temporary refuge, because it inevitably 
comes to be marked by death, and this is made clear through the novel’s treatment of 
baseball and its archive, The Baseball Encyclopedia. The contemporary moment has 
been characterised by a difficulty of communication and a deficiency in common 
knowledge: Fredric Jameson identifies postmodernism with ‘a linguistic fragmentation 
of social life’, such that there remains no common language but only private dialects, 
while Jeremy Green suggests that authors write within a field where the reader’s 
knowledge and the value of literature can no longer be assumed.157 Writing within this 
semantically isolated milieu, Auster frequently links baseball to stability and 
community.158 Baseball stands as ‘a universe as large as life itself’, providing a discourse 
that overcomes generational divisions for Miles, Morris, and Morris’s father (45, 183); a 
topic of communication that transcends class for Miles and Eddie (41-46); and a ‘wholly 
neutral subject, safe ground’ over which Miles and Morris reacquaint themselves (276). 
The baseball archive, notably, supplies a language through which to address trauma 
circuitously when it cannot be broached explicitly. His father, Morris notes, periodically 
referred to Herb Score’s eye injury throughout his life, although he never mentioned his 
own identical wound that kept him safe from wartime conscription: ‘Never a word about 
himself, never the slightest hint of any personal connection’ (164).  
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 While The Baseball Encyclopedia compiles a malleable language, its terms 
become increasingly muddied by death. Those figures that featured prominently in Miles 
and Morris’s baseball mythology gradually perish over the course of the novel, the 
Encyclopedia increasingly looking like a graveyard or, as Morris narrates, ‘the roster of 
the fallen’ (285). Most significant of these deaths is that of Jack “Lucky” Lohrke who, 
early in the novel, Miles calls, ‘the mythic embodiment of a theory of life that contends 
that not all luck is bad luck’ (35). Lucky Lohrke’s good fortune, however, must 
eventually run out, like that of baseball’s other stars, until the Encyclopedia resembles 
Oracle Night’s 1937-38 Warsaw phone directory, a ‘book of ghosts.’159 Baseball, and the 
archive more generally, can provide a haven from trauma only briefly, until its eventual 
permeation by death, enunciating an anxiety over the future that overlaps with the 
novel’s, and baseball’s own, investment in the return home. Miles’s and Ellen’s 
processes of working-through, as I showed in the last section, precede a return home, 
either to Morris or to Ben Samuels. Marjorie Garber links baseball to the return and the 
uncanny: she suggests ‘that the uncanniness of the return home, the simultaneity [...] of 
the heimlich and the unheimlich, [...] is persistently literalized in contemporary 
American culture through the figure of baseball, [...] in which “greatness” is figured as 
the capacity to control the return home, through the agency of the “home run.”’160 
Ultimate success in baseball is a player’s departure and subsequent return to home base. 
While the return home on the one hand demonstrates working-through, in Sunset Park, 
the blood-soaked pages of the Encyclopedia also denote an anxiety over the inevitability 
of a fatal accident from which there is no return. So too does Miles encounter another 
icon of the return homeward, the Wizard of Oz, interred in the Brooklyn cemetery.161 
Even if ‘there is no place like home’, that home must eventually be made inaccessible by 
death. Thus, we see figured in The Baseball Encyclopedia the archive’s inability, within 
the temporal climate of the novel, to resist being stained with death and bereavement. 
The opportunity of the archive to withstand melancholy, then, can only be temporary. 
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 Lucky Lohrke’s demise articulates a suspicion over the future, that good luck can 
only persist for so long, an insight that overlaps with the operation of chance in the 
novel. Auster is known for making chance an organising feature of his fictional worlds. 
He has stated, in an interview, ‘In the strictest sense of the word, I consider myself a 
realist. Chance is a part of reality: we are continually shaped by the forces of 
coincidence, the unexpected occurs with almost numbing regularity in all our lives.’162 
Brendan Martin quotes this reply when detailing the abundance of randomness in 
Auster’s fiction, arguing that his characters frequently take shape around their responses 
to coincidence.163 In Sunset Park, Miles frequently attributes key moments to 
meaningless chance: that his return to New York occurs at the same moment his mother 
is performing in the city is ‘[j]ust another roll of the dice, then, another lottery pick 
scooped out of the black metal urn, another fluke in a world of flukes and endless 
mayhem’ (56); his first encounter with Pilar is ‘purely accidental’ (8); and the situation 
leading to Bobby’s death occurs ‘for no special reason’ (20). These examples 
demonstrate the novel’s overt concern with ‘the imponderables of fate, the strangeness 
of life, the what-ifs and might-have-beens’ (34). I argue, however, that the novel betrays 
a pattern in its representation of chance. Scott Dimovitz, writing on Leviathan, notes, 
‘By opening himself up to contingency, an Austerian character inevitably loops back 
into a system of correspondences that will take the character where he needed to go.’164 
That is, Auster’s characters tend to secure a sought-after future by ceding choice to 
randomness. In Sunset Park, a complementary logic applies: characters, in shutting 
themselves off to the workings of chance, in articulating a desired future to be worked 
towards, actually close off the potential of achieving that aspiration.  
The first instance of this pattern occurs in Miles’s recollection of Bobby’s death. 
Bobby’s final speech announces his intention to forsake his family when he leaves for 
college. Bobby dies just after voicing these future plans, nullifying any chance of 
realising his desires. This pattern arises again and again in the text. As soon as Miles 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
162 Paul Auster, interviewed by Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory, in Conversations with Paul Auster, 
ed. by James M. Hutchisson (Jackson: The University Press of Mississippi, 2013), pp. 13-39 (p. 13).  
163 Brendan Martin, Paul Auster’s Postmodernity (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 35-6. 




determines to marry Pilar and reject Bing’s invitation to live in Sunset Park, Angela’s 
blackmail compels him to abandon Florida and install himself with the squatters (39-40, 
52). Alice spends the three years of her PhD immersed in research: ‘she has rarely 
thought about what would happen to her after she reached the top’ (289). Just when 
Alice determines to remain in New York after graduating, her dissertation is destroyed 
when police officers invade the squatters’ residence (302). Shortly after Miles re-enrols 
in college and makes plans for Pilar to move with him to New York, he assaults the 
police officer and sacrifices that future: ‘with one punch he has destroyed everything, 
they will never have their life together in New York’ (307). Morris observes, following 
his reunion with Miles, that ‘it is best to refrain from writing another person’s future,’ 
but in Sunset Park, narrating your own future appears equally perilous (279). 
This crisis of futurity, the structural impossibility of imagining and realising a 
desired future, is congruent with the novel’s figuring of children. Of all its women 
characters, Pilar is most resistant to motherhood: ‘She would rather slit her wrists or 
jump off a bridge than get herself knocked up’ (15). Her position emerges from firsthand 
observation, her sister’s baby representing only time wasted babysitting and changing 
diapers when she could be alone or studying (10). Mary-Lee’s descriptions of 
motherhood emphasise boredom with baby Miles and verge on the grotesque: ‘the 
smothering tedium of it all, the incessant wailing, the wet, yellow shit in the diapers, the 
puked-up milk, the howls in the middle of the night, the lack of sleep, the mindless 
repetitions’ (258). Lee Edelman argues that in American political discourse the Child, 
emblematic of the future, is ‘the fantasmatic beneficiary of every political 
intervention.’165 Cultural life, he suggests, is structured around the presumed needs of 
children, nurturing them for a time-to-come that is always postponed: there are always 
new children and so the future space for which they are being groomed is perpetually 
deferred. Sunset Park echoes Edelman’s critique of ‘reproductive futurism’, condemning 
childbirth for its naïve investment in the future.166 If children interrupt, for Pilar and 
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Mary-Lee, the necessity of living in the present, so too does the child itself represent an 
unknowable future entity. Morris thinks that Renzo was canny ‘to steer clear of the kid 
business, to avoid the unavoidable mess and potential devastation of fatherhood’ (146). 
Ellen, too, remains wary of introducing children into a tumultuous historical era. Of her 
nephews, she thinks, ‘just two months old and everything still before them in a world 
coming apart at the seams’ (224). While Alice is adamant in her desire to become a 
mother, hers is a minority opinion in a book critical of ‘reproductive futurism’ and the 
innocent endorsement of the Child. 
 In contrast to Sunset Park’s circumspection of childbirth, Christian Lorentzen 
notes that in most boom-and-bust fiction children ‘emerge as the most cherished assets’ 
perhaps because they ‘seem, for a while at least, to be the one asset with unlimited 
growth potential.’167 In this post-crash climate, Lorentzen offers Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never 
Let Me Go as a more fitting representation of the economic present: 
It follows three young people from a dreamy adolescence in what seems to be a privileged boarding 
school into a truncated adulthood that expires as they donate their organs to the barely glimpsed 
society that has created them—these children are clones—to exploit them. [...] It doesn’t take much 
of a leap to see in Ishiguro’s scenario the lifetimes of debt paying and service employment that 
await dreamy children at a time when college tuition swells at twice the rate of inflation.168 
Animated by an anxiety over children, Sunset Park, like Ishiguro’s novel, projects a fear 
over what the future might bring. Lorentzen’s article provides a means of linking Sunset 
Park’s crisis of futurity—in its representation of baseball, of chance, and of children—
with the current financial moment and the failure of speculating on the future. Alissa G. 
Karl similarly argues that, virtual and volatile, ‘finance capital generates narrative and 
aesthetic forms that also hinge upon the generic and systemically necessary crisis.’169 In 
‘finance capital’s narrative pattern’, Karl discovers a logic of ‘awaited crisis,’ a string of 
interchangeable catastrophes filling the text and animating it with an ethos of generic 
disruption.170 Sunset Park, I have argued, similarly exudes an anxiety over a crisis that is 
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sure to arrive eventually. This temporal logic, in which characters are compelled to live 
as though with no future, overlaps with the depleted confidence in speculating on the 
future in post-crisis culture.  
Sunset Park’s nervous foreboding maps onto the temporality of contemporary 
capitalism and, more particularly, the post-financial crisis fears of long-term investment. 
Writing a decade before the bursting of the housing bubble, Arjun Appadurai 
conceptualises the contemporary norm of long-term lending as bolstering a linear sense 
of time:  
large-scale innovations in lending [...] have created an open-ended rather than cyclic climate for 
consumer borrowing: they have thereby linked borrowing to the long, linear sense of a lifetime of 
potential earnings and the equally open-ended sense of the growth value of assets such as houses, 
rather than to the short and inherently restrictive cycles of monthly or annual income.171 
Long-term lending implies a faith in the stability in the future, that the borrower will 
remain employed and secure sufficient money to pay off their debt. When Margaret 
Atwood writes, ‘without story, there is no debt,’ she is suggesting that, since narrative 
takes shape over time, borrowing and lending always imply a time-to-come, a future 
wherein, we hope, balance has been restored.172 The financial crisis, however, represents 
a catastrophe of confidence in these extended lending schemes: a wave of foreclosures 
resulting from a rise in interest rates instigated the financial downswing and contributed 
to further defaults as the housing market crumbled.173 These foreclosures foreground a 
diminished certainty in and control over the economic future. Slavoj Žižek argues that 
‘capitalist investment is, at its very core, a risky wager that a scheme will turn out to be 
profitable, an act of borrowing from the future.’174 The potential for unexpected shifts, he 
suggests, blurs the distinction between safe and risky investments, the unknowable 
future always shadowed by the possibility of collapse. 
 By its conclusion, Sunset Park insists that characters must reside purely in the 
moment without projection forward into the frighteningly opaque future. In the novel’s 
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final scene, Miles heads towards a meeting with his father and the police, and ‘he tells 
himself, he will stop hoping for anything and live only for now, this moment, this 
passing moment, the now that is here and then not here, the now that is gone forever’ 
(308). These concluding remarks form a small portion of a two-page sentence, during 
which Miles realises that he and his fellow squatters ‘are all homeless now’ whilst 
surveying broken down buildings and considering other ‘buildings that no longer exist’ 
(307-8). Georgiana Banita argues that, in this scene, the broken-down structures conjure 
up not only the abandoned homes of post-financial collapse Florida but the absent 
remnants of another national trauma: the Twin Towers. She situates post-9/11 and post-
financial crisis uncertainty over the future—the sense ‘that the future is unwarranted and 
unsafe’—within a larger terrain of trauma in the novel, encompassing both these 
national calamities and Miles’s and Ellen’s personal wounds.175 Indeed, within the novel, 
a state of trauma is coeval with the experience of living without a future. Like his final 
decision to forget about the future, Miles lives his earlier exile in Florida with ‘no clear 
idea of what building a plausible future might entail for him’ (6). Miles, here, is ‘content 
to live in the present and not look ahead’, engineering an ability ‘to confine himself to 
the here and now’ by forgoing material desires (6). Ellen, too, has trepidations about the 
future and the possibility that she will never rehabilitate her psychic wounds: she 
characterises her melancholy as ‘fear of dying without having lived’ (106). When she 
first enrols in art class and experiences some distance from the traumatic event, she only 
then begins ‘to feel that [...] there might be something that resembled a future for her, 
after all’ (114).   
 I suggest that the novel advocates for, while also troubling, the ability to embody 
flexibility and scepticism towards the future through an artistic and archival sensibility. 
However, before turning to that analysis, I detail how both Miles and Bing pursue forms 
of resistance against the onslaught of the future. The capitalist infrastructure portrayed 
within the novel is one of quick innovation and obsolescence. Miles’s characterisation of 
the cultural environment as ‘a world of mega-junk’ and ‘a world of fads and weightless 
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ephemera’, and Bing’s description of our ‘throwaway culture’, gesture towards accounts 
of the chaotic temporality of postmodernity (67, 72). Jameson affiliates late capitalism 
with Lacanian schizophrenia, shattering time into an array of ‘pure and unrelated 
presents’ that cannot be linked up into a seamless flow of events.176 In the time of 
consumer culture, innovation happens at such a quick pace that the present becomes 
disconnected from the past almost immediately. As David Harvey writes,  
In the realm of commodity production, the primary effect has been to emphasize the values and 
virtues of instantaneity [...] and of disposability [...]. The dynamics of a ‘throwaway’ society, as 
writers like Alvin Toffler (1970) dubbed it, began to become evident during the 1960s. It meant 
more than just throwing away produced goods [...] but also being able to throw away values, 
lifestyles, stable relationships, and attachments to things, buildings, places, people, and received 
ways of doing and being.177 
In these accounts, the horizon of the present shrinks as change occurs ever-more quickly. 
Bing recognises a ‘unanimous [...] belief in the notion of progress’ within American life 
(72). Reinhart Koselleck identifies G.E. Lessing’s perfect figure of progress, who 
‘cannot wait for the future. He wants this future to come more quickly’.178 This 
orientation, however, becomes increasingly problematic within the text, where the 
future’s arrival is viewed with apprehension. Whereas Lessing’s figure is confidently 
optimistic about incoming changes and innovations, post-financial crash anxiety installs 
a frightening scene on the horizon of the future. With the future marred by ominous 
uncertainty, characters in Sunset Park do not so much embrace upcoming moments as 
learn to weather them. 
 After Morris suffers a stroke, he imagines his withered body as an embodiment 
of the fear over the future suffered by the employees at his failing publishing house. But 
even within the quickening pace of contemporary capitalist innovation, Bing and Miles 
set out two modes of temporal resistance: the Hospital for Broken Things, where Bing 
repairs outmoded technologies, and the archive, in which Miles photographs the 
remnants of foreclosed houses. Andreas Huyssen and David Lowenthal provide theories 
in which both projects could be analysed as fighting to lengthen the time of familiarity 
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against fast-paced change. Huyssen contextualises both the archive and the repurposing 
of old or vintage technologies within a broader memory culture that ‘express[es] the 
growing need for spatial and temporal anchoring in a world of increasing flux in ever 
denser networks of compressed time and space.’179 Huyssen sees these two practices as 
counteracting the consumer culture’s shrinking of the present, carving out a time of 
stability and familiarity. Lowenthal similarly suggests that physical relics, including 
images as well as objects, establish a sense of commonality between the present and 
what preceded it: they persuade ‘us that the past we recall and chronicle is a living part 
of the present.’180 
 The two projects, however, present contradictory relationships to materiality. 
Bing’s resistance to the speed of change emerges from a philosophy of ‘Tangibility’, 
which holds that across time and space the human community is united by the common 
experience of embodiment, whose same deficiencies are addressed again and again by 
new technologies (73). Bing’s emphasis on shared materiality stands in stark 
juxtaposition with Miles’s photographic project, which is explicitly anti-material: ‘all he 
wants are his pictures—not things, but the pictures of things’ (6). The digital camera is 
an aberration from Miles’s anti-materialism, the one luxury object in which he still 
indulges. Miles rids himself of material desires, part of his project of eliminating 
projection into the future while in Floridian exile. This considered resilience to 
commodities comes through in his archive, its preservation not of the object itself but of 
the image of the object. Baudrillard posits two ‘functions’ that can belong to an object: 
‘to be put to use and to be possessed.’181 Miles, by turning the material into the image, 
eliminates use value for pure display, whereas Bing aims at preserving use value by 
refurbishing and repairing objects as they become outdated. Michael Thompson provides 
a useful taxonomy with which to speak of Bing’s project, suggesting that consumer 
objects are coded according to three categories: transient, the object whose value 
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decreases as it ages, such as an old car; durable, the object whose value increases with 
time, such as the antique; and rubbish, the discarded object waiting to be rediscovered 
and converted from ‘transient’ to ‘durable’.182 By offering a repair service for obsolete 
technologies, Bing struggles to transform them into durables against the pull of 
ephemerality. 
 If Bing’s project seeks to undermine quick obsolescence in the contemporary 
marketplace by keeping old technologies in use, Miles’s photography of abandoned 
objects similarly attacks capitalism through its elimination of use value. Collecting 
possesses a complicated relationship with capitalism and consumption. James Clifford 
notes that while, in the broadest sense, gathering the self together through the 
arrangement of objects is likely a universal endeavour, Western society views this 
subject-object relationship in the capitalist terms of ownership and possession.183 Susan 
Stewart implicates collecting in feeding commodity fetishism, collected objects 
transporting their owners back to the scene of acquisition while obscuring the mode of 
production through which they are created. Collecting objects is, for Stewart, 
‘prelapsarian’, a naive and pure form of consumer participation in which all acquisitions 
are ‘objets de lux, objects abstracted from use value and materiality within a magic cycle 
of self-referential exchange.’ 184 For Walter Benjamin, conversely, divorcing the object 
from functionality rescues it from being tarnished by capitalism: ‘To [the collector] falls 
the Sisyphean task of divesting things of their commodity character by taking possession 
of them. But he can bestow on them only connoisseur value, rather than use value.’185 
Benjamin, like Baudrillard, links collecting with a kind of possession that undoes use 
value, but he argues, too, that freeing objects ‘from the drudgery of being useful’ 
elevates them above the capitalist agenda into the domain of art.186 Benjamin, thus, 
ascribes to the collector the task of ‘renew[ing] the old world’, lending permanence and 
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lustre to outdated objects.187  
 Benjamin’s collector, it is worth noting, is a specimen of the domestic interior, 
using the home as a display case for his wares. While in Sunset Park the domestic space 
becomes endangered by the financial crisis, the archive stands as a temporary asylum in 
which order can be restored. Miles’s photographic venture specifically turns the 
archiving lens on the interior that can no longer accommodate those objects that 
previously performed the work of memory and of self-definition. Read alongside 
Miles’s distaste for material accumulation, his photographs still bear the anti-consumer 
object impulse that animates Benjamin’s noble collector. Miles’s photographs function 
according to two principles: on the one hand, they preserve the memory of market 
collapse, of the destructive impulse embedded in capitalism and its traumatic effect on 
human life, even as they work to re-establish a kind of order within the ruins; at the 
same time, they refuse to shore up the desire for material objects by preserving only 
their image and allowing their skeletons to drift out of sight. Miles, that is, through the 
medium of photography can both archive the past while adhering to a principled 
antipathy to the ethos of consumer consumption.  
 It is possible to differentiate Bing’s and Miles’s projects based on Pierre Nora’s 
distinction between lieux and milieux de mémoire. Miles, in Nora’s terminology, creates 
lieux de mémoire, consciously composed material sites that stabilise memory, whereas 
Bing facilitates a milieux de mémoire, where keeping objects in circulation allows 
memory to evolve organically within everyday life.188 The novel, however, encourages 
us to think of these two tactics together as means of resisting the ever-shrinking horizon 
of the present and the terrifying uncertainty of the future. Significantly, both men 
position themselves against new technology: Miles laments requiring a cell phone for 
work and a digital camera for archiving while abstaining from other new technologies, 
and Bing ‘shuns cell phones, computers, and all things digital’ (7, 72). The novel also 
reveals several crossovers between their two activities. Miles, for instance, takes a job at 
Bing’s Hospital while still pursuing his photographic venture, and while the Hospital is 
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ostensibly invested in the recuperation of failing technologies, Bing nevertheless secures 
‘ninety percent of the money he earns comes from framing pictures’ (73). This 
inadvertent investment in image culture recalls the origin of Bing’s philosophy of 
tangibility and his resistance to technological innovation: ‘Paging through an illustrated 
book about the Dead Sea scrolls one afternoon, he stumbled across some photographs of 
the things that had been unearthed along with the parchment texts: plates and eating 
utensils, straw baskets, pots, jugs, all of them perfectly intact’ (74). These 2000-year-old 
implements, which look ‘utterly contemporary’, suggest to Bing that, despite 
technological shifts, human consciousness has remained largely unchanged across time. 
This epiphany arrives to Bing in a form that marries his own urge to conserve material 
objects with Miles’s drive to turn them into images: a photograph of objects preserved 
for centuries.  
 Both Miles’s and Bing’s projects appear embedded, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, in a critique of the fast-paced turnover of postmodern capitalism made 
frightening by crisis of futurity manifest in the financial collapse. As means of 
resistance, however, they seem doomed to fail. Bing, who explicitly understands the 
Hospital as mode of resisting the mainstream belief in progress, views his rebellions as 
politically futile: they are ‘peevish gestures that accomplish little or nothing even in the 
short run, but they help to enhance his dignity as a human being, to ennoble him in his 
own eyes’ (72). Miles’s archival strategy, too, as I have argued, can only restrain the 
passing of time briefly, like the Baseball Encyclopedia that becomes smeared with 
death. Miles and Ellen’s movements in the novel’s final pages evince the failures of the 
archive and of the home to provide permanent shelter and protection. Fleeing the police, 
the novel’s two archivists take shelter in a graveyard, an archive of the dead and the site 
of Miles’s second set of photographs, before concealing themselves in Ben’s apartment. 
The protective nest of the archive, like that of the home, must ultimately be deserted, the 
novel concluding with Miles en route to a meeting with the police. In this sense, then, 
though they cannot fight off the foreboding future, both renewing technologies and 
archiving them appear as activities directed towards the invigoration of the present 




capacity to restrict the temporal rush of postmodern capitalism, in the final section I 
argue that the novel finally envisions flexibility in the face of the uncertain future as the 
most formidable means of survival. The novel conceives of the characters who pursue 




 In foregrounding the post-financial crisis anxiety over the future, Auster 
formalises a terrain of chance in Sunset Park that he explored in his earlier fiction. 
Alford writes, ‘Auster’s random world is that of a life (or text) lived forward; it’s one 
damn thing after another, with no seeming meaning.’189 By limiting its characters to the 
present moment, Sunset Park positions itself alongside an earlier postmodern narrative 
temporality. Elizabeth Ermarth argues that the language of postmodern narrative 
subverts the historical temporality of realist writing, an expanse of time over which all 
perspectives are united into a form of textual agreement.190 Ermarth contends that 
postmodernism undermines this convention by instituting a ‘rhythmic time’ frequently 
modelled after the collective improvisation of jazz music, which shifts the contours of 
subjectivity:  
Because rhythmic time is an exploratory repetition, because it is over when it’s over and exists for 
its duration only and then disappears into some other rhythm, any “I” or ego or cogito exists only 
for the same duration and then disappears with that sea change or undergoes transformation into 
some new state of being.191  
Unlike Ermarth’s jazz improvisers or Jameson’s schizophrenics, Sunset Park’s 
overriding emphasis on contingency and the unknowable future generates a melancholic 
subjectivity personified by the artist and his or her archive of work.  
 The certainty of future catastrophe generates a particular form of melancholy that 
Sarah Henstra calls ‘proleptic grief’. Henstra defines this concept in relation to the Cold 
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War conviction of imminent nuclear catastrophe, but it echoes Sunset Park’s certainty 
that the future can only entail disaster in an unknown form. She summarises:   
Mourning ‘on hold,’ oriented toward a loss we are sure is coming but cannot prevent, goes beyond 
other kinds of melancholia in confounding the explanatory and curative projects of psychoanalysis, 
which depend on the chronological ordering of trauma (that is, in the past tense) and on the 
elaboration of emotion in symbolic terms.192 
Whereas Miles and Ellen could work through their traumatic histories via the production 
of archives, the uncertain future cannot be approached by the same mourning strategies 
because its specific traumas remain unavailable, yet to transpire. This very 
unknowability, then, requires not recourse to an archive but, as we shall see, figuratively 
becoming of an archive. Auster’s Travels in the Scriptorium presages Sunset Park in this 
respect, linking the writer melancholically with the archive of his work. In the novel, 
characters from Auster’s back catalogue return to put the writer, referred to as ‘Mr. 
Blank’, on trial for the various tribulations to which he subjected them and for 
abandoning them in often-perilous situations. The author, in turn, becomes imprisoned 
in a work of fiction, revenge for his actions as a writer.193 Boulter, thus, argues that 
Travels imbues ‘the author-as-archive’ with melancholy, Mr. Blank haunted by his 
responsibility for the characters he has written and, like them, ‘encrypted within this 
archive, never to die, never to disappear.’194  
 Sunset Park similarly aligns an artistic with an archival sensibility, but in 
Auster’s later novel this union proposes a strategy for coping with the haywire 
contingency of the uncertain future. The artistic mode, enacted by the novelist Renzo 
and the actor Mary-Lee, sees movement between intense, dedicated work on a project 
and periods of anxiety between assignments. Awaiting fresh creative epiphanies or new 
acting jobs, each must live with the feeling that every project will be their last. Morris 
narrates: ‘Renzo is always in a slump, each book he finishes is always the last book he 
will ever write, and then, somehow, the slump mysteriously ends, and he is back in his 
room writing another book’ (149-50). After the most frenzied period of writing in his 
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life, Renzo lives out ‘an anxious repose’ until he is struck by ‘the tiniest germ of an 
idea’, a ‘flicker’ of inspiration (150-51, emphasis in original). Renzo’s mode of living 
from book to book mirrors the conditions for surviving temporal unpredictability more 
broadly. Personifying malleability, Renzo embodies the necessary anxious patience for 
creative renewal that might never arrive. Unlike Mr. Blank, Renzo’s archive of work 
does not haunt him so much as evince his ability to realign himself to new stories and 
new worlds as they emerge. 
 Sunset Park explores this creative orientation more thoroughly through Mary-
Lee, who, like Renzo, lapses into fretful unease during breaks between roles. Miles 
remembers his mother as someone subject to swift switches in mood and recalls that 
between acting jobs she would anxiously hustle for another role or another career 
opportunity (63). These struggles, however, lead to a wide-ranging career filled with 
diverse performances: ‘Mary-Lee has been smart and flexible, willing to reinvent herself 
at each step along the way’ (190). Fashioning a pliant persona forms a particular skill 
and virtue when faced with the perils of an uncertain future, enabling Mary-Lee to 
portray a range of characters. The result is a figuring of Mary-Lee as an archive of acting 
roles, a shape-shifter who, like Miles says of baseball, contains an entire universe inside 
of her: Morris ‘wonders how this attractive but wholly ordinary woman, this woman 
with her fluctuating moods and vulgar passion for dirty jokes, has it in her to transform 
herself into so many distinct and totally different characters, to make one feel she carries 
all humanity inside her’ (191). The successful actor, thus, appears uniquely suited to 
morphing along with the violently variable times because she contains within herself an 
archive of characters, an array of roles played and of potential roles left to cycle into 
when the future demands it. 
 The range of possibility that resides within the artist—different books written 
and characters embodied—transforms them into just the mercurial creature demanded of 
the contemporary subject. This flexibility, borne of an archive of varied artistic 
achievement, carries with it the anxiety of a career perpetually at its end, constantly 
contending with the futureless position to which Miles vows to adhere at the novel’s 




Renzo is the same as Mary-Lee, they are both prisoners of what they do, for years both have been 
plunging forward from one project to the next, both have produced lasting works of art, and yet 
their lives have been a bollix, both divorced twice, both with a tremendous talent for self-pity, both 
ultimately inaccessible to others—not failed human beings, exactly, but not successful ones either. 
Damaged souls. The walking wounded, opening their veins and bleeding in public. (192) 
The quality that allows Renzo and Mary-Lee to thrive as artists and to contend with the 
postmodern terrain of swift changeability also dooms them, at least in Morris’s eyes, to 
despair and isolation.195 In pursuing the only possible relationship to time still viable at 
the novel’s conclusion, Renzo and Mary-Lee reveal both the means and the cost of 
committing to the moment at the expense of the future. 
 Pilar presents the apotheosis of the adaptable subject, and this affiliation is, 
again, figured in archival terms. In her review of the novel, Marlene Watrous argues 
that, in trying to justify their illegal romance, ‘Auster overcompensates for potential 
misgivings, making Miles and Pilar too good to be true.’196 Pilar, she notes, is 
unbelievably vivacious, particularly for a teenager: ‘extraordinarily bright and 
intellectually curious, with brilliant SAT scores and essays that need not one 
correction.’197 In addition to neutering the scandal of their affair, Pilar’s unbelievable 
precocity, I suggest, aligns her with Peggy, a character in The Best Years of Our Lives of 
whom Alice takes special notice. Like Pilar, ‘Peggy is too perfect to be credible as a 
human being—too poised, too good, too pretty, too smart, one of the purest incarnations 
of the ideal American girl she can think of’ (101). Her very perfection, though ‘the 
weakest link in the film’, for Alice, ‘ends up holding the story together’ (101). Pilar 
occupies the same position in Sunset Park, a figure too faultless to be credible who ends 
up encompassing the story’s thematic concerns by most fully epitomising the embodied 
archive of possibility.  
 Alice notes that the mastery of Teresa Wright’s portrayal of Peggy resides 
‘entirely in her eyes and face’ (101). Pilar’s hold over Miles is similarly figured as an 
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ocular matter: Miles falls for her, ‘Because of the way she looks at him, perhaps, the 
ferocity of her gaze, the rapt intensity in her eyes when she listens to him talk, a feeling 
that she is entirely present when they are together, that he is the only person who exists 
for her on the face of the earth’ (14). Morris lends an archival aspect to Pilar’s ‘intense 
concentration’, confident as he answers her barrage of questions ‘that she would not 
forget a word you had said’ (284). This rendering of Pilar as a databank finds fuller 
expression just a page earlier, when Morris subtly evokes a camera in his description of 
her gaze: ‘the dark steady eyes that absorb everything around her, that emit the light that 
has made the boy fall in love with her’ (283). In this description, Pilar literally becomes 
an archiving technology, recording the people around her and the knowledge they have 
to offer. Pilar’s flashbulb eyes gesture towards her position as the uncanny double of the 
other characters, a position she can embody because she is afforded so few plausible 
distinguishing features. With exception to Pilar, the novel narrates at least one chapter 
from the perspective of every main character. Pilar throws the absence of her own voice 
into relief when she observes that The Great Gatsby relies on the ‘compassion and 
understanding’ of its narrator (11). Provided with no occasion to tell her story, Pilar can 
only appear as a cypher, a mirror to the other characters. 
 Throughout the novel, Pilar is figured as a doppelganger, a reproduction of those 
around her. Twice Morris refers to her as the embodiment of possibility, personifying 
the lost potential of Willa and of Suki Rothstein, the dead child of his friends. After Pilar 
decides to attend Willa’s alma mater, Morris narrates: ‘You told her that your wife went 
to Barnard as well, that you saw her for the first time when she was a Barnard student, 
and the torch has now been passed from the boy’s stepmother to her’ (283). For Morris, 
Willa’s studentship at Barnard stands for a time of possibility prior to her catalogue of 
traumas, and he wonders what their life might have looked life if they had married in 
these early days: ‘what if your little dalliance had led to marriage? Result: no dead 
husband, no dead son, no runaway stepson. Other sufferings and sorrows, of course, but 
not those’ (267). Evoking youthful potential prior to the effects of trauma, Pilar 
represents the uncanny return of an earlier moment of opportunity. Morris repeats this 




for Morris, ‘the quintessential embodiment of youthful exuberance and promise’ (141). 
Pilar stands as the second coming of the young Suki, the new ‘promise of youth in its 
fullest, most glorious incarnation’ (282). Pilar in these figurations is, on the one hand, 
the incarnation of indiscriminate potential, and yet that future is always someone else’s 
and never her own to determine.  
 Miles unwittingly envisions Pilar as his own double, illuminating the tension 
between the openness of her prospects and their subsumption by the terms of other 
people’s failures. Pilar emerges as Miles’s doppelganger upon the couple’s first 
encounter, seeing each other in a Florida park while reading the same edition of The 
Great Gatsby (8). I argue, however, that Pilar becomes an extension of Miles and that 
meeting her eyes is a moment of non-seeing, a moment of seeing himself: recall that 
under her gaze Miles narcissistically feels that ‘he is the only person who exists for her 
on the face of the earth’ (14). Pilar mimes the young Miles in her voracious reading and 
devotion to studying. Miles reciprocates by projecting his own lost dreams onto Pilar’s 
future, identifying her with a time before the traumatic death of his stepbrother: ‘He, the 
young man without ambitions, the college dropout who spurned the trappings of his 
once privileged life, has taken it upon himself to become ambitious for her, to push her 
as far as she is willing to go’ (11). Treating her as an avatar of his previous life, Miles 
imagines that Pilar will abandon her desire to become a nurse and instead ‘go on to 
medical school one day and become a doctor’ (12). Medical school, we later learn, was 
one of Miles’s own squandered ambitions (67). Pilar’s future, here, is not one she 
constructs but one that Miles has lost, his past aspirations deferred onto his young lover.  
 On her visit to New York, Miles again figures Pilar in terms that call to mind her 
hopeful future while limiting that future to the language of his own past. In one very 
long sentence, Miles swings from denying that he is ‘telling her what to do’ to ossifying 
her future in his imagination, fixing a picture of her adulthood in his mind: 
he suddenly understood what she would be like ten years from now, twenty years from now, Pilar 
in the full vigor of her evolving womanhood, Pilar all grown into herself and yet still walking with 
the shadow of the pensive girl walking beside him now, the young woman walking beside him 
now. (206-7)  




refuses to vocalise her own intentions, a moment when ‘for once Pilar was silent, not 
willing to share her thoughts with him’ (206). Here we find Pilar’s future once again 
pulled away from her, posited according to the desires of her lover at a time when she 
does not speak, just as she is refused the ability to narrate within the tapestry of the 
novel.  
 Miles also figures Pilar as the double of Mary-Lee’s current stage role, imagining 
that he will guide her into New York gradually, ‘letting her tell him when she was ready 
to go in up to her waist, up to her neck, and if and when she wanted to put her head 
under’ (204-5). Miles’s terminology invokes Mary-Lee’s role in Samuel Beckett’s 
Happy Days, in which she begins the play covered in sand to her waist and, in the 
second act, to her neck. Yet, even Miles recognises that, in reality, Pilar bucks this 
projection, more closely resembling the passionate real-life Mary-Lee than her onstage 
persona. Having researched the city in advance, ‘Pilar ran into the lake with flapping 
arms [...] gliding along as smoothly as a practiced veteran’ (205). Pilar’s passionate 
reaction to city life, her commitment to experimentation, resonates with what Miles 
earlier termed ‘her emotional excesses, her combustibility’ (14). This attitude echoes 
Mary-Lee’s own volatile and intense moods, Morris calling her ‘the queen of excess, the 
Madonna of naked feelings’ (275). The affiliation lends Pilar the same flexible quality 
possessed by Mary-Lee, one reinforced by the young girl’s status as an archive of those 
around her. Recall that Pilar abhors the idea of parenthood and its disruption of the 
future, a disinterest similarly expressed by adaptive artist-archivists Renzo and Mary-
Lee. Pilar, then, stands as one of their kind, and her amorphous nature is at once 
acknowledged and foreclosed by Miles and Morris. 
 In Miles’s and Morris’s imaginations, Pilar stands prior to the future’s 
determining moment, when the present fans out into several options, embodying the 
uncanny subject of Renzo’s essay: ‘the things that don’t happen, the lives not lived’ 
(153). It is for this reason that she is, in her various associations, transported back to the 
time before Miles runs away, before Willa first parts with Morris, and before Suki 
graduates from high school, moments when alternative futures are still possible. In 




to make new choices and arrive at a different future untainted by trauma. This future is, 
in one sense, impotent, only a recapitulation of others’ failures, of moments already 
lived. Yet, the very fact that she can accommodate this universe of comparisons, that she 
can become the archive of so many others, suggests that, like Renzo and Mary-Lee, Pilar 
is naturally equipped to cycle through roles as the future unleashes itself in unforeseen 
ways. Although the open future that Miles and Morris imagine for her is perpetually 
stained by other people’s grievances, Pilar’s own propensity to become an archive, to 
record fastidiously the information imparted to her, suggests a mercurial status, a way of 
resisting those projections and struggling against the traumatic temporality of the present 
moment.  
 Pilar’s final status, however, remains somewhat unclear, evoking the tension 
between two melancholic orientations that the novel never fully resolves: the wounds 
that spring from destroyed companionship and the ones that tarnish a detached lifestyle. 
When Miles compromises their happy future together by attacking the police office, 
Pilar is presented with two options. Threatened with the loss of Miles, Pilar’s easy 
relationship to the future might be traumatically spoiled as she mourns their failure to 
secure a desired future together. Yet, as an embodied archive, Pilar also seems endowed 
with the subjective openness required to spiral towards a yet-unlived and unarticulated 
future, by moving on from Miles and into a new persona. To become an archive, as 
Morris notes, is to be ‘ultimately inaccessible to others’, but it is also to endure and even 





The Archive as Psychoanalytic Mirror 
in Siri Hustvedt’s What I Loved 
 The previous chapter situated archiving within a programme of working-through 
the traumatic past, where recording history photographically or the body artistically 
stages a form of catharsis. This chapter continues this investigation by interrogating how 
acts of curation can imaginatively harness and address the distressing past. Drawing 
significantly on the object relations psychoanalytic literature of D.W. Winnicott and 
Christopher Bollas, this chapter develops the concept of ‘archival play’, in which 
creative interaction with personal objects enables a form of self-analysis involving the 
revelation and interpretation of the collector’s internal world. I make this argument 
through a reading of Siri Hustvedt’s What I Loved (2003), which places an archive of 
play at the heart of self-definition and narration. Its narrator, Leo, collects objects 
abandoned by loved ones as they leave him and, by fashioning them into different series 
and systems, he participates in a game of self-exploration that ultimately produces the 
novel itself. The novel compares Leo with Mark, wayward child of Leo’s friend and 
artist, Bill, and an archetype of antisocial disorder. This chapter views Leo and Mark as 
the embodiments of psychoanalytic concepts put forward by Winnicott and Bollas, 
animating their theories and orientating them around a relationship to the archive.198 
 In his recent writing on the ‘aesthetic subject’, Leo Bersani argues that 
psychoanalysis should move beyond diagnosing the human impulse to assert dominion 
over the material world, to use objects merely as screens for the projection of the interior 
self. Bersani argues: ‘External reality may at first present itself as an affective menace, 
but psychoanalysis—like art, although in a more discursive mode—might train us to see 
our prior presence in the world, to see, as bizarre as this may sound, that, ontologically, 
the world cares for us.’199 The distinction that Bersani draws between object-mastery and 
object-relationship gestures towards the difference between Jean Baudrillard’s and 
Walter Benjamin’s theories of collecting. As Judith Pascoe notes, where Baudrillard 
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stresses the collector’s authority over his or her objects, Benjamin, she insists, ‘imagines 
the owner of an object courting its favor.’200 Benjamin’s mode of collecting, modelled 
after the inquisitive and acquisitive child, encompasses an ethos of creative play. 
Baudrillard, conversely, views each collection as a personal language isolating because 
it is readable only by the collector him or herself. These theories, extrapolated within the 
chapter, provide models through which to explore the collection as a personal mirror, 
play space, and language within Hustvedt’s text. What I Loved, like Bersani, asks what 
might be gained from being attentive to the world’s materiality and its symbolic 
resonances.  
 In an essay on Charles Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend, published just one year 
after What I Loved, Hustvedt details a model of subjectivity premised on the ability to 
narrate the self intelligibly in language. The first step in this process is one of self-
reflection. Hustvedt writes, ‘In order for the self to exist, it must be able to represent 
itself as another, a mirror image, and the recognition of that whole self gives birth to the 
subject.’201 The image of the mirror that Hustvedt calls upon is particularly potent in 
psychoanalysis, and in the essay she undertakes a brief reading of Lacan’s ‘mirror 
stage’. For Lacan, the child’s reflection in a mirror presents it with an image of 
harmony, an ‘ideal-I’, towards which it continues to strive in vain despite its tumultuous 
internal landscape.202 While for Lacan the ‘mirror stage’ establishes an enduring discord 
in the infant, a yearning for unity that can never be achieved, Hustvedt also stresses the 
psychological necessity of attempting to render the self whole even if any such 
conception is spurious or incomprehensive.203 But confronting the mirror image is just 
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the preliminary act of self-creation. Hustvedt contends that, for it to have meaning, the 
mirror image must be translated into the legible register of language, into narrative 
pointed outwards to an interlocutor. Even if we tell our story to ourselves, Hustvedt 
declares, ‘the tale must become comprehensible to a listener.’204 
  What I Loved, I suggest, tracks the same process of self-articulation from 
internal fragmentation to inscribed narrative through the mirror image. In it we find a 
variety of mirrors, including the self-portrait, the hysteric, and the collection, which 
reflect the interior self or mainstream society in a distorted but recognisable form that 
calls out for analysis. Caroline Rosenthal argues that What I Loved ‘stresses that we need 
art and narrative as reflective aesthetic spaces to achieve some kind of a vantage point 
on our lives, however temporary and fragile.’205 My argument departs from Rosenthal’s 
by distinguishing between the novel’s mirroring surfaces—like art, the body, and the 
archive—and its treatment of narrative. Rather than equivalents to language, the novel’s 
artistic, somatic, and archival structures stimulate language through their internal 
heterogeneity. Significantly, Rosenthal’s essay, like most work on What I Loved, fails to 
offer an in-depth consideration of Leo’s collection or his blindness in terms of the 
novel’s broader logic. I argue that Leo’s macular degeneration, by forcing him to view 
the world through his periphery, finds a corollary in the novel’s mirrors, including the 
collection, which similarly facilitate a form of indirect vision that exposes previously 
disguised outlooks.  
 In situating the archive as an intermediary between the undifferentiated internal 
self and the self cohered in narrative, What I Loved complicates Susan Stewart’s 
distinction between the souvenir and the collection. For Stewart the souvenir is a vehicle 
of nostalgia for an event that can never be repeated, ‘generat[ing] a narrative which 
reaches only “behind,”’ whereas the system of classification constructed within the 
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collection overwrites the past with an order of its own.206 Stewart’s theory suggests that a 
collection can never be retrospective but functions only to eliminate the past. As such, 
by reaching back to figures and moments now distant, Leo’s objects seem to form not a 
collection at all but what Peter Schwenger calls ‘an unordered group of souvenirs.’207 
Yet, in the space of Leo’s drawer, the definitions of souvenir and collection rub up 
against each other, articulating a more complex dynamic. As a series of souvenirs 
becomes ordered, as they accumulate into a collection, the affiliations they generate 
spark a transition into autobiographical narration. Mixed and remixed into new 
arrangements, the personal collection stages an arena of personal interpretation in which 
the self, mirrored back at itself through its objects, offers itself up like a dream for 
interpretation. Evoking Krzysztof Pomian’s definition of the collection as a bridge 
between the invisible and the visible, I argue that the archive in What I Loved functions 
as a personal mirror that in distancing Leo from himself, allows him to play with his 
past, metabolise its traumas, and compose a personal narrative that is, for Hustvedt, the 
ultimate sign of subjective health.208   
 
Looking Indirectly 
 Hustvedt is a writer frequently concerned with issues of seeing. Asbjørn 
Grønstad, for instance, observes that her first three novels all begin ‘with acts of 
looking’, specifically with ‘women gazing at the bodies of men.’209 In What I Loved the 
primary visual quandary is what Leo terms ‘[t]he difficulty of seeing clearly’, 
emphasised by his encroaching blindness.210 Hustvedt’s first observation in ‘Notes on 
Seeing’ points in broad strokes to the eye’s deficiencies: ‘To look and not see’, she 
decides, is ‘an old problem. It usually means a lack of understanding, an inability to 
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divine the meaning of something in the world around us.’211 Vision is frequently, for 
Hustvedt, correlative to knowledge, and yet we ought not conclude that Leo’s blindness 
metaphorically points to an intellectual shortcoming.212As Hubert Zapf argues, ‘It seems 
[...] that this external limitation of his vision allows [Leo] to see all the more sharply 
with his inner eye’.213 Indeed, it is only after his eyesight fades that Leo’s life comes into 
focus, that he transforms his past into the narrative that is the novel.214 I argue that the 
particularities of Leo’s blindness point to a way of seeing and knowing that evades the 
problems affiliated with direct observation.  
 That Leo will be diagnosed with macular degeneration is revealed early in What I 
Loved, although his eyesight does not become foggy until the narrative’s primary action 
has ended, one year after Bill’s second wife, Violet, leaves New York. Significantly, he 
does not suffer from a total absence of sight but from cloudiness just in front of him: he 
narrates, ‘I still have my peripheral vision, but directly in front of me there is always a 
ragged gray spot, and it’s growing thicker’ (19). Consigned to see through the margins 
of his visual field, Leo must employ his other senses to gain insight into the world 
around him. He indicates, for instance, that focusing on Lazlo’s voice reveals ‘new sides 
to his cryptic personality—resonances of feeling that I never saw on his face’ (20). Yet, 
this form of blindness, in which Leo cannot look at anything head-on also literalises the 
means for analysing society and the self present elsewhere in the text, by observing them 
indirectly, through their expression in artwork, on the body, and in the collection. We 
might consider this visual strategy akin to Slavoj Žižek’s method of ‘looking awry’: 
staging Lacan’s writings through the ‘mise-en-scène’ of popular culture, he argues, 
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‘renders visible aspects that would otherwise remain unnoticed.’215 In What I Loved, 
seeing peripherally or through mirror reflections sheds light on previously obscured 
domains of society and of the self.216  
 Hustvedt warns that, inured to the habituated rhythms of everyday life, 
conventional vision risks taking note only of expectation. Leo’s initial failure to identify 
Mark’s deceitfulness results from his presumption of and desire for the boy’s honesty: 
‘spectacular lies’, he explains, ‘rely less on the liar’s skill than on the listener’s 
expectations and wishes’ (219). The novel’s third section begins with three anecdotes of 
misrecognition stemming from the collapse of familiar visual cues: after getting lost, 
Leo’s father does not recognise his own house; in a foreign hallway, Leo mistakes his 
own mirror reflection for another man; thinking that he poured himself juice, Leo is 
disgusted by the taste of milk. For Leo, these frissons of estrangement, ‘when the 
familiar turns radically foreign,’ can only occur with,  
a loss of the external signposts that structure vision. Had my father not lost his way, he would have 
recognized his family’s house. Had I known there was a mirror in front of me, I would have seen 
myself immediately, and had I identified the milk as milk, it would have tasted like itself. (254)  
These moments reveal the extent to which preconceptions structure sensual experience. 
Without identifiable markers, these characters fail to register their acquaintance with a 
building, a taste, even themselves. These ruptures produce alienating moments of 
misrecognition that provide rare glimpses of and insights into the familiar uncloaked of 
habituation.  
 In What I Loved, by projecting a virtual double into space, mirrors offer a 
distinctive perspective, often facilitating the viewer to transcend their expectations and 
inspect the world and the self anew. Just as when he fails to recognise his own reflection 
in the hotel hallway, as Leo chases Mark across the country he is surprised by his 
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reflection in these unfamiliar spaces. The mirrors of an Iowa mall confront him with a 
body that is ‘suddenly alien’ (316). Set against a foreign backdrop, Leo is faced with a 
radically changed perspective on himself: ‘Surrounded by the inhabitants of Iowa, I 
looked like a gaunt Jew wandering through a mob of overfed Gentiles’ (316). Leo 
experiences an even stronger sense of self-alienation when he checks himself in the 
mirror after being assaulted by Mark and Teddy Giles. Hunched and decrepit, Leo is 
‘[a]ppalled’ by his reflection, and it provokes an attempt to realign his appearance with 
his own vision of himself, ‘to replace the inhuman stare I had seen in the mirror with a 
man’s gaze’ (328).  
 While the mirror can puncture expectation and facilitate visual clarity, so too 
does it resolve the problem of viewing the self. I noted earlier the link that Hustvedt 
draws between self-narration and mental health, her stipulation that the self exists only 
when it is able to understand itself as ‘a separate and distinct whole being’. 217 Yet, as 
both Leo and Matt note, the self is absent from its own visual field. As the subject gazes 
out at the world, his or her body hides itself in ‘a kind of hole’, meaning that, as Leo 
states elsewhere, ‘I’m only whole to myself in mirrors and photographs and the rare 
home movie’ (129, 255). The confrontation with the mirror, Hustvedt’s ‘mirror stage’, is 
a necessary step towards subjective stability, an image of wholeness that is the gateway 
to a self-narrative, without which we would be condemned to psychosis or, what she 
calls, the ‘morbid fragment.’218 In What I Loved, Mark embodies the inability to self-
narrate, and this failure is tethered to his psychological problems, his incapacity to feel 
empathy. Rosenthal explains that Mark ‘suffers from a personality disorder because he 
cannot integrate the different spaces, and the different demands they make on him, into a 
narrative of self.’219 What Mark lacks, and what Hustvedt and Lacan suggest the mirror 
provides, is a unified angle on the self to then decipher in language. The mirror emerges 
as a palliative to the eye’s failure to capture the subject in its wholeness, a site necessary 
for the self to communicate itself in a language comprehensible to others.  
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 The mirror image, we have seen, generates the possibility of self-interpretation 
by displacing the ‘“I” [to] the position of a “you.”’220 The process of mirroring is not 
confined, for either Hustvedt or Lacan, to the mirror as such but can be performed by an 
array of substances. Baudrillard suggests that ‘as a mirror the object is perfect, precisely 
because it sends back not real images, but desired ones.’221 For Baudrillard, the collection 
is above all narcissistic, reflecting back at the collector an attractive self-portrait while 
establishing in its objects a personal language that ‘has lost any general validity.’222 As a 
result, the collection is a place where melancholy festers because its vernacular is never 
made legible to others. Although What I Loved similarly positions the collection as a 
mirror and imbues it with a linguistic undertow, here the archive’s discourse remains 
hidden even from the consciousness that organises it, requiring meditation and 
interaction to interpret its symbolism. Schwenger writes, responding to Baudrillard, 
‘Whatever general paradigm we may put forth, the narrative of any one collection—or, 
more precisely, collector—remains not only private but largely unconscious. This is not 
to say that such narratives can never be written; they are, rather, a challenge to the skills 
of the novelist.’223 Likewise, in What I Loved, the collection works as a kind of personal 
cipher, allowing Leo to decode the hieroglyphics of his internal domain and, 
subsequently, to synthesise the traumatic departures of his family and friends into an 
autobiographical story. It is through the collection-as-mirror that, I will contend, Leo 
transitions from internal fragmentation to narrative fullness, uniting his past into the 
story that is presented as the novel. Before turning to the collection, however, I first 
analyse the novel’s other reflective surfaces that demonstrate the particular valences of 
the psychoanalytic mirror, which produces narrative paradoxically by hitting up against 
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Artistic Plethora and Representing the Mixed Self 
 When Leo states that, in his art, ‘Bill was hunting the unseen in the seen’, his 
words recall the role Pomian affords the collection, as the vessel between the invisible 
and the visible (13). They also evoke Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s writing on artistic 
practice. Meditating on Cézanne’s paintings, Merleau-Ponty names the goal of the work 
of art: ‘The painter recaptures and converts into visible objects what would, without him, 
remain walled up in the separate life of each consciousness: the vibration of appearances 
which is the cradle of things.’224 While both Bill and Merleau-Ponty call for artwork to 
illuminate the invisible, the content of the unseen and their strategies for approaching it 
divide their thinking. Significantly, Bill positions his work against that of Cézanne and, 
thus implicitly, against Merleau-Ponty: ‘Nothing is clear. Feelings, ideas shape what’s in 
front of you. Cézanne wanted the naked world, but the world is never naked. In my 
work, I want to create doubt’ (12). In Merleau-Ponty’s reading, Cézanne strove to 
achieve the impossible task of painting reality at its most foundational level, capturing 
on the canvas the multitude of sensuous registers beyond just the visible traces of a 
scene.225 Bill, however, envisions no stable and accessible substance underwriting the 
visible world. Rather, for Bill, the visual field takes shape around the spectator’s 
particular emotional and intellectual terrain. Instead of Cézanne’s totality of senses, he 
argues that the purpose of art is to portray the uncertainty of every act of visualisation, to 
produce doubt.226  
 The passage of art from personal mirage to public object is, we might recall, 
similarly the process of self-creation outlined by Hustvedt, the imagination of the self as 
a stable whole followed by its articulation in language. But while Bill does experiment 
with more linear forms, his Self-Portrait, the first of his works that the reader 
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encounters, is not constructed of narrative language. This, for Leo, is ‘the paradox’ of 
the work, that while it attempts to represent ‘invisible movement’, it does so ‘in 
figurative painting, which is nothing if not a frozen apparition—a surface’ (13). 
Hustvedt, in her own writing on art, similarly differentiates painted work from literary 
narrative based on their temporalities. Whereas on a canvas every element ‘is there all at 
once’, novels, she contends, ‘are meaningful only as a sequence of words’.227 Hustvedt’s 
poet-narrator in The Summer Without Men makes a similar observation about narrative’s 
inability to attend to overlapping moments: ‘simultaneity is a BIG problem for words. 
They come in sequence, always, only in sequence’.228 The simultaneity of the painted 
surface resists the movement and ordered stability of narrative. Instead, in What I Loved, 
artwork signals the midway point in the translation of personal vision into language, into 
interpretations that strive to capture the doubt that shades the canvas.  
 Leo views all of Bill’s artistic production as emerging from his personal life. He 
calls the work O’s Journey a ‘fabular autobiography’ even though it ‘didn’t mirror Bill’s 
life in any of its details’ (126-7). Bill’s Self-Portrait, however, more overtly connects his 
artwork with an excavation or a mirroring of the self. Despite its self-referential title, the 
Self-Portrait portrays three people: Violet, marked with a bruise and holding a miniature 
taxicab, is seemingly the subject of the portrait; also visible is the loafer of another 
person leaving the scene, a shoe later revealed to belong to Bill’s soon-to-be ex-wife 
Lucille, as well as the artist’s shadow cast over the canvas. Bill’s literal presence in his 
Self-Portrait is only as the ephemeral trace of his shadow haunting the two women to 
whom he will be married over the course of his life.229 The portrait points to two critical 
terms, elaborated on elsewhere in the text, which are fundamental to comprehending the 
logic of self-mirroring in What I Loved: that the self is composed of its ‘mixing’ with the 
external world and that the artistic work thrives through a symbolic ‘excess’ that exceeds 
linguistic representation. 
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 By representing Bill as a composite of three people, the Self-Portrait, Hubert 
Zapf suggests, illustrates Violet’s contention that the self is a ‘mixed’ substance, strung 
together from external influences that trespass its borders.230 Against the conventional 
humanist ideal of a contained and unified self, Violet’s ‘mixing’ emphasises that people 
are above all porous, our physical membrane infiltrated by food, our intellect pierced by 
books and images, and our very self composed from our engagement with others. For 
Violet, ‘It isn’t: I think, therefore I am. It’s: I am because you are’ (91). This process of 
mixing is the inevitable recourse of engaging with the world, but Violet also cautions 
that ‘sometimes it’s dangerous’ (91). In a novel where the self requires unity in order to 
exist, formulating its amorphous substratum articulates a specific tension between the 
reality of subjective comingling on the one hand and, on the other, the necessary 
internalisation of an anchored, coherent sense of self from which to speak. The failure to 
manage this tension, the danger of which Violet speaks, is the stuff of abnormal 
psychologies and cultural hysterias. Leo’s initial reaction to the Self-Portrait 
immediately links it with the discourse of mixing. He wonders, ‘Did that title next to a 
man’s name suggest a feminine part of himself or a trio of selves?’ (4). When first 
viewing the Self-Portrait, Leo mistakes the shadow as his own, and Bill later offers it up 
to him: the shadow ‘can be yours, too’ (15). The shadow, thus, marks out an ambiguous 
space in which Bill’s viewers might similarly become a part of his Self-Portrait, of his 
mixed identity.231 Leo makes this very observation—that every viewer takes the place of 
the artist’s shadow—in an essay he writes on Bill’s work, tellingly titled ‘Multiple 
Selves’ (25).232 Bill’s gift of the shadow consolidates the two men’s relationship, 
‘mark[ing] the moment when a meandering conversation between two men took an 
irrevocable turn toward friendship’ (15). The painting, then, is both a representation of 
and a conduit for mixing.  
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 The shadow’s indeterminacy, its refusal to be fixed to any one name, also points 
to Leo’s key term of artistic ‘excess’ or ‘plethora’, the quality of mystery that he uses to 
define good art. In Mysteries of the Rectangle, Hustvedt differentiates the simple images 
of consumer culture from noteworthy works of art based on similar criteria. What 
Hustvedt derides in the ‘facile images’ of popular culture is that they are ‘so easily read 
that they ask nothing of us but our money’.233 Whereas poor art, for Hustvedt, presents 
easily comprehensible narratives, successful artworks are semantically slippery, their 
symbolic abundance defying the linearity of language. It is this internal complexity that 
Leo terms ‘excess’ or ‘plethora’, the quality of ‘good works of art [...] that escapes the 
interpreter’s eye’ (121). While bad art can be immediately understood, for Hustvedt, 
meaningful art—work with a ‘plethora’—confounds narrative and, for this very reason, 
demands to be read into language however inadequately. Hustvedt is wary of confining 
an artwork’s mélange to a narrative that would only denude its complexity. Yet, while 
she damns any narrative that sets out to ‘understand’ or ‘solve’ a painting, to master it, 
she nevertheless remains invested in personal dialogues with the work of art, ‘stories of 
traveling in that illusory, strange, and motionless world’.234 
 What I Loved animates the discrepancy between artworks with and without 
‘excess’ through the conflict between Bill and enfant terrible Teddy Giles. Rosenthal 
states their distinction plainly: ‘While Giles typifies an art that is all surface and effect, 
Bill represents an art that is interested in the repressed and hidden.’235 Giles fashions 
horrific and graphic scenes of violence, mannequins bloodied and torn apart, which Leo 
contends, ‘reproduced the gruesome images of horror flicks and cheap violent porn’ 
(203). As mere facsimiles of the culture of violence, Giles’s installations are, for Leo, 
too-perfect mirrors to reveal anything unknown. He states, ‘They criticized nothing and 
they revealed nothing. The work was simulacra excreted from the culture’s bowels—
sterile, commercial feces meant purely for titillation’ (203). Bill’s work, on the other 
hand, possesses that elusive excessive substance because it seeks to ‘create doubt’, to 
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overflow narrative language (12). This plethora compels Leo to decode Bill’s work 
diachronically, to return to his images anew and expand his interpretations. Zapf 
recognises that ‘Leo keeps making ever new discoveries in this picture which are 
connected to the events taking place in the novel and seem to foreshadow these events 
almost prophetically’.236 This personal and drawn-out consideration is the kind of 
viewing that Hustvedt advocates when she writes, ‘every painting worth talking about 
reveals itself over time and takes on its own story inside the viewer.’237 
 As a simulacrum of the culture of violence, the voice of Giles’s gruesome work 
is described in terms of language that is terse and unsubtle. Leo calls its style, like the 
self-satisfied style of many contemporary art critics, ‘a language I’ve come to hate, 
because it admits no mystery and no ambiguity into its smug vocabulary, which 
arrogantly suggests that everything can be known’ (203). Where Giles’s work ‘feels like 
a joke—a one-liner’, Leo presents Bill’s fairytale-inspired dioramas as a verbal melee, a 
‘visual argument’ (200, 113). If Giles’s installations speak too obviously to be a useful 
mirror—that is, they mirror too narrowly and too exactly—Bill’s work provokes 
attempts at narration precisely because they represent a challenge to the requirements of 
discourse. What compels Leo to write a retrospective about Bill’s oeuvre is precisely its 
‘investigation of the inadequacy of symbolic surfaces’, and Leo struggles with its 
subtlety for ‘several years’, his book ‘growing and shrinking and then growing again’ 
(297, 362). In comparison to Giles’s arrogant self-assuredness, Leo describes writing on 
Bill’s work in terms of a ‘tormenting mistress whose bouts of passion were followed by 
inscrutable coldness, who screamed for love and then slapped my face’ (298). What I 
Loved, read alongside Hustvedt’s non-fiction commentaries, conceives of an artwork’s 
aesthetic value in terms of its overloaded uncertainty rather than its polemical precision, 
its resistance to interpretation compelling the drive to discover in language a provisional 
analysis.  
 This section has excavated the mirroring qualities of the work of art and its 
facility through symbolic excess to produce narrative responses. Hustvedt’s essay 
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‘Embodied Visions’ articulates something akin to this process of self-formation, arguing 
that ‘the experience of looking at visual art always involves a form of mirroring, which 
may be but is not necessarily conscious.’238 Hustvedt suggests that engaging with a work 
of art stages a confrontation between the subjectivity of the viewer and the creativity of 
the artist. A loved work of art, she contends, ‘reflects the vision of the other, of the artist, 
that we have made our own because it answers something within us that we understand 
is true.’239 Like Bill’s concept of aesthetic plethora, Hustvedt argues that the personal 
truth, discovered within the creativity of the artist, takes the form of a ‘vast discursive 
statement’ or transcends discourse altogether.240 Significantly, Hustvedt lends pieces of 
art this capacity as ‘objects without utility’, noting that even nonfigurative works can 
produce such reflective moments.241 We might recall from the previous chapter that, for 
both Benjamin and Baudrillard, collecting eliminates the object’s use value. Hustvedt’s 
writing on the mirror of artwork, then, seems equally applicable to the collection, and 
indeed, Leo, as we shall see, engages with his drawer of abandoned objects by reflecting 
upon their symbolic and material resonances. Notably, in ‘Embodied Visions’, Hustvedt 
applies the rhetoric of play and the ‘potential space’ theorised by D.W. Winnicott to the 
encounter between spectator and artwork. This same terminology animates my own 
discussion of the collection in What I Loved, but first I turn to the mirror of hysteria to 
further illuminate Violet’s concept of ‘overmixing’ and its constitution of Mark as pure 
reflection. 
 
Hysteria, Overmixing, and the False Self 
 In the novel’s array of hysterics, we find a mirror itself composed of excess, one 
that projects a critical angle on society through the unruly dialect of bodily symptoms. In 
his essay ‘Of Other Spaces’, Michel Foucault argues that in order to stabilise their 
cultural order, societies create ‘heterotopias’, physical locations where that very 
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authority might be contested.242 These spaces consolidate social orthodoxy while also 
revealing it to be messy or arbitrary. Foucault’s heterotopias are an amorphous concept, 
but they point to sanctioned spaces where society reveals itself obliquely, and it is for 
this reason that he likens them—like utopias—to the mirror. In his essay, Foucault calls 
psychiatric hospitals, alongside prisons and rest homes, ‘heterotopias of deviation’, 
quarantining those people who diverge from social norms and, thereby, delimiting those 
very orthodoxies.243 What I Loved similarly situates the hysteric, the asylum’s occupant, 
as a heterotopic lens through which to understand broader cultural structures. 
  The three intellectual projects that Violet pursues all take hysteria as their focus 
but scrutinise the illness in its distinctive historical permutations. For Violet, the hysteria 
treated and displayed in the Salpêtrière in nineteenth-century France has modern 
corollaries in both eating disorders and the antisocial disorder that plagues Giles and 
Mark. Every hysterical illness is, however, marked by particular symptoms, and Violet 
ponders why the same somatic expressions abound at particular moments in time. She 
concludes that, in Leo’s words, ‘the contagions [...] move in language, pictures, feelings, 
and in something else I can’t name, something between and among us’ (366). Hysteria 
is, for Violet, ‘the sickness that moves in the air’, but it also presents ‘a permissible way 
out’ of unbearable personal and cultural settings (365, 54). Hysterias are subjective 
states generated by yet operating in opposition to social mores, widespread conditions 
that bear the marks of the mainstream precisely because they react against it. Mark 
Micale, for instance, notes that like hysteria, eating disorders and other contemporary 
psychological ailments ‘are perceived as social and cultural diseases reflective in some 
direct, if undetermined, way of social and cultural conditions unique to the present.’244 
Widespread hysterical ailments form pervasive movements in opposition to social 
regulations, articulating this resistance through bodily signs unutterable in language. 
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 When there are no words to express an injury, hysteria can take over to mime 
that disenfranchisement through the body. In her account of contemporary hysterias, 
which situates the United States in the 1990s as ‘the hot zone of psychogenic diseases,’ 
Elaine Showalter notes that men and women alike ‘convert feelings into symptoms when 
we are unable to speak—when, for example, we feel overwhelmed by shame, guilt, or 
helplessness.’245 Indeed, it is the uncontainable quality of their communication, its 
resistance to linear masculine discourse, that makes the hysteric a revolutionary figure in 
the feminist theories of Luce Irigaray.246 Thus, the heterotopic mirror of hysteria, by 
speaking in the multifaceted patois of the body, possesses a symbolic plethora whose 
translation into language is particularly fraught. Christine Marks argues that, in What I 
Loved, the hysteric at the Salpêtrière is caught in ‘a struggle between individual 
rebellion and discursive regulation’, between the indeterminate language of the body and 
the analytic language of the medical profession.247 Marks contends that, in their 
endeavour to name and, thereby, to categorise hysteria, these nineteenth-century 
physicians circumscribe its expressive potential. In doing so, they enact another form of 
violence on the hysteric, literalised when the doctors would sign their patients like art 
objects. The doctors’ symbolic brutality warns that interpreting the mirror of excess 
entails a responsibility to those figures whose bodies, images, or objects form the 
material of the reflective surface. 
 Hysterical symptoms not only reveal society through the excessive register of the 
body, but the hysteric is itself the embodiment of society’s excess, those pushed to its 
outskirts unable to attend to its shifting regulations. As such we might consider hysteria 
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as a social mirror with a plethora, an obscure voice translated into language by Violet 
through her concept of ‘mixing’. Whereas the nineteenth-century hysteric’s wild 
performances embraced mixing to critique a culture with a surplus of strictures, Violet 
argues that eating disorders conversely strengthen the border between the self and 
society in reaction to a contemporary culture in which traditions have collapsed.248 The 
epidemic of eating disorders, Violet argues, results from wide-ranging social changes, 
‘including the breakdown of courting rituals and sexual codes, which leaves young 
women formless and vulnerable’ (163). To translate the symbolism of eating disorders 
into language, Violet develops her idea of ‘overmixing’: easily penetrated by the outside 
world these individuals naturally ‘find it hard to separate the needs and desires of other 
people from their own’ (88). In response, eating disorder sufferers react to external 
pressures by shoring up their boundaries, either by refusing to allow food to enter their 
body or by binging on it to ward off any erotic interest.  
 The terminology of ‘overmixing’ similarly applies to Mark and Teddy Giles, 
whose antisocial disorder is the novel’s most contemporary form of hysteria.249 
Enmeshed in a youth culture that strives, as one rave flyer announces, to ‘ELIMINATE 
BOUNDARIES’, Mark’s personality becomes influenced by those around him, leaving 
him with no stable subjective core (213). His psychological makeup appears to be a 
combination of the novel’s other hysterical forms. Like eating disorder sufferers, Mark 
is easily infected by the outside world, but he responds to this impingement by 
embracing external influences rather than shutting down his borders.250 As such, like 
nineteenth-century hysterics, Mark inhabits a mirror-like orientation. Violet notes that, 
lodged next to the epileptics’ ward, the hysterics at the Salpêtrière started having 
seizures: ‘They became what they were near’ (56). As his name implies, Mark, or ‘the 
Mark’ as his friends sometimes call him, is an embodied impression of the people 
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around him, shape-shifting in order to meet their expectations and their desires. Violet, 
for instance, understands Mark’s displays of empathy as emerging not from his own 
sympathetic nature but from her own desire that he behave as such: ‘He gives us the 
performance he thinks we want’ (275). Leo, similarly, discards the possibility that, like 
many adolescents, Mark is merely experimenting with different identities when he spies 
him speaking and acting with a wholly unfamiliar cadence with Giles: he writes, ‘For 
years I had seen in Mark the shifting colors of a chameleon, had known that he changed 
according to the circumstances in which he found himself, but at the sound of that 
unknown voice, the disquiet that had been lurking in me for so long seemed to find its 
horrible confirmation’ (318). Leo’s terror emerges from the realisation that Mark 
possesses or expresses no default self, no ethical or personal compass from which to 
deviate but embodies an array of distinct selves without underlying coherence or 
structure.  
 Mark embodies Winnicott’s concept of the ‘false self’, the ‘polite or socialized 
self’ that bends to social convention even when this requires unfaithfulness to a sense of 
personal authenticity.251 Although the false self is at times a social necessity, in abnormal 
development it hides and overrides the ‘true self’ through its performance of 
compliance, evoking a feeling of being unreal or inauthentic.252 For Winnicott, 
compliance is the sign most revealing of psychological problems, while spontaneous and 
creative action evince well-being. Mark’s pathology is one in which his self exists 
exclusively in relation to people with whom he interacts, structuring his appearance 
towards the goal of unanimous appeal: Bill relays to Leo that ‘when he had asked Mark 
what he most wanted from life, the boy had replied with apparent candor that he wanted 
people to like him’ (238). As a result, Mark cannot narrate a coherent story about 
himself, a deficiency revealed during his spell in rehab where, Violet notes, he could 
only parrot other people’s accounts of his affliction. Violet reveals to Leo:  
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They wanted him to feel—to tell his story. So he started to talk, but when I think about it, he never 
said much of any significance. But he did cry. That made them happy. He gave them what they 
wanted—feeling, or the appearance of it. But a story is about making connections in time, and 
Mark’s stuck in a time warp, a sick repetition that just shuttles him back and forth, back and forth. 
(308) 
Like the eating disorder patients Violet analyses, Mark is ‘overmixed’, but rather than 
shutting down his borders, he absorbs other people’s desires, tailoring his voice and his 
actions to their specific appetites. 
 In this respect, Mark personifies the shadow-figure in Bill’s Self-Portrait that 
waits to be assumed by someone else’s body. Mark’s languid posture is just one 
expression of his compliance. Twice, an enraged Leo tackles him only for the younger 
and stronger man to offer no resistance, his ‘rag doll’s’ body radiating only amazing 
‘passivity’ (229, 321). Violet analyses this compliance as stemming from Mark’s chaotic 
upbringing, being sent away by and returned to his mother for erratic behaviour having 
‘turned him into a docile, agreeable replica of himself’ (352).253 Leo believes that, 
because he was at the age of seven ‘an unusually agreeable child’, Mark’s hardships 
‘seemed to have left no trace on his character’ (238). Yet, such a deferential attitude is, 
for Winnicott, a telling symptom of abnormal psychological development and a buoyant 
false self.254 Mark’s somatic compliance mirrors the subjugation of his violent inner 
voice for a position of outward conformity. He explains: ‘There’s a voice inside my 
head. I hear it, but nobody else does. People wouldn’t like it, so I use other voices for 
them’ (323). Rather than a singular craven false self, Mark takes on several unique 
social personas bearing little congruity. It is for this reason that Mark finds it confusing 
‘when I’ve met two different people in two different places and then I meet them at the 
same party or something, and I don’t know how to act’ (322). Mark is seemingly a blank 
space, written anew in each social arena. He is, then, both overmixed and unmixed, 
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Using People as Objects 
 Whereas Mark’s pathology prevents him from registering the influence of other 
people, Leo compiles the components of his ‘mixed’ self in a collection of objects. 
When the novel begins, Leo keeps in his drawer photographs of family members who 
perished in Auschwitz: he says, ‘The black-and-white figures of the photographs have 
had to stand in place of my memory, and yet I have always felt that their unmarked 
graves became a part of me. What was unwritten then is inscribed into what I call 
myself. The longer I live the more convinced I am that when I say “I,” I am really saying 
“we”’ (22-3). The drawer functions as a repository for artefacts of those intimate figures 
whose influence has shaped Leo, bearing the materials of his ‘mixed’ self. As the text 
progresses, Leo adds to this drawer objects of others he has loved but who are no longer 
present either because, like Matt and Bill, they have died or because, like Erica and 
Violet, they have moved away. In Hustvedt’s The Blindfold, Mr. Morning similarly 
employs the object world to access the dead, hiring Iris to tape-record whispered 
descriptions of the items his neighbour has left behind ‘[f]or a kind of biography’.255 
Here, as in Leo’s collection, the characteristics of material possessions fill in the 
silhouette of the lost person. In addition to projecting information about its owners, the 
collection of objects harkens back to a familiar home-space lost to the past. In The 
Sorrows of an American, Eric contemplates his father’s preoccupation with archiving the 
experience of Norwegian settlers in America as a way to revisit his own history, ‘to 
return home again and again.’256 Like Eric’s father, in his collection Leo organises 
around him the components of his vanished home, reuniting through amulets those loved 
ones lost to distance and to death. 
 The collection, I will argue, forms a psychoanalytic space where Leo can analyse 
his past relationships, finding in its materials a fountain of meaning from which to form 
an autobiographical story. Yet, the text implies a curious symmetry between Leo’s 
therapeutic collection and the psychotic behaviours of Giles and Mark. After finally 
coming to terms with Mark’s psychological abnormality, Leo characterises his absence 
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of empathy as being like ‘when others aren’t a part of us anymore but are turned into 
things’ (346). In a sinister twist, the economy of Leo’s collection corresponds quite 
literally to his description of Mark’s anti-social disorder, his archival objects standing 
metonymically for their absent owners. Like this unexpected salience, the disturbing 
rumour that Giles collects children similarly gestures towards Leo’s archive, itself a 
collection of people in absentia. These two subtle similarities between Leo and the 
psychotic new guard of Mark and Giles cast a disturbing shadow over the collection, and 
insist that Leo’s collection be considered in relation to Mark’s unethical position within 
the text.  
 Leo charges Mark with objectifying others because he cannot sympathise with 
them, whereas his own collection makes objects of people who have receded from his 
life but continue to exert a gravitational force on his identity. Mark’s personality 
illustrates an inability to differentiate others from himself, and this failure distinguishes 
his acts of objectification from Leo’s collection. In Playing and Reality, Winnicott 
argues that relating to objects precedes object-usage in the maturation process.257 At birth 
the infant cannot distinguish itself from the outside world, and so no object is felt to be 
part of an external, shared reality. Successful parenting involves anticipating and 
mirroring the child’s desires in order to maintain its sense of omnipotence, failing it only 
slowly and thereby forcing it gradually to acknowledge a world outside itself. Only 
when this work of weaning is achieved can the child recognise a shared object world. 
That Mark cannot distinguish himself from other people, that he shapes himself to their 
desires, suggests that he is unable to use them as objects.258 The episode in which Mark 
bites the sleeping Leo hints at this developmental stasis, aligning him with the infantile 
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stage in which the baby chews an object in order to make it ‘part of himself’ so that he 
might then use it.259  
 Leo’s acts of objectification, unlike Mark’s, emerge from the contemplation of 
his past, objects taking the place of those no longer present because they continue to 
contour his subjectivity. What I Loved suggests that possessing an identity, producing or 
discovering a mirror of the self and then articulating it in language, inevitably involves 
the objectification of others, whose influence forms the bedrock of that mixed self. Bill’s 
Self-Portrait is one example of this phenomenon, turning Violet into a work of art for 
the sake of self-enlightenment: Leo notes, ‘you borrowed her to show yourself’ (15). 
Rosenthal argues that the novel diffuses Violet’s objectification by portraying the 
painting first through her own words, by presenting her as a dialogic partner in the 
painting process, and by positioning the composition itself as subverting the eroticised 
male gaze.260 Rosenthal, however, does not mention the Self-Portrait’s most obvious sign 
of violence, the bruise that Bill applies to Violet’s knee. Erica notes: ‘It’s like he loved 
doing it, like he wanted to make a little wound that would last forever’ (6). The bruise, 
in Erica’s account, emerges as the alarming underside of infatuation, the romantic 
feelings Bill holds for Violet taking the form of an indelible bruise to ensure his imprint 
on her body and, therefore, her memory. Leo repurposes this imagery after confessing 
his love to Violet: ‘Neither Violet nor I ever mention the night I told her I loved her, but 
my confession still lies between us like a shared bruise’ (358). The bruise, then, becomes 
the emblem of mixing, the self forming around an assemblage of influences conceived 
of as small brutalities. 
 This twining of physical desire and representational brutality, present on the 
canvas of Bill’s Self-Portrait, implies that infatuation enacts a violence on its target. In 
her essay ‘A Plea for Eros’, Hustvedt elucidates this very argument, suggesting that, 
‘Desire is always between a subject and an object.’261 Initiating a relationship and 
maintaining it, in this account, requires attempts to understand the partner’s wishes, but 
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these interpretations can easily lapse into misunderstanding. Relationships, then, always 
occur between subjects and the objectified version of their partner, imagined with 
varying degrees of nuance and depth. Within a novel that defines the self in terms of its 
mixing with others and requires its evocation in language to ward off psychosis, the 
realisation of a self must come with such acts of objectification, the violence of—to 
paraphrase Leo—borrowing others to show oneself. Here we are not far from the doctors 
at the Salpêtrière who treated their hysterical patients like art objects: ‘Medicine had 
granted permission to a fantasy that men have never abandoned, a muddled version of 
what Pygmalion wanted—something between a real woman and a beautiful thing’ (74). 
This fantasy of omnipotent control, however, comes through unexpectedly, and with 
varying degrees of intensity, in the archive.  
 Whereas nineteenth-century doctors treated their patients as bodies over which 
they executed total control, Leo uses objects abandoned by his friends and family as the 
gateway into an analysis of himself, operating with a sensitivity of analysis absent in 
medical diagnostic protocols. Nevertheless, Leo’s endeavour still symbolically exerts 
power over his friends: to reveal the ‘mixed’ self and then narrate it in language requires 
taking control over their lives, fashioning them according to terms meaningful to one’s 
own self-narrative. Jacques Derrida acknowledges this process in his analysis of Yosef 
Hayim Yerushalmi’s ‘Monologue with Freud’, which, by uniting the Jewish community, 
the author, and the psychoanalyst under the pronoun ‘we’, corrals the dead Freud into 
the religion’s ranks. Derrida argues that Yerushalmi’s use of ‘we’ exercises ‘the violence 
of this communal dissymmetry’, instrumental to the foundation of any common category 
or group: ‘It is the origin of the common, happening each time we address ourselves to 
someone, each time we call them while supposing, that is to say while imposing a “we,” 
and thus while inscribing the other person in this situation of an at once spectral and 
patriarchic nursling.’262 Yerushalmi can, without Freud’s consent, re-subscribe him into 
the Jewish community because he is dead, and, as Derrida notes, phantoms, like 
newborns at their initial circumcision, cannot contest that invocation. In What I Loved, 
where every individual is a ‘we’, a ‘mixed’ constellation of intimacies, the very 
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formation and possession of a self requires this communal violence, bruising others, 
objectifying their lives and appropriating their stories, in order to reveal the person 
around whom they orbit. 
 In this section I noted a strange violence that unites Mark’s antisocial disorder 
with the archival strategy that Leo employs to understand himself. The novel, however, 
also compels these two characters to be compared based on their relationships to play. 
The next section investigates the games developed by Mark and Leo, respectively, and 
introduces the concept of ‘archival play’. Leo’s collection, we shall see, becomes the 
platform through which he addresses his past, but its malleable form enables a series of 
curations that, as a form of play, permits him to analyse and, eventually, narrate this 
series of departures.  
!
Archival Play 
 Both Mark and Leo develop games expressive of their psychological makeups, 
demonstrating again the differences between Mark’s false-self compliance and Leo’s 
more developed object-usage. In Playing and Reality, Winnicott contends that ‘it is only 
in being creative that the individual discovers the self.’263 Play is, for Winnicott, a 
communicative gesture that can be analysed for meaning and the basis for the practice of 
psychoanalysis itself. Moreover, Winnicott argues that only through playing and through 
acting creatively does the true self find expression and conquer compliance. Mark’s and 
Leo’s games, I argue, correspond to Christopher Bollas’s notions of trauma and psychic 
genera. For Bollas, the subject’s ability to evolve over time, rather than lapse into 
repetition, hinges on its facility at using objects to express its internal domain. Whereas 
the traumatic subject is disposed to contain disturbing events through their cyclical 
repetition, psychic genera see the establishment of a new subjective orientation through 
a process of unconscious re-arrangement.264 Like Bollas’s traumatic position, Mark’s 
monotonous game strives to confine the psychological wounds emanating from his 
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vertiginous childhood, while Leo’s game materialises and externalises the establishment 
of psychic genera through its remixing of archival objects. 
 Master Fremont, the game Mark plays as a child, illuminates his burgeoning 
false self and his pathological concern with mixing. Violet describes the game: 
Mark is Master Fremont and I’m his servant. I wrap him up in his robe and carry him out of the 
bathroom to his bed. I put him down on the bed and then I start hugging and kissing my little 
master. He pretends to be very angry and he fires me. I promise to be good and never hug him 
again, but I can’t control myself, and I throw myself at him and kiss him and hug him all over 
again. He fires me again. I beg to be given another chance. I get down on my knees. I pretend to 
cry. He relents, and the game starts all over again. He could play it forever. (92) 
In Master Fremont, Hustvedt mimics the Fort-Da game played by Sigmund Freud’s 
grandson and analysed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.265 Although Fort-Da begins 
simply as a game of tossing a toy away, when the child acquires a wooded reel with a 
string attached, it evolves into a game of disappearance and reappearance: the boy 
throws the toy and then, to his great pleasure, pulls it back into view. Since the child 
permits his mother to leave him without causing a fuss, Freud analyses the game as an 
enactment of his repressed anxiety around her departure. Fort-Da, Freud decides, is a 
form of revenge upon the mother for leaving, a way for the child to take control of her 
departure by sending her away himself if only in the form of the cast-away object.  
 As in Fort-Da, Mark moves from a position of passivity to one of authority. 
Violet, echoing Freud, analyses Master Fremont as a way for Mark to master his milieu 
of neglect. The anxiety of being shuttled between households, sent away by his mother, 
Lucille, to live with Bill and Violet, is channeled into his obsessive game. Violet says: 
‘it’s a mixing game. He gets to reject me, send me away and then take me back over and 
over again. He has the power’ (92). In the form of Master Fremont, Mark attempts to 
acquire a feeling of self-control: reacting against his fluctuating environment, Mark 
invents a game in which he has ultimate jurisdiction, where he controls the mother’s 
movement and her affection. Master Fremont is, however, premised on eternal 
repetition, the initial game presenting no opportunity for spontaneity. It thus both voices 
the root of Mark’s compliance, his feeling of being out of control, and enacts 
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compliance by structurally forbidding creative action. In weeding out spontaneity, the 
game seemingly prefigures the repetitive pattern that will animate Mark’s future life, his 
predictable fluctuations between his compliant state and eruptions of theft and 
deception. Leo’s later contention that Mark is ‘a machine of perfect repetition, [...] 
driven to do what he had done before’, could equally well describe the structure of 
Master Fremont (268). 
 This image of Mark as a machine recalls Leo’s description of his own 
melancholy state following Matt’s death, when he terms his failing marriage ‘a machine 
[...], a churning repetitious engine of mourning’ (146). Leo, in the novel’s second game, 
interrupts his depression through a creative remixing of his past in what I term ‘archival 
play’. Whereas Master Fremont is a traumatic and repetitive reaction to an anxiety over 
external vacillations, the game Leo plays with his objects embraces and contemplates his 
mixed self, and in doing so functions as a form of therapy rather than traumatised 
reenactment. For Freud, Fort-Da was a primary example of the death drive, the impulse 
to repeat material in opposition to the drive for pleasure.266 Baudrillard links Fort-Da to 
the collection’s own economy of mourning. By fixing objects in a series and subjecting 
them to a game of disappearance and reappearance, Baudrillard argues that the collector 
strives to overcome death by taking control of time:  
What man gets from objects is not a guarantee of life after death but the possibility, from the 
present moment onwards, of continually experiencing the unfolding of his existence in a controlled, 
cyclical mode, symbolically transcending a real existence the irreversibility of whose progression 
he is powerless to affect.267 
Time, materialised in the series of objects, can be made to replay over and over again, 
the forward movement towards death undermined by this cyclical, repetitive game.  
 What I Loved contests Baudrillard’s idea that the collection is neutered of 
creativity, aligning itself instead with Walter Benjamin and his figure of the child 
collector. Graeme Gilloch argues that, in Benjamin’s writing, ‘Through the playfulness 
of the child, the broken and forgotten object is transformed into something new, 
something valuable.’268 Benjamin affords children a natural zeal for collecting, their 
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faces baring a passion for the archival hunt ‘which lingers on, but with a dimmed and 
manic glow, in antiquarians, researchers, bibliomaniacs.’269 The child’s heightened 
attention to the outside world becomes, for Benjamin, the purview of the collector, who 
remains constantly on alert for new wares. If, for the collector, the world vibrates with 
potential encounters, objects waiting to be discovered and collated, this intensity of 
meaning overlaps with the experience of living within the dream: ‘For in the dream, too, 
the rhythm of perception and experience is altered in such a way that everything—even 
the seemingly most neutral—comes to strike us; everything concerns us.’270 While Leo 
does not intensively seek out his objects, his engagement with them corresponds to the 
imaginative play that Benjamin lends the collector. Leo’s collection, we shall see, 
manifests itself within the logic of the dream, his archive charged with meaning that 
shifts with every new addition and rearrangement. Benjamin writes that, taking on a new 
meaning with each additional object, the collection ‘shows [the collector] his affairs in 
constant flux.’271 Not only does Leo’s collection grow with, and thereby register, the 
changes in his personal life, but these additions provide new fodder for investigation, 
new items to be mined for significance, as the entire review of the archive shifts with 
each addition. 
 After Matt’s death, Leo finds it impossible to mix with the world: he narrates, 
‘light, noise, color, smells, the slightest motion of the air rubbed me raw with their 
stimuli’ (148). With his collection, however, he stages a kind of controlled mixing, a 
theatre of remixing wherein he contemplates those people now gone and sorts them into 
networks of meaning. Whereas Master Fremont systematically repeats itself, Leo’s 
archival play corresponds to Bollas’s opposing term, psychic genera: ‘a combinatory 
play that leads to the eventual establishment of a new perspective.’272  I have already 
noted that the novel explicitly links Leo’s drawer with his interior terrain. As he adds 
mementos to the drawer, Leo begins to play a ‘game of mobile objects’, in which he 
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moves the items into various organisational schemes and analyses these juxtapositions 
for meaning (364). Leo explains:  
Each thing was a bone that signified absence, and I took pleasure in arranging these fragments 
according to different principles. Chronology provided one logic, but even this could change, 
depending on how I read each object. [...] For days I worked on possible time tables and then 
abandoned them for more secret, associative systems, playing with every possible connection. 
(191)  
Leo, discovering himself in the objects left behind by loved ones, externalises Bollas’s 
psychic genera, physically playing with and rearranging his objects in order to achieve a 
new outlook on his past. Like the ‘combinatory play’ of the generative process, Leo’s 
game is one of reorganisation, objects shuffled into new schemes to divine their 
meanings. Whereas the recombinations of Bollas’s genera occur unconsciously, Leo 
manifests this process through his collection.  
 Bollas suggests that the true self—and its unique internal idiom—‘finds its 
expression through the choices and uses of objects that are available to it in the 
environment.’273 When selecting the first objects to add to his collection, culled from his 
dead son’s possessions, Leo calls his selections ‘purely a matter of instinct’ (149). As in 
Bollas’s theory, Leo’s choices seemingly reflect his subjectivity, projecting it into 
material objects and thereby opening himself up for analysis. In Being a Character, 
Bollas articulates a connection between dreaming and these objects infused with 
subjective meaning. The world, he notes, is littered with objects that provoke a personal 
response, objects laden with affiliations and memories much like those items installed in 
Leo’s drawer. Coming into contact with these objects is like dreaming, he argues, the 
dream’s environment orientated by the unconscious and so similarly outfitted with 
objects of subjective significance.274 Indeed, these objects, which Winnicott terms 
subjective objects, establish the vocabulary of dream life, furnishing the dream with its 
implicit symbolism. For Bollas, both dreams and subjective objects reveal the internal 
idiom of the true self and provide the material with which to take stock of it. 
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 By curating them into different orientations, Leo extracts fresh associations from 
his talismans in a process related to psychoanalytic dream interpretation. Early in the 
novel, Erica says of Bill’s Self-Portrait: ‘It’s like looking at another person’s dream, 
isn’t it?’ (5). Like the mirror of the portrait, so too is the mirror of the collection a means 
of glancing at the self in an oneiric state, providing a framework for dream analysis. 
Gaynor Kavanagh similarly calls the curated public museum a ‘dream space’ for its 
propensity to elicit unpredictable personal associations. Echoing the Winnicottian 
vocabulary of games we find in What I Loved, she contends that in the museum, ‘The 
mind is at play, free-wheeling and open to itself.’275 That Leo only plays with his objects 
in the liminal time preceding sleep further associates the collection with the dream, Leo 
noting that, ‘My drawer proved to be an effective sedative’ (192). What I Loved, thus, 
positions the collection as what Hustvedt elsewhere calls ‘dream consciousness’, the 
slackening of rational thought that occurs ‘in reverie, in the hypnagogic visions that 
precede sleep, in the free associations of analysis, and in the making of art.’276 Susan 
Hiller, similarly, suggests a loose correspondence between the layers of meaning in a 
collection—the disjunction between the story its curator is trying to convey and the one 
interpreted by the audience—and the dream narrative’s possession of ‘both a manifest 
and a hidden content’.277 Addressing objects as though they are the latent content of a 
dream, Leo attempts both to decode their unity and, later, to fashion their meanings into 
a self-narrative. 
 Leo interprets his objects as lexical signifiers in the ‘free association’ form of 
dream analysis developed by Sigmund Freud. Freud advises that the analysand, when 
approaching his or her dream, voice whatever comes to mind in an unmediated and non-
selective way, likening this state to the time before bed, the period during which Leo 
contemplates his objects.278 These lines of associations strive to articulate what Freud 
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calls the ‘dream-thoughts’ that are abbreviated and condensed in the formation of the 
dream, and by interpreting these links of affiliated but seemingly unrelated ideas 
psychoanalysis attempts to decode the dream’s meaning.279 Thinking of Leo’s objects as 
terms of free association elucidates their relationship to the concept of artistic ‘plethora’: 
just as Freud notes that dream-thoughts need to be abbreviated in the formation of the 
dream, so too does the symbolism carried by each object overrun the structure of 
narrative, each arrangement eliciting different correspondences. Leo’s objects, thus, 
manifest material indicative of the interior self, providing not a narrative but a series of 
signifiers to approach through the psychoanalytic process.  
 Leo treats his collection’s ‘associative systems’ as trains of thought, dispersals 
whose network unity he tries to uncover. Leo describes one instance of his play: 
I put Erica’s lipstick beside Matt’s baseball card one day and moved it near the doughnut box on 
another. The link between the latter two objects was delightfully obscure but plain once I noticed it. 
The lipstick conjured Erica’s colored mouth, the doughnut box Mark’s hungry one. The connection 
was oral. I grouped the photograph of my twin cousins, Anna and Ruth, with the wedding picture of 
their parents for a while, but then I shifted it to sit beside Matt’s play program on one side and the 
photo of Bill and Violet on another. Their meanings depended on their placement, what I thought of 
as a mobile syntax. (191-92) 
In this game, Leo attempts to decipher his collection—and, therefore, to analyse his 
connections to lost friends and family—through playful juxtaposition. Forming them 
into networks, Leo treats his objects like terms in a string of free association, searching 
for himself in their connective threads. Bollas suggests that by performing free 
association in psychotherapy, the analysand compiles ‘a network of thought that 
constitutes the matrix of [his or her] unconscious as it functions within the 
psychoanalytical space.’280 Free association, he insists, both teaches the analyst the 
patient’s internal vocabulary and challenges the patient to participate in a creative 
process. Leo, exercising free association without an analyst, attempts to understand the 
discourse of his collection in a game that, unlike Mark’s Master Fremont, presents him 
with the creative challenges of forming novel arrangements and uncovering latent 
connections. Leo narrates: ‘Talismans, icons, incantations—these fragments are my frail 
shields of meaning. The game’s moves must be rational. I force myself to make a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
279 Ibid., p. 298. 




coherent argument for every grouping, but at bottom the game is magic’ (364). Treating 
his objects as signifiers in a game of free association, Leo thus employs the collection as 
a psychoanalytic space of self-interpretation.  
 Winnicott provides two goals for the psychoanalytic encounter: mirroring and 
playing. Like the good-enough mother, who by anticipating her child’s desires facilitates 
its spontaneity, Winnicott advises that psychotherapists play with their patients, 
stimulating creative exchanges by refusing to pin them down with definitive 
interpretations. To avoid engendering compliance, Winnicott urges analysts not to place 
themselves in a position of supremacy by telling their patient what is wrong with them, 
instead calling psychotherapy ‘a long-term giving the patient back what the patient 
brings.’281 Winnicott emphasises playing with the patient so that they come to self-
analyse, to discover what might be the analyst’s interpretation within themselves. Adam 
Phillips briefly summarises in his book on Winnicott: the analyst ‘aims to be an attentive 
but unimpinging object.’282 The collection, by reflecting the inner panorama of the self, 
literalises this description by offering up the contents for analysis, provoking a game 
through which Leo unravels his ‘mixed’ self and, in the process, develops his creative 
capacities.  
 Like Master Fremont, Leo’s ‘archival play’ articulates a specific relationship to 
Violet’s concept of mixing. Whereas Master Fremont follows a script in which young 
Mark perpetually controls the mother and ensures her love for him, the archive 
orientates Leo within an analytical space in which to consider and come to terms with 
his past through a fluid process of remixing. Writing from a psychoanalytic perspective, 
Werner Muensterberger locates collecting objects within a repetitive temporality centred 
on defeating anxiety: ‘Repeated acquisitions serve as a vehicle to cope with inner 
uncertainty, a way of dealing with the dread of renewed anxiety, with confusing 
problems of need and longing.’283 What I Loved, however, distances the archive from the 
discourse of mastery, relating it instead with discovery and play. Leo’s game of 
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recombination, unlike the mechanical repetition of Master Fremont, investigates the 
‘mixed’ self rather than obsessively attempting to mediate its relationships. In this 
section, I have argued that the archive functions as a psychoanalytic space providing the 
materials of free association to parse for meaning and significance. The collection stands 
as a mirror that promotes self-knowledge, a balm for the eye’s failure to capture the 
subject in its totality. In the next section I continue this conversation, considering 
Winnicott’s writing on the ‘potential space’ of play and Hustvedt’s own interpretation of 
this space as a narrative landscape. 
 
Potential Space and Narrative 
 Winnicott situates play within a ‘potential space’, which he contrasts with both 
internal and external reality. Play, Winnicott suggests, inhabits the nexus of the world 
infused with subjective meaning and objectively perceived reality, and he applies it to 
the mother-child and the analyst-analysand bonds, both relationships whose success rests 
on playing and on mirroring. The collection represents a potential space, containing 
objects evocative because of their emotional ties to their previous owners but whose 
meaning is also discovered in their physical characteristics. Leo keeps Violet’s letters, 
for instance, not ‘to study their contents’ but simply ‘as objects, charmed by their 
various metonymies’ (364). These metonymies include the emotional ties Leo has to the 
objects in addition to their formal qualities: recall, for instance, when Leo compares 
Erica’s lipstick with Mark’s donut box for their connection with the mouth. Indeed, the 
drawer proves a particularly salient metaphor for the potential space, swaying between 
the outside and inside worlds, just as Winnicott distinguishes the play space from 
internal and external domains. While I have already demonstrated how Leo’s drawer 
functions as a space of play, here I further elucidate its role in organising his internal 
world and producing a self-narrative. 
 In Hustvedt’s The Sorrows of an American, psychoanalyst-protagonist Eric 
employs the figure of the house to metaphorise the robust self. He advises, ‘we all need 




erect a silent fortress where no one leaves and no one enters.’284 The self as an 
architectural structure is frequently invoked in What I Loved, when, for instance, Bill’s 
imagination is called a ‘secret room’ and when Leo compares his colleagues’ sympathy 
to ‘walls of silent respect’ (29, 143). Whereas, for Eric, the walls of the self are meant to 
keep others at bay, in What I Loved the house provides an apt metaphor because it 
evokes the duelling demands that the self be both unified and open to outside influences. 
Those people who refuse to mix healthily with others are twice equated to closed-down 
structures. Violet, for instance, calls Lucille, debilitated by self-consciousness, ‘all 
boarded up and shut down like a condemned house’ (353). She similarly says of a binge 
eater, ‘She’s turned her own body into a cave where she can hide’ (124). Both images 
signal the pathological failure of the self to mingle with the outside world, the house’s 
various entrances and windows boarded up or eliminated altogether. 
 Thinking of the self as a house, either precariously built or stable, is a means, 
within What I Loved, for describing the struggle for mental stability. As such, despite 
Mark’s apparent psychological problems, Bill hopefully imagines ‘a room where he held 
on to those who loved him and whom he loved’ (329). Here, the inner chamber would 
signal the traces of a stable self, a healthy consistency of character that Mark lacks. 
Mark does, however, possess a room of his own, Leo donating Matt’s old bedroom to 
him as a sign of trust and camaraderie. Whereas Mark keeps his private space 
overwhelmingly cluttered, the enclosed space of Leo’s drawer provides a source of 
memory, meaning, and order. Gaston Bachelard argues that the architecture of the 
childhood home is seminal in contouring the mind, accentuating the role played by 
furniture with closed compartments like desks, wardrobes, and chests for providing ‘a 
model of intimacy.’285 Tellingly, it is his intimate bonds that Leo parses in his drawer, 
whereas Mark’s own personal space is left as messy and undifferentiated as his own 
relationship to others. Bachelard contends that the order produced in the enclosed spaces 
of drawers and wardrobes establishes the organisation of the entire dwelling, 
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‘protect[ing] the entire house against uncurbed disorder.’286 The drawer, in What I Loved, 
as we have seen, proves a space where the house, and thus the stuff of the self, is 
categorised and sorted through. 
 With their accumulation of personal artefacts and photographs, Carol Mavor 
suggests that ‘dresser drawers [...] function as miniature museums of our archived 
selves’.287  In different ways, Nicole Krauss’s Great House and Hustvedt’s Sorrows, in 
addition to What I Loved, demonstrate the propensity for drawers to become the site 
where the self, the home, and narrative itself discover forms of stability and design. 
Nicole Krauss’s The Great House tracks the movement of a desk of drawers as it 
changes hands and infiltrates the sensibilities and psychological lives of its owners. If 
the novel is, as its title suggests, a ‘great house’ then it is the desk that provides its 
coherence. Composed of four seemingly distinct narrative frameworks, the chest’s 
presence in each designates a primary cohesion for the novel-as-house. Likewise, within 
the novel, we see the arrangement of the desk dictating the psychology of its owner. The 
writer-protagonist of the text’s first chapter sees in its ostensibly mundane construction 
‘a far more complex design, the blueprint of the mind formed over tens of thousands of 
days of thinking while staring at them’.288 While in Krauss’s novel the desk’s 
arrangement of nineteen drawers permeates the writer’s mind, in What I Loved a single 
drawer provides a gateway into its owner’s interior world, a place where the inner 
constitution of the self is materialised and arranged.  
 Hustvedt’s Sorrows similarly explores the relationship between bureau and body. 
The novel begins with Eric and Inga sorting through their dead father’s study, 
specifically his desk, a venture that Eric compares to ‘ransack[ing] a man’s mind, 
dismantl[ing] an entire life’.289 Amongst the meticulously collated and arranged files, the 
siblings discover a mysterious letter hinting at a possible crime in their father’s past, a 
secret never spoken and yet not wholly withheld, the incriminating evidence stored 
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where it is certain to be discovered. Throughout the rest of the novel, Eric and Inga seek 
out information about the letter’s secret, as well as a different secret announced by 
another archive, a series of love letters sent by Inga’s now-deceased husband. Inga 
relates the pursuit of these unspoken histories to the first section of Søren Kierkegaard’s 
Either/Or, in which a beloved desk, when attacked out of frustration, reveals a hidden 
drawer and, with it, a manuscript. For Inga, in Kierkegaard’s anecdote, ‘the secretary is 
standing in for a living body, a person giving up secrets under duress,’ with the hidden 
drawer’s contents ‘its inner voice’.290 In addition to connecting the drawer with the inner 
world, Sorrows positions the desk’s contents as a secret history, not forgotten and never 
vocalised but also not fully disguised. The drawer, thus, awaits its movement from 
concealment to revelation, from silence to expression. 
 Like the desks in Great House and Sorrows, the drawer in What I Loved occupies 
a liminal space between interior and exterior worlds, moderating the generation of 
narrative by objects temporarily concealed. In her own writing on psychoanalysis, 
Hustvedt calls Winnicott’s potential space, ‘not phenomenal reality, the here and now, 
but an illusory narrative terrain alongside of it.’291 By conjoining the potential space with 
the development of narrative, Hustvedt hints at a connection between Leo’s collection 
and the composition of his autobiographical story. Indeed, Hustvedt elsewhere suggests 
that writing narrative requires a process of imaginative play. She states: ‘I have 
discovered that a novel can be written only in play: an open, relaxed, responsive, 
permissive state of being that allows a work to grow freely.’292 As I have already noted, 
the novel compares the objects in Leo’s collection to language, to a ‘mobile syntax’ 
through which Leo excavates their latent meanings (192). In my discussion of ‘archival 
play’, I termed Leo’s arrangements not stories but dream-thoughts, strings of symbols 
rather than narrative arcs, drawing on Bollas’s observation that significant objects 
become repurposed as dream symbolism. Bollas, mirroring the syntactic quality that Leo 
affords his collected items, terms the object world ‘an extraordinary lexicon’ for 
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elaborating the true self’s interior idiom.293 Like the excessive mirror of the portrait, I 
suggest here that the collection, as a factory of symbolic meaning, propels Leo’s self-
narration, presented to the reader as the novel.  
 While most accounts of What I Loved only mention the collection in passing, 
Benjamin Markowitz’s review calls the novel ‘a record of these items’ significance.’294 
Indeed, Leo terms the collection a record of ‘what I missed’, editing but clearly evoking 
the novel’s title (191). The close relationship between the story and the collection is 
implied by Leo’s contemplations of the narrative form:  
We manufacture stories, after all, from the fleeting sensory material that bombards us at every 
instant, a fragmented series of pictures, conversations, odors, and the touch of things and people. 
We delete most of it to live with some semblance of order, and the reshuffling of memory goes on 
until we die. (120) 
The reorganisation of memory that Leo here places at the foundation of autobiography is 
just the work that he pursues in his collection, arranging fragments of memories and of 
people into different orders. Yet, while Leo suggests that narratives elide much of the 
past, the archive seemingly courts the sustenance of those people and those objects 
threatened with erasure. Whereas narrative, says Leo, ‘flies over the blanks, filling them 
in with the hypotaxis of an “and” or an “and then”’, the collection strives to shade in the 
gaps between objects and moments in time, to nourish memory rather than skate over its 
absences (365). Leo sees his collection doing the work of remembering his dead son at 
times during the day when his thoughts wander on to other topics: ‘I think my collection 
was a way to answer those blanks’ (149). Likewise, Leo seeks for his archive to expose 
and to understand Mark’s erratic behaviour, ‘to fill in the features of that missing face’ 
(284). A storehouse of remembrance, the collection contains a plethora of signification, 
gesturing towards content often elided by narrative systems.  
 Both the novel’s beginning and its end indicate its debt to the archive. The 
narrative’s composition is initiated by the collection’s fulfilment. The discovery of 
letters written by Violet to Bill years earlier, the final objects he commits to the 
collection, spurs Leo to commence writing: ‘When I put the letters down,’ he writes, ‘I 
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knew that I would start writing this book today’ (3). The past, and the contents of the 
novel, come into focus with the collection’s completion. So too does the narrative’s 
indecisive ending mirror the workings of the collection. Leo concludes: 
Every true story has several possible endings. This is mine: the children upstairs must be asleep, 
because the rooms above me are quiet. It’s eight-thirty in the evening on August 30, 2000. I’ve had 
my supper, and I’ve put away the dishes. I’m going to stop typing now, move to my chair, and rest 
my eyes. In half an hour, Lazlo is coming to read to me. (367) 
Leo’s conclusion refuses to offer up a key to the preceding narrative, instead providing 
only a provisional endpoint, a moment of time that will quickly fade away. The novel, I 
suggest, inherits this inconclusiveness from the collection. Like the collection, which in 
its frequent rearrangement possesses no fixed conclusion, the narrative offers 
conclusions about the past while resisting a definitive final word that would fix the 
story’s meaning. These various saliences between collection and novel imply that the 
objects form a necessary middle-step in the production of an autobiographical narrative, 
which produces and stabilises Leo’s subjectivity in the aftermath of various deaths and 
departures. In this chapter’s final section I also relate the novel’s insistent indeterminacy 
to a particular kind of distance that the archive facilitates, which repeats in Leo’s 
narrative. If, as I have suggested, the archive provides a rare glimpse of the ‘mixed’ self 
in its entirety, it achieves this affect through a self-distancing mechanism that, by 
foregoing strict conclusions, permits Leo to both rearrange and totalise the past and the 
collection. 
 
Self-Distance and Clutter 
 Mark Currie argues that in order to partake in the therapeutic process of self-
narration, one necessarily creates another kind of schizophrenia in which the self that is 
narrated is divided from and controlled by the subject doing the narrating. Currie 
highlights the odd moment when the narration of the past catches up with the present 
moment, the ‘narratological shipwreck’ at which point the two figures, the narrator and 
its narrated avatar, collide. 295 Leo calls to mind this moment towards the novel’s 
conclusion: ‘Every story we tell about ourselves can only be told in the past tense. It 
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winds backward from where we now stand, no longer the actors in the story but its 
spectators who have chosen to speak’ (364). What I Loved’s final sentence, quoted 
above, reveals this ‘shipwreck’ moment but unlike the fraught conclusion to Currie’s 
example—Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde—Leo’s self-encounter hardly causes a wrinkle in the 
water. This effect is achieved through Leo’s abnegation of moral authority. Currie 
suggests that temporal distance facilitates the creation of moral distance, the opportunity 
to make judgments about a past self requiring the erection of a distinct, enlightened self 
in the present. Borrowing from the work of Hayden White, we might consider What I 
Loved’s ending more like that of the chronicle, which refuses closure, rather than a 
narrative with its impulse to conclude by moralising.296 Earlier in the novel, Leo notes, 
‘The recollections of an older man are different from those of a young man. What 
seemed vital at forty may lose its significance at seventy’ (120). What I Loved refuses 
the conclusive end, instead gesturing towards a future moment in which the inflections 
of the past will have shifted with the arrival of new events, information, and insight. In 
doing so, the novel offers up readings of the past without insisting on their singularity or 
authority. 
 The moralising distance that Currie observes in Jekyll and Hyde enables the 
present self to elucidate confidently the past in its entirety, ignoring the shortcomings 
and failures that mark any historical narration. In narrating What I Loved, however, Leo 
occupies a middle-distance from which the past is synthesised into a complete document 
while still acknowledging that no account can ever achieve total transparency or 
veracity. The temporal remove from which Leo relays his story is complemented and 
enabled by the spatial distance between himself and his objects. During the course of the 
novel, before Leo has achieved a long temporal remove from the past, the archive 
provides a self-distancing mechanism, a means of gazing upon the past and the present 
from a distance. That is to say—before a large temporal gulf has been established, the 
archive enables a spatial distance on the past in order to bring it into clear view. It is the 
quality of remoteness that compels Leo to clip out one particular photograph of Bill and 
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Violet, which he savours ‘because the photo’s small dimensions imitated the proportions 
of distance—two figures standing very far away from me’ (191). The collection of 
objects, miniature enough to all fit inside a single drawer, thus, fulfils Leo’s desire to 
‘take a far view of myself from the top of a hill’ (255). In its spatial manoeuvring, then, 
the collection accomplishes the ideal of distance that Bollas applies to his model of 
psychotherapy, where the analyst, while ‘interpreting the roots of free association, [...] 
must find some way to catch glimpses of the forest.’297 
 The archival distance found in Leo’s interaction with his objects and weaved into 
his narrative account permit him both to read and to shift the archive. Roland Barthes’s 
and Michel de Certeau’s writing on observing the city emphasise the necessity of 
distance to make sense of an otherwise overwhelming mass of signification. Roland 
Barthes notes that the construction of the Eiffel Tower for the first time made Paris 
observable from a bird’s-eye view, transforming it into ‘a corpus of intelligent forms.’298 
Barthes argues that this perspective enables a strategy of ‘decipherment’, interpreting the 
metropolis by encountering it at once as a seamless entirety and a series of recognisable 
landmarks: ‘Paris offers itself to him as an object virtually prepared, exposed to the 
intelligence, but which he must himself construct by a final activity of the mind’.299 The 
Eiffel Tower, for Barthes, allows the city to be read as a complete document because the 
panoramic view elicits and interacts with memories of experiencing the city on ground 
level. It is precisely this act of navigating the city that, de Certeau argues, is sacrificed 
by inspecting New York from the heights of the World Trade Center. De Certeau argues 
that this ascent ‘makes the complexities of the city readable,’ while at the same time 
‘immobiliz[ing] its opaque mobility in a transparent text.’300 Being able to read the text 
of the city, then, comes at the expense of freezing its rush of activity and absconding 
from its composition. To make New York discernible as a text is to eliminate one’s 
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ability to participate in it, which remains the occupation of walkers who ‘write without 
being able to read it.’301  
 Barthes and de Certeau foreground two modalities of the urban text, the 
experience of occupying it and of observing it from above. Rather than only providing 
distance, Leo’s analysis the archive maps on to both of these aspects of engaging with a 
monumental scene: tangibly interacting with its distinct parts and interpreting its entirety 
for meaning as a unified network. The archive enables Leo to address the past by 
offering a distanced view on it. Like Lacan’s ‘mirror stage’, the archive provides a 
removed perspective from which to see the self in its entirety, and it thus enables Leo to 
strive to describe his history in narrative language. Yet, Leo seems to operate from a 
mobile middle-distance that, in addition to allowing the necessary remove to see the 
archive whole, also provides the immediacy to touch, rearrange, and play with the past. 
This mobile relationship facilitates reading the collection, harnessing the ‘excess’ 
signification latent in each object: the balance of interactive play and distant reading 
enables Leo to engage and to read the clutter of his objects rather than be overwhelmed 
by them. Mark’s room represents the danger of clutter. Congested by a glut of objects, it 
connotes an overloaded subjectivity that resists being transferred into a coherent 
narrative. Phillips writes: ‘Clutter, as chaotic accumulation, could be both a thwarting 
and a source of revelation. One might think of the difference as being two different 
kinds of unconscious work, the good mess and the bad mess—the mess that can be used, 
and the mess that stultifies.’302 If Mark’s room is a ‘bad mess’ because it overwhelms 
narration, Leo’s collection, by galvanising self-analysis, provides an example of a useful 
mess. Allan Hepburn similarly argues that ‘[c]lutter appeals to the collector’s sense of 
discovery.’ 303 Refusing to nail down a constant arrangement, Leo turns his cluttered 
drawer into a ‘good mess’, whose adjustability and readability creates a system of 
analysis.  
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 Benjamin writes that ‘[a] sort of productive disorder is the canon of the mémoire 
involuntaire, as it is the canon of the collector.’304 For Benjamin, disorder benefits the 
collector by eliciting unexpected memories, and it is just these types of meanings and 
correlations that Leo draws from his objects. In What I Loved, this disorder is expressed 
in the collection’s openness to being creatively reordered, engaging with its quality of 
excess. Loaded with metonymies, each object speaks a new significance when provided 
with a different logical order. Leo’s comment on Bill’s final, fragmentary work of art 
applies equally well to his own collection: ‘when strung together the fragments had 
formed a syntax that might be read for possible meaning’ (336). Teasing out their 
different connotations, the work of rearrangement exposes the excess of meaning within 
each object. Leo, for instance, asks: ‘Were Erica’s socks the sign of her leaving for 
California or were they really a token of the day Matt died and our marriage began to 
fail?’ (191). The ability to adjust its curation institutes the collection as a middle stage in 
the development of a stable if provisional narrative order. Leo notes that, ‘The truth was 
mobile and contradictory’, implying that his ‘game of mobile objects’ might better 
articulate reality than a narrative fixed in writing (255, 364). Yet, Hustvedt’s diagram of 
psychological health requires the representation of the self in language, in narrative 
comprehensible to a reader. While the novel structurally approximates some of the traits 
of the collection, specifically its open-endedness, the narrative inevitably loses the 
collection’s plasticity when fixed in linear language. For this reason, Leo refuses to 
administer a final conclusion that would ignore the slipperiness of the past, its resistance 
to signification. The novel, instead, insists that the archive provides a bendable, 
adjustable means of approaching the past from which to derive narratives that, because 
of their insistent stability, can never indefinitely feel accurate or full.  
 In his analysis of Jekyll and Hyde, Currie notes a competition between the mirror 
and the self-narrative as structures of subjectivity. He writes: ‘If the mirror image has 
dominion over the present tense, it is incapable of grasping identity over time; and if 
self-narration has mastery over past events, the present tense represents a crisis in its 
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power.’305 While Currie limits this reading to Jekyll and Hyde in particular, it 
nevertheless speaks to the division of psychic labour administered in the production of 
the self in Hustvedt’s text. However, rather than casting them in conflict, What I Loved 
envisages a symbiotic relationship between mirror and narrative. Functioning as a 
mirror, the collection compiles an overloaded quantity of symbolism whose underlying 
language and meaning is exposed through play and then refashioned as narrative. The 
narrative, flowing across time but fixed in its linear order, stabilises the subject by 
projecting a version of the past that will inevitably lose veracity over time. The archive, 
easily reshaped, can grow and change and, in doing so, spur on new narrative ventures. 
The archive-as-mirror, evolving with time, collects and registers relationships as they 
pass away, providing the material and the distance for a psychoanalytic encounter to 
transform them into a narrative that will, however briefly, consolidate the self. 
 This chapter has argued that the archive, by providing a removed perspective on 
the self, delivers both the elements for a playful game of self-analysis and a totalising 
distance from which to write a unified narrative. The next chapter, however, sees the 
critique of any distancing mechanism that would fantasise about capturing a terrain of 
knowledge in its totality. E.L. Doctorow’s Homer and Langley, we shall see, rebuffs 
distance for immediacy and rejects the presumed certainty of visual knowledge for a 
tentative objectivity borne of blindness. Unlike Leo’s collection that, confined to a 
drawer, floats in an indeterminate space between real and dream worlds, Homer and 
Langley’s collection grows to fill every cranny of their mansion. Emphasising tactility 
and materiality, their unruly archive overpowers the domestic space rather than 
instigating its reordering.  
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Archive Fever in the Doomed Domestic of 
E.L. Doctorow’s Homer and Langley 
 Although this dissertation excavates several ways the archive functions as a 
‘technology of self’ in contemporary literature and culture, this chapter embeds that 
analysis within a longer aesthetic and cultural tradition that begins with nineteenth-
century realism. Roland Barthes has observed that it is only with Honoré de Balzac, a 
founder of literary realism, that objects are integrated into literary investigations of the 
human passions.306 Peter Brooks adds: ‘You cannot, the realist claims, represent people 
without taking account of the things that people use and acquire in order to define 
themselves—their tools, their furniture, their accessories.’307 In nineteenth-century 
literary realism, the constellation of objects surrounding a person, often those installed 
within their home, comes to provide a gateway into their character. As such, realism 
provides a critical node of inquiry for an analysis of the history of the personal archive, 
of the relationship between collecting objects and enacting the self. E.L. Doctorow’s 
Homer and Langley investigates the nineteenth-century literary inventory, recalling and, 
more often, undermining its tropes to commentate on the present culture of self-
archivisation. The novel re-imagines the story of the eponymous, real-life Collyer 
brothers who, born in the late-nineteenth century, notoriously hoarded themselves to 
death in their Fifth Avenue New York mansion.308 Langley pursues their father’s 
obsession with collecting but turns his sights on the cheap and discarded objects of the 
metropolis, tracing the inheritance of nineteenth-century collecting and its overstuffed 
interiors to a fatal conclusion: the heaps of objects collapse, crushing Langley and 
leaving the blind and newly-deaf Homer to starve.  
 The Collyer brothers’ story has resurfaced in various artistic settings and, as a 
result, Joyce Carol Oates observes that ‘their story has become a kind of cautionary tale 
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as memorable as any of the Grimms’.’309 In readdressing their tale, however, Doctorow 
changes several of the brothers’ biographical details: pushing the narrative forward 
twenty years, extending the brothers’ lives to the 1980s, conscripting Langley to service 
in the first World War, making Homer an accomplished pianist, and blinding him at a 
much earlier age.310 Doctorow has, I will demonstrate, long contested the 
representational strategies of realism within his novels.311 With Homer and Langley he 
revisits these earlier critiques by turning to the prevalent locale of the nineteenth-century 
novel: the bourgeois home. 312 In focusing on the nineteenth-century domestic interior in 
a contemporary novel, and by extending Homer and Langley’s lives in this dwelling 
through to the third quarter of the twentieth century, Doctorow acknowledges a link 
between the archiving habits of these two eras.313 Langley’s magpie impulse, we will see, 
represents the flowering of his own father’s explicitly nineteenth-century habit while 
also marking the brothers as ‘prophets of a new age’—that is, ours.314 While recognising 
the roots of contemporary archiving within the walls of the nineteenth-century home, 
Doctorow also undercuts the realist novel’s typical representational strategies through 
his selection of perspective and voice, and through his treatment of objects independent 
of, even rebellious towards, subjective mastery. The result is a text sceptical of the 
unifying lens of the realist text and of the classification strategies of the archive amidst 
an overflow of objects. Instead, implicitly contemplating our current information-dense 
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era of digital technology, Homer and Langley recommends a form of archival curation 
dependant not on strict categorisation and total knowledge but on the swaying musical 
intonations of literary discourse and on the disqualification of visual certainty. 
 Alain Robbe-Grillet, in 1956, advocated a new, non-realist novel that would 
prioritise the materiality of objects ahead of their symbolic resonance:  
No longer will objects be merely the vague reflection of the hero’s vague soul, the image of his 
torments, the shadow of his desires. Or rather, if objects still afford a momentary prop to human 
passions, they will do so only provisionally, and will accept the tyranny of significations only in 
appearance—derisively, one might say—the better to show how alien they remain to man.315 
Robbe-Gillet’s demands on the novel anticipate much recent theory and philosophy that 
emphasise the thingness of objects ahead of their conceptualisation by human systems.316 
Homer and Langley mediates between these two positions, treating its archival goods as 
both symbolic—politically, historically, and personally—and harshly material, their 
violence registered both intellectually (to systems of meaning) and physically (to the 
brothers’ well-being). The novel addresses realism and materiality most fully, however, 
through its critical deployment of the blind Homer as narrator. Zadie Smith calls upon 
Robbe-Grillet’s essay, and those lines quoted above in particular, in delineating a 
counter-tradition to the realist novel still active today and with which we might 
provisionally associate Homer and Langley. These texts, she notes, frequently call 
attention to the disembodied, removed, and knowing narrator of realist novels: ‘most 
avant-garde challenges to Realism concentrate on voice, on where this “I” is coming 
from, this mysterious third person.’317 Like several of Doctorow’s other novels, which I 
survey in the opening section, Homer and Langley disavows the realist convention of 
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distanced and unifying narration, here by employing a blind narrator who can offer 
neither the panoramic unity nor visual certainty.  
 Like this critique of perspectival distance, archives of trash are commonplace in 
Doctorow’s fiction, but Langley’s collection is unique in the hostility it presents to the 
brothers. If the collection of outmoded technologies previously represented the ideal of 
preserving lost history, the eventual collapse of Langley’s archive introduces the 
possibility of overloading the material apparatus of memory. Langley’s untamable 
archive materialises an anxiety in Doctorow’s thinking about historical writing: 
Doctorow, as I will demonstrate, calls for the recuperation of as many historical 
perspectives as possible, but the threat of overburdening the archive renders this desire 
problematic. This tension, that Doctorow advocates the expansion of the historical 
archive at the same time that he warns of overtaxing it, recalls a cultural condition 
described by Andreas Huyssen that is, itself, a repetition of the conditions of the long 
nineteenth-century.  
 Huyssen associates American and European culture since the 1970s with a 
memory boom, a turning away from high modernism’s investment in the future for a 
proliferation of interest in the past.318 He positions this invigoration of memory and 
museum discourses as strategic resistance to the acceleration of time in contemporary 
capitalism, marking out a stable environment amid rapid social transformation.319 While 
the digital landscape has expanded the capacity for remembrance, Huyssen notes that 
these same technologies frequently bear the charge of inciting cultural amnesia.320 These 
seemingly contradictory accounts—that ours is a time with both an abundance and a 
dearth of memory—recalls Richard Terdiman’s analysis of post-Revolution France. 
Terdiman argues that the long nineteenth century (1789-1920) inherited from the French 
Revolution a ‘memory crisis’, characterised by a diachronic temporality in which the 
past seemed increasingly distinct from the present and resilient to containment in 
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memory.321 Yet, the obsession with the past at this time encompassed not just a sense of 
history’s inaccessibility but also, simultaneously, its ever-presence. Terdiman, thus, 
names the nineteenth century’s ‘two principal disorders: too little memory, and too 
much.’322 
 This chapter will argue that Homer and Langley attempts to navigate this 
paradox, tracking its legacy from the late nineteenth-century but posing it as a principle 
issue in the writing of history today. I situate the hazards of rampant collecting within 
the discourse of ‘information overload’ and argue that its dangers present Doctorow’s 
earlier ideas about historical writing with particular difficulties. John Johnston notes 
several post-1970 American novels that witness the immense flow of data produced by 
new technologies and cybernetics. These novels, he suggests, ‘demonstrate the necessity 
of discovering alternatives to mimetic and expressive models in a culture of noise and 
entropic dissemination’.323 Doctorow, I argue, portrays the menace of overload through 
the unruly archive, but provides, in Homer’s diary, a model for curating history that 
might cure archival destruction. While Doctorow advocates a varied tableaux of 
historical accounts, the risk of overloading interpretation, of there being too much data 
and too many objects, proves a potent conundrum. On the one hand, the novel continues 
Doctorow’s project of expanding the historical register, contributing new historical 
narratives that complicate and expand on conventional understandings of the past. Yet it 
also critically reflects on the practice of memorialisation, warning of a surplus of 
information borne of retaining too much history. As such, the novel manifests a 
contradictory promotion and questioning of the personal archive in contemporary life, 
but it also proposes, through its narrative form, an ethical means of curating the past 
resilient to the hazard of overwhelming the archive. Homer and Langley implicitly 
promotes a curational protocol consonant with Homer’s blindness and the diary it 
produces: cautious about its direction, melodic in its prose, tentative of its knowledge of 
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fact, and open to a variety of historical perspectives.  
 
Perspective and the Politics of Realism 
 Scholarly discussions of Doctorow’s novels frequently foreground their 
indeterminate political allegiances. Michelle Tokarczyk, for instance, calls Doctorow’s 
politics a ‘skeptical commitment,’ comparing the ‘detached, alienated stance’ of several 
of his characters to Peter Sloterdijk’s notion of cynical detachment.324 Rather than 
articulating a strong oppositional credo, these characters, she observes, remain ‘unable 
to commit to a political or even a personal belief system.’325 Likewise, while Doctorow is 
typically affiliated with radical, leftist, and socialist politics, his novels refuse to align 
themselves with one side of America’s bipartisan government system. Stephen Cooper 
argues this case, noting that Doctorow’s novels scrutinise both the American Left and 
Right, pursuing ‘a postmodern politics’ that insists on a prismatic view of the past.326 
Doctorow’s emphasis on circulating an array of historical perspectives communicates 
his opposition to history’s ossification into a single, monolithic myth.327 As such, John G. 
Parks contends that ‘Doctorow’s ultimate political enterprise is to prevent the power of 
the regime from monopolizing the compositions of truth, from establishing a 
monological control over culture.’328 For Parks, Doctorow employs a ‘polyphonic 
fiction’ to disrupt history’s singular script with marginalised or ignored voices.329 
 Doctorow’s politics throughout his career have been premised on indecision, on 
the expansion, diversification, and complication of the official historical register.330 
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Doctorow’s 1977 essay ‘False Documents’ forms the bedrock of most accounts of his 
politics of representation and orientates his work in conflict with the realist genre of 
fiction.331 In the essay, he expresses the political and ethical necessity of questioning 
authoritative accounts of the past that claim veracity, demoting the official archive to the 
level of any other historical narrative. ‘False Documents’ begins by naming two forms 
of power—‘the power of the regime’ and ‘the power of freedom’—and connects these 
forces with different kinds of language.332 Drawing his example from The New York 
Times, Doctorow defines the regime’s language as a discourse that demands 
corroboration with the outside world and thereby constructs a landscape of fact. While 
the regime’s discourse claims authenticity for being empirically verified, Doctorow 
observes that its doctrines are nevertheless constructed, ‘the questionable world we 
ourselves have painted’.333 Conversely, the language of fiction (for Doctorow the 
language of freedom) can approach reality from the oblique angle of a convincing lie, 
challenging conventional wisdom with an imaginative discourse unbound from 
observable fact. In contrast to regime language that seeks to confirm accuracy, fiction, 
Doctorow suggests, can fashion itself towards the future and strive to invigorate cultural 
transformation. At the essay’s end, however, Doctorow collapses his distinction between 
linguistic registers, arguing that instead of languages of the regime and of freedom, 
‘There is only narrative.’334 This final move serves further to deaden the truth claims 
made by official accounts based on external, visual corroboration, which Doctorow 
demotes to just one amongst many narrative possibilities.  
 ‘False Documents’ affords the novelist a special, visionary place within the 
domain of language. Already aware that history is made, distributed, and altered by 
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narrative, as guardians of the language of freedom, writers can modify the past by 
amending it with new voices and unheard perspectives. In his most recent volume of 
essays, Doctorow reiterates: storytellers ‘may not realize when they commit to the 
practice of fiction that they are ordained to contest the aggregate fictions of their 
societies.’335 Doctorow’s desire not just to upset official history but to upend the idea that 
there might be a single authentic account positions him in tension with the doctrines of 
realism, the dominant artistic mode of the mid-nineteenth century.336 The predominant 
goal of realist art was, as Linda Nochlin outlines, ‘to give a truthful, objective and 
impartial representation of the real world, based on meticulous observation of 
contemporary life.’337 It is precisely this objective perspective, however, that Doctorow 
critiques in ‘False Documents’. Indeed, he applies the name ‘realism’ to the hegemonic 
language of the regime, for its translation of consensus into truth, its valorisation of 
visual corroboration.338 
 Doctorow expresses this aversion to a singular view of history in his frequently-
cited interview in Heidelberg, where he hypothesises that historical truth might be made 
accessible through the proliferation of perspectives. Doctorow proposes: 
I think history is made; it’s composed. There is an objective event, but until it is construed, until it 
is evaluated, it does not exist as history. As Nietzsche said, you need meaning before you know 
what the fact is. [...] Events in the past, too, don’t totally exist until we construe them, and quite 
clearly, since they can only be recorded in words or in pictures, the judgment that is made has far 
more leeway. [...] So I suppose my view of history is a phenomenological one, and you might call 
it cynical or pessimistic, you might say it verges on the existential, but there is a saving grace: since 
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history can be composed, you see, then you want to have as many people active in the composition 
as possible. A kind of democracy of perception. Thousands of eyes, not just one.339 
While Doctorow refuses to occlude the reality of a historical event outside of language, 
he nevertheless concludes that it can only be successfully approached, and should 
always be disseminated, through a ‘multiplicity of witnesses’.340 While Doctorow 
emphasises the diversification of interpretation, realism thrives on its fusion. Elizabeth 
Ermarth calls realist fiction an ‘aesthetic form of consensus’, which unifies a variety of 
perspectives into a system of agreement.341 She explains: ‘To the extent that all points of 
view summoned by the text agree, to the extent that they converge upon the “same” 
world, that text maintains the consensus of realism’.342 Whereas the stability of a realist 
novel rests in the harmony between its vantage points, Doctorow insists on a varied 
historical ecology that would resist the limiting measures of such consensus.  
 David Michael Levin’s distinction between the ‘assertoric’ and the ‘aletheic’ 
gaze provides a useful terminology through which to conceptualise Doctorow’s ocular 
rebellion against realist unification. For Doctorow, realism submits the world to what 
Levin calls an ‘assertoric’ gaze: 
the ‘propositional’ looking that I would associate with the correspondence theory of truth, with 
truth as ‘correctness’, essentially tends to see from only one perspective, one standpoint, one and 
only one position. Such a gaze will therefore tend to be narrow, dogmatic, intolerant, rigid, fixed, 
inflexible, and unmoved: in sum, not very caring.343 
Doctorow’s project in Homer and Langley, as well as in some of his earlier fiction, is to 
write history from an ‘aletheic’ perspective: 
the way of looking that I would associate with the hermeneutical theory of truth, with truth as 
‘unconcealment’, would essentially be moved by a tendency to see from a multiplicity of 
standpoints and perspectives: with an awareness of contextuality, of field and horizon, of 
situational complexity; and with a corresponding openness to the possibility of different 
positions.344  
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Levin argues that, whereas the ‘assertoric’ perspective anchors itself in place while 
suppressing alternative viewpoints, the ‘altetheic’ is democratically and inclusively 
kaleidoscopic. For this reason, he suggests, the ‘aletheic’ ‘is a gaze that cares.’345 
Undercutting the tenets of ‘assertoric’ vision and developing an ‘aletheic’ style of 
historical writing are consistent elements of Doctorow’s fiction, and I track their 
development across his back catalogue in the remainder of this section. Like these 
novels, Homer’s blind narration, I argue at this chapter’s conclusion, forms another 
attempt at establishing an ‘aletheic’ narrative vision, wherein writing from no visual 
perspective opens his narrative up to a range of visual standpoints.  
 Doctorow’s dissatisfaction with realism shapes The Book of Daniel, his novel 
that contemplates the arrest, trial, and execution of Paul and Rochelle Isaacson, 
reminiscent of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, through the eyes of their son, Daniel. As 
Naomi Morgenstern notes, Daniel calls his own accuracy into question and includes in 
his story scenes he never could have witnessed, such as his parents’ execution. In 
Morgenstern’s analysis, The Book of Daniel represents not only an attempt to capture the 
past as such but to understand the traumatic past, the execution of his parents, which is, 
for Daniel, the shocking ‘primal scene’ observable only in its reenactments. 
Morgenstern, thus, reads Daniel as addressing the question of ‘how we come to see 
again what we could never have seen in the first place.’346 Acknowledging Doctorow’s 
pronouncement that history can only be encountered through heterogeneous 
perspectives, Daniel’s impossible endeavour mixes narrative styles, voices, and 
temporalities. Theophilus Savvas notes that Daniel juxtaposes the story of his parents’ 
involvement in the old radical Left with his own participation in the new Left of the 
1960s alongside other, seemingly random content. In so doing, Savvas argues, the novel 
embodies ‘a circuitous kind of dual narrative’ in contrast to ‘[t]he sequential style of a 
linear narrative’, emblematic of realism, of which both novelist and protagonist remain 
dubious.347 Santiago Juan-Navarro similarly terms the novel antirealist because, as the 
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narrator, Daniel reveals ‘the limitations of his vision’ and attempts to transcend ‘closure 
through self-consciousness and indeterminacy.’348 
 Daniel’s refusal to write a typical, linear historical account evokes the novel’s 
central metaphor of electricity. Geoffrey Galt Harpham notes the text’s frequent use of 
electric imagery, arguing that, as a metaphor for the novel, the electric circuit binds 
together the desire for narrative closure and the brutality born of such determinacy.349 He 
argues that, within the logic of Daniel, disparate elements must be brought into a 
sequential system in order to be legible; however, creating a circuit in which electricity 
can flow freely incites violent outbursts, the shock treatment undergone by Daniel’s 
sister, Susan, or Paul and Rochelle’s final executions in the electric chair. Thus, he 
argues, the novel twins the necessity of narrative closure to make the past readable, and 
to ward off incessant repetition, with the hostility of narrative finitude. Harpham notes 
that, for the novel to end, Daniel must write the concluding electrocution scene, closure 
achievable only through the Isaacson’s murder.350 Yet, we might ask if Daniel does 
properly conclude. Savvas, positioning the novel against realist conventions, notes that 
Daniel ‘refuses to close his own circuit, refuses to make the final connection, by leaving 
the book with three possible endings.’351 Indeed, while Daniel does, on the final page, 
complete his novel-as-dissertation, he designates it as, ‘A Life Submitted in Partial 
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Doctoral Degree in’ a range of disciplines as 
variously odd as ‘Gross Entomology’ and ‘Arch Demonology’.352 The novel has ended 
but without the clarity we might typically expect, Daniel being called away from his 
desk by protesters now occupying the library. Thus, through the image of the electric 
circuit and its dispersed, frayed conclusion, Daniel warns of the dangers of unifying a 
narrative in a harmonic circuit, and thus replaces the realist mode with a decentred 
structure that calls its own certainty into question. 
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 As John G. Parks notes, Daniel frequently calls himself a ‘criminal of 
perception,’ relating his own project of confronting and narrating the past to his parents’ 
purported crime of spying. Parks suggests this moniker ‘implies that there is something 
illicit or transgressive in [Daniel’s] keen ability and great desire to perceive his world, to 
seek out the truth of history, to analyze, to make connections.’353 Yet, as I have 
demonstrated above, Daniel declines to pin history down to a single account that aims to 
reveal and corroborate the past definitively, a technique that would reproduce the 
mechanisms of realism and the language of the regime. Rather, Juan-Navarro, linking 
the novel with Doctorow’s imperative for a range of historical viewpoints, suggests that 
Daniel forms ‘a discursive receptacle of multiple perspectives’.354 Daniel’s position as a 
‘criminal of perception’ gestures towards alternative modes of witnessing the past in its 
multiplicity—through, to recall Doctorow’s previous formulation, ‘Thousands of eyes, 
not just one.’ Several of Doctorow’s later texts, which I now turn to, address tactics of 
seeing, critiquing the removed perspective that dreams of revealing the terrain of the 
visible in its entirety, instead approaching objects and stories from the immediate 
perspective of the human encounter.355 The drive against perspectival remove culminates 
in Homer and Langley, which ultimately contests Parks suggestion that, ‘if to perceive is 
transgressive, not to see is deadly.’356 It is, at least in part, Homer’s blindness that 
permits him to capture new observations about his surrounding environment and, more 
significantly, frees him from the tyranny of observable fact in his account of twentieth-
century life.  
 Ragtime, the next novel published by Doctorow, similarly undermines realist 
narrative techniques, and I demonstrate that this critique again interacts with the 
discourse of vision and perspective. Just as Daniel fictionalises a historical controversy 
but changes several of its details, Ragtime borrows real life figures, including Sigmund 
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Freud, Harold Houdini, J.P. Morgan, Evelyn Nesbitt, and Emma Goldman only to 
reinvent many of their biographic details.357 In doing so, Ragtime adheres to Doctorow’s 
outline of the language of freedom in ‘False Documents’, by fictionalising reality rather 
than pretending to offer an impossibly factual account. More than just rattling the 
distinction between fact and fiction, Ragtime parodies the narrative perspective invoked 
by realist fiction. Disputing Fredric Jameson’s famous declaration that, as a postmodern 
text, Ragtime must bear the marks of nostalgia, Linda Hutcheon argues that the novel’s 
nostalgia ‘is always ironically turned against itself—and us.’358 Hutcheon points to 
several generalisations contained within Ragtime’s opening chapter (‘There was a lot of 
sexual fainting. There were no Negroes. There were no immigrants’) that the character 
Emma Goldman discredits only a page later (‘Apparently there were Negroes. There 
were immigrants.’).359 By exposing Doctorow’s irony, Hutcheon explains the 
contradiction between the initial historical overview offered by the narrator and the 
variegated narrative itself, which contests these generalisations by pursuing the stories of 
the beleaguered African-American musician Coalhouse Walker Jr. and the impoverished 
Jewish immigrants Tatah, Mameh, and Little Girl. This ‘detachment’ of the narration 
from the narrator creates what Juan-Navarro calls the novel’s ‘ironic distance’, or 
‘narrative distance’, that he deems its principal innovation.360 
 The distinction between the narrator’s wide-reaching comments and the 
narrative’s own action performs a critique of the masterful intonation typical of realist 
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narration, its perspectival remove from narrative action.361 Doctorow has said that he 
aimed for Ragtime’s voice ‘to have narrative distance. To create something not as 
intimate as fiction nor as remote as history, but a voice that was mock historical — 
pedantic.’362 While Doctorow situates this desired effect in the ‘unusual’ space between 
history and fiction, I would suggest that it also parodies the realist fictional voice. 
Ermarth argues that realist fiction implies that, by providing readers with the ‘proper 
distance’, they can be made ‘to see the multiple viewpoints and so to find the form of the 
whole in what looks from a closer vantage point like a discontinuous array of specific 
cases.’363 That is, realism achieves its consensus through a perspectival remove that 
grants narrator and reader the distance to envision the story as a connected, homogenous 
totality. Harpham’s account of Ragtime associates the novel with this distancing 
strategy, where ‘everything is presented in miniature and has the curious aesthetic 
quality of tiny things.’364 Ragtime, however, problematises the unifying vision provided 
by this displaced perspective, its miniaturisation facilitating only the illusion of mastery, 
the narrator’s generalisations contested by what proves to be a more striated web of 
entwined stories.  
 In later texts, Doctorow conjoins the impulse towards miniaturisation and 
distance with the childhood search for symbolic mastery over the world. The eponymous 
narrator of Doctorow’s most recent novel, Andrew’s Brain, asks: ‘why do things in 
miniature bring out our affection? Like those little metal cars we all played with as kids 
that were models of real cars. How important to us that they were accurate to scale.’365 
Doctorow contemplates the trope of scale and perspective within the maturation process 
at length in World’s Fair, the coming-of-age story of Edgar Altschuler in the Bronx in 
the late 1930s. Early on in the narrative, Edgar announces that he ‘had difficulty with the 
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proportions of things’, declaring an interest in scale that trails the remainder of the text 
in its various models.366 Christopher D. Morris argues that, laying bare the gap between 
real and representation, these models, like systems of signification and including the 
novel itself, necessarily misrepresent the world while providing the only platforms with 
which to conceptualise it.367 Morris, however, does not address Edgar’s concern with 
achieving panoramic vision enabled by distance or by miniaturisation, prefigured in his 
youthful construction of a fortress where ‘I had surveillance of the whole vast kitchen 
floor.’368 When confronted with the Hindenburg zeppelin, Edgar narrates, ‘she was 
visible in her entirety,’ an encompassing perspective that three pages earlier is figured in 
terms of totalising knowledge.369 Observing a car accident from his classroom window, 
Edgar notes, ‘From this height the spectacle of the event was magnified, the whole field 
of circumstance could be seen.’370 Edgar’s emphasis on perspectival remove again 
colours his family trip to a football game, where the group moves to ‘better seats, farther 
back in the section, where with some altitude we could now see the whole field 
clearly.’371  
 Edgar’s belief in and desire for an encompassing vision that omits no detail rests 
in tension with his curiosity in sleight of hand, the ‘“now you see it, now you don’t” 
kinds of things’ that his father and uncle practice.372 Such feats of trickery, where the eye 
is turned against itself, teaches Edgar that, ‘You didn’t have to broadcast everything you 
knew all at once, but could reveal it suspensefully’.373 This realisation that the apparent 
truth might be the result of trickery challenges the possibility of a distant perspective 
that reveals a whole field of vision, finally discarded with his anticipated visit to the 
World’s Fair. Leading up to his trip, Edgar worries that he will miss out on something, 
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an anxiety curbed when his friend Meg presents him with a comprehensive map of the 
Fair, showing it ‘as if you were looking down from an airplane’.374 Yet, the Fair 
confronts Edgar with frequent distortions of scale, its displays featuring small models of 
future cities and statues of enlarged body parts, giants housed next to little people: he 
narrates, ‘I was made light-headed by the looming and shrinking size of things.’375 Twice 
Edgar swings from the distant to the life-sized viewpoint, when he moves from 
observing a model of the World of Tomorrow to its actual construction outside the 
exhibit, and finally, when he moves from the heights of the Parachute Jump to a 
performance of Oscar the Amorous Octopus. These destabilising shifts in perspective 
recall Roland Barthes writing on the pictorial plates of Diderot and D’Alembert’s 
Encyclopédie, whose presentation of objects he tellingly compares to the real-life 
World’s Fair.376 
 Barthes notes that the encyclopaedic plates present their objects in two different 
orders: the top of the page shows the object enmeshed in its context of use, while the 
bottom of the page finds the object enlarged and drawn in its essence. For Barthes, the 
‘paradigmatic’ perspective of the isolated object forms a ‘radical language, consisting 
of pure concepts’, that the ‘syntagmatic’ table vivant transforms into a discursive 
message with ‘an extreme density of meaning’.377 By demonstrating the object in use, the 
removed perspective illuminates the object’s meaning and its human purpose. The up-
close vantage point, however, challenges this didacticism. If the removed perspective 
portrays a well-organised world controlled by human implements, the up-close 
perspective demonstrates a grotesque landscape that is wholly unfamiliar: in this 
gargantuan world, ‘the sea urchin is also a sun, a monstrance’, named objects losing 
their distinctive qualities and, thus, their systematised order, language collapsing with 
the shifting of scale.378 The paradigmatic images thus violently disrupt the comfortable 
order produced by the contextual syntagmatic scenes, nature undoing rather than 
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confirming human design. The damage the immediate perspective perpetrates on the 
order produced by the distant viewpoint repeats in Edgar’s trip to the World’s Fair, his 
oscillations between the distant and up-close viewpoints finally resolved in the stands of 
the erotic water ballet. 
 Literalising the bird’s-eye perspective of the Fair’s map, Parachute Jump yanks 
Edgar and Meg into the sky, showing them a frightening vista of New York beyond the 
borders of the amusement park:  
I saw out over the world now, over the Fair. I saw Manhattan, I saw clouds over the city lit from 
below by electric light. I grew dizzy. I closed my own eyes and held on to Meg as tightly as she 
held me. I swore that if I came out of this alive, never again would I go up in such a contraption.379 
The terror of the ride, its demonstration of the artificiality of every frame of reference, 
contrasts starkly with Edgar’s previous idealisation of the from-above vantage point, 
abandoned in his subsequent viewing of the Amorous Octopus. The show, which stages 
the sexual pursuit of the several women, including Meg’s mother, by a huge octopus-
puppet, marks what Edgar feels to be his maturation. The stadium confounds Edgar’s 
previous confidence that Meg’s map would provide an infallible guide to the Fair: 
‘though it was there for everyone at the World’s Fair to see, I shouldn’t have seen it.’380 
Hidden in plain sight, Edgar sneaks into the performance and eschews the seats at the 
rear of the stands, deemed preferable for their panopticism earlier at the football game, 
for ‘the first row, by the rail.’381 From this perspective of immediacy, achieved through 
spontaneous action rather than planed out with his map, Edgar meets his sexual 
maturation:  
I knew everything now, the crucial secret, so carelessly vouchsafed. After all, I had not intended 
this, it had come to me without my bidding, without any planning or calculation on my part, 
presented, in fact, as an accident of the adventure. It was not my fault. I had worried before, all the 
time in this enormous effort to catch up to life, to find it, to feel it, comprehend it; but all I had to 
do was be in it and it would instruct me and give me everything I needed.382 
Whereas Todd McGowan argues that this moment demonstrates Edgar’s interpolation 
into late capitalism—satisfied and knowledgeable rather than dissatisfied and 
inquisitive—I would rather situate it within the novel’s consistent consideration of 
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scale.383 By investing in spontaneity and presence, Edgar’s development aligns maturity 
with acknowledging the impotence of the removed perspective, or the miniaturised 
model, and disavowing the illusion of mastery and total vision that it appears to offer.  
 This section has demonstrated Doctorow’s politically-motivated desacralisation 
of realist aesthetic practices throughout his literary career. For Doctorow, the 
representation of history requires a dissonant artistic style that gestures towards the 
messiness of the past and the conflicting ways it is experienced. Rather than viewing 
knowledge as a flat screen that once seen can be possessed and known, Doctorow urges 
us to imagine a multidimensional past that can be reckoned with only through a wealth 
of distinct perspectives. Whereas the former type of gaze produces a violent and 
narcissistic form of knowledge, wherein the viewer tames history, the latter is sensitive 
to the diversity of human experience. This distinction between the vision that masters 
and the vision that inquires maps on to Levin’s ‘assertoric’ and ‘aletheic’ gazes. 
Throughout his oeuvre, I have suggested that Doctorow courts an ‘aletheic’ narration 
that strives to see democratically and prismatically. In Homer and Langley, this 
‘aletheic’ impulse is woven into Homer’s blind narration that can offer neither 
panoramic unity nor visual confirmation. Instead, the novel-as-diary represents a form of 
curation that makes sense of the past while revelling in uncertainty and diversity.  
 
Homer and Langley and the Nineteenth-Century Realist Novel 
 This section situates Homer’s blindness as a subversion of the typical realist 
narrator and places it within Doctorow’s imperative to overthrow mythic history with 
marginalised voices. Presented within the milieu of the nineteenth-century realist 
novel—the domestic interior filled with objects from different times and places—
Homer’s blind, first-person narration provides a new angle on the museum-like home. 
We shall see that, by eliminating the removed and harmonizing perspective of realism, 
Homer and Langley strives towards a diversification of history typical of Doctorow’s 
political aesthetics. At the same time, by holding on to history in the form of outdated 
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technologies, Homer and Langley overcrowd their house and, as a result, fatally entomb 
themselves in an archive. In this text, then, resisting the realist strategy that would unify 
at the cost of narrative diversity, and instead maintaining an archive for the sake of a 
broader, non-hegemonic historical account, seemingly condemns the brothers to death. 
 Homer’s blindness, and its supplementation by ‘[his] exceptional hearing, which 
[he] trained to a degree of alertness that was almost visual’, locates the novel alongside 
Doctorow’s imperative to broaden history and subvert the traditional realist narrator 
(4).384 Blindness, by seemingly disabling his ability to make erotic advances, elevates 
women to a position of control and exonerates him from adhering to sexual codes: ‘it 
could do lots of things, my sightlessness’ (5). If Homer’s blindness imbues him with a 
form of sexual-social deviance, it more generally codes him as a social outsider, and it is 
from this outsider perspective that the novel gives an account of modernisation and 
industrialisation. Homer, whose narrative moves across time from the late-nineteenth 
century to the 1980s, tracks technological development through his other senses: he 
remarks, ‘I [...] gauged the progress of our times by the changing sounds and smells of 
the streets’ (20). As such, just as Doctorow recommends is the novelist’s aim in ‘False 
Documents’, Homer provides an account of modernity from an often-ignored 
perspective, his ears registering data missed by other characters. He notices, and Langley 
misses, that guests at their tea dances sit out the livelier numbers, swaying to the somber 
songs as an exercise in ‘public mourning’ (65). Homer comes to this insight by 
‘hear[ing] the chairs scraping’ and ‘listen[ing] to the sound of their dancing’ (64, 65). 
While as Brooks notes, ‘Realism tends to deal in “first impressions”’—most 
significantly, ‘the way things look’—Homer and Langley, voiced without recourse to 
vision, cannot provide the in-depth descriptions typical of the realist genre.385 
 Homer’s blindness specifically dissolves the possibility of offering a removed 
and unifying perspective, foregrounded in the trajectory of his loss of sight, which forms 
part of the novel’s first passage: 
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The houses over to Central Park West went first, they got darker as if dissolving into the dark sky 
until I couldn’t make them out, and then the trees began to lose their shape, and then finally, this 
was toward the end of the season, maybe it was late February of that very cold winter, and all I 
could see were these phantom shapes of the ice skaters floating past me on a field of ice, and then 
the white ice, that last light, went gray and then altogether black, and then all my sight was gone 
though I could hear clearly the scoot scut of the blades on the ice, a very satisfying sound, a soft 
sound though full of intention, a deeper tone than you’d expect made by the skate blades, perhaps 
for having sounded the resonant basso of the water under the ice, scoot scut, scoot scut. (3) 
Emphasised here is Homer’s incapacity to observe from a distance, the horizon of his 
visual field moving closer and closer, but it is just this perspectival remove that 
characterises the realist narrative technique. Like Ermarth, who affiliates it a distancing 
strategy, Brooks considers the realist novel of the domestic space as exhibiting an 
aesthetic of the small-scale model: ‘More than most other fictions, the realist novel 
provides a sense of play very similar to that given by the scale model.’386 Didier 
Maleuvre similarly writes of the realist novel as a dollhouse, detailing the home in its 
entirety only by absenting human experience: ‘one can grasp its interior as a totality only 
because one could never fit inside.’387 Whereas, for Maleuvre, the typical realist novel 
aims to offer a unified vision of the home’s interior at the expense of leaving it, Homer’s 
blind first-person narrative takes stock of the Victorian bourgeois interior from within 
while skirting realism’s demand of totalised vision. Maleuvre argues that the nineteenth-
century interior encompasses a museum aesthetic, replete with displayed bibelots 
‘freezing and conserving an image of the past in a display of collectibles.’388 He imbues 
this interior space with an ultimate unhomeliness, one that, he argues, persists in 
bourgeois homemaking today, making Homer and Langley’s death at the hands of the 
collection appear to be the disturbing apotheosis of nineteenth-century collecting and a 
parable relevant to the contemporary experience.  
 Maleuvre notes some exceptional realist texts, including Balzac’s catalogue of 
his house in L’Inventaire de l’Hôtel de rue Fortunée and Joris-Karl Huysmans’s A 
Rebours, which reveal the homelessness hidden within the over-decorated homes of the 
nineteenth-century and its realist descriptions. These texts, he suggests, lie at the apex of 
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realism for their supreme dedication to in-depth object description, and yet end up 
undoing the realist project by overloading the text with optic specificities such that the 
scene can never be imagined in a seamless entirety. By showing realism in its extreme 
form, Maleuvre notes that these texts reveal the uncanny homelessness that rests at the 
heart of interior-dwelling since the nineteenth century. In L’Inventaire, Maleuvre argues, 
by approaching the object from the human level of the collection, not from above, ‘the 
world is always awfully close, the object always blindingly near, crowding the 
subject.’389 Like Balzac in L’Inventaire, Homer provides an account of encountering 
objects, of steering himself through a harsh landscape of objects indifferent to him.390 
Indeed, Homer and Langley’s conclusion, like Maleuvre’s analysis of L’Inventaire, sees 
the brothers not just cramped by their expanding material repertoire but, in Langley’s 
case, crushed beneath it. Homer and Langley thus, we shall see, witnesses the harshness 
of interior-dwelling that Maleuvre sees at play in the French realist novel but by 
subverting rather than intensifying its representational methods.  
 Homer’s sightlessness obscures the visual impact of objects, their spectacle, 
which Maleuvre argues is their primary effect of the nineteenth-century interior. Homer 
describes his blindness as melting away the object’s image, leaving only its materiality 
intact: he navigates through space purely by sensing ‘where the air is filled in with 
something solid’, materiality felt where visual impression remains illusive (5). For this 
reason, Homer’s blindness proves an asset during a power outage: ‘it needed the native 
gifts of a blind man who sensed where things were by the air they displaced to get from 
one room to another without killing himself in the process’ (158). Corresponding with 
Maleuvre’s argument that ‘[t]he bourgeois observes his objects, he does not live with 
them’, the objects gifted to the brothers by their parents are distinctly ornamental: 
‘things to really excite a boy, like an antique toy train that was too delicate to play with, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
389 Ibid., p. 133. 
390 We might consider Doctorow’s aesthetic strategy alongside Brown’s analysis of The Spoils of Poynton, 
in which, he argues, Henry James attempts to attend to objects while ridding his narrative of the lengthy 
descriptions that weighed down the realist text. Without detailing their material specifics, Brown argues, 
James can register how objects mediate relationships and animate the people who contend for their 
ownership. Bill Brown, A Sense of Things: The Object Matter of American Literature (Chicago and 




or a gold-plated hairbrush’ (7).391 We might, then, identify in Homer the ability to 
encounter objects precisely because he cannot be seduced by their visual charms. 
Homer’s blindness prevents the long descriptions of objects on which the realist process 
thrives, and which in Maleuvre’s account overpowers the conceptual apparatus in 
L’Inventaire. Instead his reports frequently diminish to lists of objects without lengthy 
qualifications of them, encountering their materiality rather than their spectacular 
visuality. While Homer and Langley actualises the threatening collection that Maleuvre 
sees underlying realist discourse and the nineteenth-century interior, it achieves this 
effect through the pairing down of description rather than its proliferation. 
 Like the nineteenth-century bourgeois interior, Homer and Langley’s house 
bursts with objects collected and displayed by their parents. Homer describes their home 
at the novel’s beginning as:  
a monumental tribute to late Victorian design that would be bypassed by modernity [...] and which 
I always found comfortable, solid, dependable, with its big upholstered pieces, or tufted Empire 
side chairs, or heavy drapes over the curtains on the ceiling-to-floor windows, or medieval 
tapestries hung from gilt poles, and bow-windowed bookcases, think Persian rugs, and standing 
lamps with tasseled shades and matching chinois amphora that you could almost step into...it was 
all very eclectic, being a record of sorts of our parents’ travels [...]. (6) 
In domesticating objects from faraway times and places and masking the walls with 
drapes and bookcases, Maleuvre argues that the nineteenth-century interior-dweller 
negates architectural space for an escapist fantasy.392 Maleuvre, in his reading of 
Huysmans’s A Rebours, pairs the accumulation of objects with a desire for the collector 
to neutralise himself, to physically degenerate to the status of a physical object as the 
house fills with material content.393 Homer’s description of his parents’ mansion 
emphasises these same decorative techniques, the walls smothered by furniture and 
material brought home from their travels. When they inherit the house from their 
parents, Langley’s collection continues to fill the house, forming ramparts in the form of 
a labyrinth of interior walls and, later, a precarious security system. By dictating the 
brothers’ movement, eventually pinning Homer to his writing desk, these precarious 
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archival structures similarly evoke the impulse to self-obstruct that, for Maleuvre, 
motivates the realist collector.  
 This section has detailed some of the ways in which Homer and Langley 
overlaps with and subverts the tropes of nineteenth-century realist fiction and its 
engagement with a museal domestic interior cramped with objects. In recalling realism, 
Doctorow is able to contextualise the current proliferation of collecting and hoarding 
within the historical movement in which the object’s centrality to self-definition was 
first interrogated. Rebecca Steinitz notes that nineteenth-century collections, like diaries, 
‘serve as assertions of control’, attempts to bolster a self that ‘is always threatened, 
always in need of such propping up.’394 Yet, Homer and Langley, following Maleuvre, 
situates collections as antagonistic to their owners, self-abnegation parading as mastery. 
Like the texts that Maleuvre sets as the apex of realism, Homer and Langley’s non-
realist, blind narrative demonstrates the antagonism, rather than the harmony, between 
subject and object in the bourgeois interior and the unhomeliness of the curated home. 
Doctorow, however, also formally contests realist aesthetic techniques by writing the 
novel through the blind Homer, who can only attend to the archive’s physicality and 
cannot witness it as an orderly dollhouse.  
 
Impossible Self-Reliance 
 Homer and Langley come of age in and inherit from their parents a mansion 
typical of nineteenth-century decorating and realist fiction, and this abode naturalises for 
them a form of dwelling encumbered by objects: ‘it was our legacy, Langley’s and mine, 
this sense of living with things assertively inanimate, and having to walk around them’ 
(7). In part, this obstruction by objects engenders in the brothers a habituated 
homelessness that permits the archive to mushroom to its ultimately fatal size. Homer’s 
remark that their mansion would be ‘bypassed by modernity’ signals towards the vogue 
for collecting that Langley continues to pursue after their parents’ demise, a fashion 
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dispensed with in modern dwellings (6).395 While Langley inherits the Victorian taste for 
collecting from his father, Homer suggests that his brother’s morbid thriftiness ‘bring[s] 
to his passion for collecting things something entirely his own’ (37). Rather than seeking 
out objects for their aesthetic appeal, Langley brings home outmoded technologies, 
inexpensive because they have been technologically surpassed. Like the outdated Model 
T Ford that Langley installs in the dining room, chosen for its discount price, or the 
bicycle built for two with a blown tire, many of the objects are damaged beyond use yet 
remain part of the archive’s vast contents.  
 Archiving the broken or outdated material of the modern city, Langley resembles 
Walter Benjamin’s ragpicker. The ragpicker, child of industrialisation, mines the 
garbage of the street in search of the valuable, the missed, and the forgotten. Benjamin 
argues, through a reading of Charles Baudelaire, that the ragpicker and the poet alike 
take as their projects the refuse of industry, cataloguing material excreted by the 
metropolis.396 From this material, he suggests, they can offer the usually occluded 
account of, what Ben Highmore calls, ‘the broken promises that have been abandoned in 
the everyday trash of history.’397 Writing before the publication of Homer and Langley, 
Michael Wutz notes a sustained commitment to the ragpicker in Doctorow’s work, both 
as characters within his novels and as a method of composition that re-imagines the 
discarded past. Homer and Langley adheres to both of these trends, featuring a 
practicing ragpicker while fictionalising a real-life story and expanding its parameters to 
comment upon the contemporary moment.398 Wutz argues that through both textual 
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strategies, Doctorow positions detritus as material to be refashioned into cultural 
critique, ‘as unfinished business to be rethought and rewritten, as already consumed 
trash to be reused and unrefused.’399 If, as Wutz argues, Doctorow envisions the novelist 
as a ragpicker, capable of radically recycling the past, we can thereby think of Langley’s 
collection as the material for such a narrative endeavour that might challenge official 
history with the objects it has misplaced, suppressed, and discarded. 
 Like Benjamin’s ragpicker and poet, Homer’s discourse on the collection betrays 
its investment in political critique. Long before Homer calls the house ‘a Temple of 
Dissidence,’ he terms the archive, at its apparent inauguration, ‘the collection of artifacts 
from our American life’ (146, 24). Fittingly, Homer articulates this title when Langley 
mounts his WWI rifle on the drawing room mantel, inducting the archive by recalling a 
traumatic event whose official memorialisation in the form of public parades upsets the 
former soldier. Langley’s ragpicker archive, thus, commences out of dissatisfaction with 
mainstream remembrance, but it also bespeaks his troubled relationship with the world 
outside the house. The collection, which in Homer’s estimation rests at the seam of the 
personal and the political, documenting “our American life”, implies a relationship with 
the outside world that becomes increasingly strained as time passes.400 Langley’s 
collection, thus, claims the place that Jacques Derrida stakes out for the archive, 
signifying the ‘institutional passage from the private to the public’.401 
 Langley’s ragpicking stems from and fulfils the homelessness that Maleuvre 
instates at the centre of the nineteenth-century interior, by troubling the distinction 
between the outside and the inside. At the novel’s conclusion, Homer recalls his 
childhood as a time without a border between domestic interior and municipal exterior: 
‘home and park, both lit by the sun, were one and the same’ (207). Whereas Homer 
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evokes a time when both inside and outside worlds seemed trustworthy in their 
orderliness, Langley recasts this observation in terms that highlight his indifference to 
the homely. When questioned about the logic of installing an automobile in the dining 
room, Langley articulates an argument symmetrical with Homer’s childhood nostalgia: 
‘What after all can be said about having a roof over your head that is philosophically 
meaningful? The inside is the outside and the outside is the inside’ (80-1). While here 
Langley disavows the distinction between outside and inside, he nevertheless affords it 
some credence when he states of the same automobile: ‘You wouldn’t think this car was 
hideous to behold on the street. But here in our elegant dining room its true nature as a 
monstrosity is apparent’ (81). As Langley continues to breach the domestic border, the 
objects he imports become truly monstrous, challenging the very possibility of 
household dwelling.  
 Julia Prewitt-Brown has argued that in depictions of the domestic interior, which 
identify people with the objects they own, ‘the bourgeois soul is at once defined and 
imperiled.’402 Prewitt-Brown invests the bourgeois interior with a concern for security 
that becomes increasingly impoverished as capitalism becomes established. Whereas 
seventeenth-century Dutch paintings, such as Vermeer’s The Love Letter, depict 
interiors suffused with security and equilibrium, Prewitt-Brown notes that by the 
nineteenth-century the outside world appears to more violently encroach upon the 
domestic scene.403 Homer and Langley presents a congruent image of the domestic 
collection, wherein Langley’s final attempt to establish an independent space separate 
from the outside world, in which the brothers might achieve a radical Emersonian 
independence, ultimately proves fatal.  
 By forgoing the distinction between inside and outside in the form of his 
collection, Langley creates a distinctly unhomely domestic space, more mausoleum than 
museum. The supply of phonographs that Langley brings home takes the place of 
furniture, and this replacement of domestic comforts by archival objects persists as the 
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house fills up with bric-a-brac. While Homer calls the interior ‘a road on which Langley 
and I were traveling like pilgrims’, this avenue becomes increasingly perilous with the 
continual influx of objects (112). Its rooms, Homer narrates, develop into ‘a kind of 
obstacle course for me’, transforming what should be a familiar layout into foreign 
territory: ‘I was like a traveler who had lost his map’ (96). The collection increasingly 
restructures and obscures the house’s design, Langley building maze-like passageways 
out of his vast archive of newspapers: ‘The house by this time of our lives was a 
labyrinth of hazardous pathways, full of obstructions and many dead ends’ (158). The 
house’s troubling reorganisation occurs alongside its literal deconstruction. During 
WWII, Langley, for instance, ‘contributed to what was called the War Effort by selling 
off the copper rain gutters and chimney flashing of our house’ as well as ‘selling the 
walnut wood paneling from the library and our father’s study’ (86). The collection as a 
means of domesticating the outside world, thus, imperils the home-space, the comforts 
of the interior trumped as its living quarters fill up with foreign objects. 
 As the outside world begins to seem like a more threatening space, Langley 
shifts from a willingness to invite it into the house through the collection to a maniacal 
desire to keep it at bay. Homer’s narration imbues Langley with ‘the strength of no 
illusions’, an inborn sense of alienation that intensifies as the world appears more hostile 
and less orderly (18). After a mobster holds the brothers captive in their own house, 
Langley takes stock of house’s conditions:  
The lintels over the second-floor windows, he said. Chipped away here and there. And the cornice, 
chunks of it missing. I don’t know when that happened. And there’s some sort of filthy bird’s nest 
tucked in one of the gaps. Well why not birds, he said. Home to the world. Thieving servants, 
government agents, crime families, wives…’ (127).  
Here, Langley denigrates the notion that the house might be open to the outside, an 
effect that he previously used to justify his archival endeavour. The police’s raid on the 
brothers’ tea dances, as well as their failed relationships with women, Homer notes, 
‘marked the beginning of our abandonment of the outer world’ (76). While Homer’s 
sense of purpose derives from social participation, from his ability to play records at 
their dances or the community’s common investment in WWII, Langley increasingly 




police during WWII, when the authorities apprehend their Japanese-American 
housekeepers and send them to an internment camp. After this violation, Langley 
advises Homer: ‘This house is our inviolate realm [...] I don’t care what kind of damn 
badge they flash’ (90).  
 While Langley previously deconstructed the distinction between inside and 
outside, he reinstalls the division when announcing to Homer that their primary goal will 
be ‘[s]elf-reliance [...] We don’t need help from anyone. We will keep our own counsel. 
And defend ourselves. We’ve got to stand up to the world—we’re not free if it’s at 
someone else’s sufferance’ (127). Yet, as Homer acknowledges late in the text, ‘Our 
every act of opposition and assertion of our self-reliance, every instance of our creativity 
and resolute expression of our principles was in service of our ruination’ (200). Attempts 
to keep the world at bay, to insist on their independence, result in its insistent return in 
increasingly threatening forms. Such is the case when Langley pulls out the telephone 
only for the repairman to appear, and for the large black shutters that the brothers install 
to function as an invitation to real estate brokers to knock at their door (128). Like his 
swelling menagerie of objects, Langley’s schemes to thwart collection agencies render 
the home increasingly uncomfortable, eliminating its supply of both water and 
electricity.  
 When Langley refuses to continue to pay off their mortgage, he attracts the 
interest of the newspaper media. As a result, the brothers’ house becomes a tourist 
attraction, drawing the ire of the neighbourhood children who throw rocks at its 
windows. Homer understands this attack as the final stage of the brothers’ isolation: 
after losing electricity, water, and gas, they find themselves ‘in a circle of animosity 
rippling outward from our neighbors to creditors, to the press, to the municipality, and, 
finally, to the future—for that was what these children were—rather than being of minor 
significance, well, that was the most devastating blow of all’ (200). In order to ward off 
intruders, Langley fashions his vast archive into a security system, building up 
precarious structures that threaten to collapse and crush any burglars that might trespass. 
Here we see the collection swing from an engagement with the outside world, a 




borders. It is, however, just this sense of security, the imperative to remain self-reliant 
and free of social influences, that transforms the archive into an ultimately self-
annihilating guillotine that destroys the brothers.404 
 Whereas Fredric Jameson sees the nineteenth-century realist narrative contoured 
by the same historical forces that produced the contained bourgeois subject, this 
monadic subject cannot extend into the twentieth century in which the brothers come of 
age.405 Even if the nineteenth-century collector could tame the outside world through his 
acquisitions (which Maleuvre would contest), in the chaotic world of the industrialising 
twentieth-century city this tactic means inviting external chaos into the living room. 
Surrounded by an impeding municipal and capitalist infrastructure, the brothers’ attempt 
to separate themselves from society must, then, finally destroy them. Yet, this section 
has argued that their sacrifice appears simultaneously encoded into the collecting spirit 
that Langley inherits from his parents, the nineteenth-century archival interior having 
conditioned an indifference to domesticity that permits the archive to swell. The 
nineteenth-century endeavour to domesticate the outside world ultimately sees that 
external space, through its collected debris, disrupt the very foundations of the home and 
the self.  
 
Archive Fever and the Violent Future  
 This section interrogates the grim conclusion of Langley’s archive, the fatal blow 
it delivers to the two brothers. Morris notes the consistent theme of historical recurrence 
within Doctorow’s works, analysing it through Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of the 
eternal return, which emphasises the circularity of history and, in Heidegger’s 
interpretation, the impossibility of making an original philosophical conjecture.406 Homer 
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and Langley similarly scrutinises repetition and revolution, explicitly in Homer’s 
distinction between anarchy and change and in Langley’s Theory of Replacements, but 
also more subtly through the temporal vagaries of the archive. This section will 
contemplate the temporality of the archive in Homer and Langley through the lens of 
Derrida’s ‘Archive Fever’. By twinning historical recurrence with historical 
transformation and archival repetition with archival destruction, Derrida provides a 
salient model for analysing the novel’s logic of prophecy and destruction. As such, I 
claim that Homer and Langley provides a framework through which to examine 
Derrida’s abstract claims about the archive in action. 
 Doctorow’s novel Billy Bathgate explores the archive’s projection of a future and 
participation in its construction through another ragpicker archive. Like Langley, Arnold 
Garbage sifts through the detritus of New York City, discovering objects that will prove 
valuable. It is from his collection that, as Philip E. Simmons notes, Billy Bathgate buys 
the gun with which he launches his career in the mob, the narrative propelled by the 
junkyard. In comparison to the linearity of Billy’s narrative, enervated by the archive, 
Simmons suggests that the ragpicker collection itself rests outside of time: Garbage, he 
writes, ‘provides a model of an alternative mode of existence outside history in the stasis 
of the collection.’407 When Billy throws a party in Garbage’s trash-filled basement, the 
children find clothes and costumes from bygone eras to affect adulthood, symbolically 
transported into their futures through the materials of the past: ‘so by and by in the 
smoke and jazz we were all just the way we wanted to be, dancing in the dust of the 
Embassy Club of our futures, in the costumes of shy children’s love’.408 The archive, 
here, provides the raw material for erecting the future in the present, for embodying 
adulthood though only fleetingly. 
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 While, in Billy Bathgate, the archive’s old-fashioned clothing allows the children 
to project themselves into a future space, Doctorow’s first novel, Welcome to Hard 
Times, envisions a violence heralded by the archive’s initiation. Welcome begins with 
the ruination of a small town at the hands of the Bad Man from Bodie, who, after the 
town is rebuilt, returns to devastate it for a second time. The novel is written by Blue, 
called the mayor of Hard Times by its inhabitants because he records the town’s 
distribution of property. Marilyn Arnold notes that Welcome stages a competition 
between the wilderness’s chaos and civilisation’s order, embodied respectively in the 
Bad Man and Blue. She argues that, for Doctorow, the historical process involves 
building ‘the future in the image of the past, producing an inevitable cycling of 
history.’409 I suggest a reading that, while congruent with Arnold’s analysis, accentuates 
the role played by archival law in the destruction of the town.  
 Blue, in my interpretation, ensures the town’s destruction by stabilising property 
ownership with his records—that is, by establishing an archival system. When the Bad 
Man first attacks, he trails Blue such that he cannot recover his ledgers inscribed with 
the town’s records and, later, finds that they have been obliterated: ‘The drawers were 
burnt out and I found just the covers left of my ledgers.’410 If, here, the records must 
perish alongside the town, elsewhere the archive appears more conspicuously violent. 
Blue acknowledges the record’s fatal danger when he narrates, ‘I’m losing my blood to 
this rag, but more, I have the cold feeling everything I’ve written doesn’t tell how it was, 
no matter how careful I’ve been to get it all down it still escapes me’.411 In this sentence, 
as Morris notes, the ‘rag’ stands ambiguously for Blue’s bandages and for the ledgers in 
which he writes the novel, ‘but in either case the flows of blood and ink are concurrent 
and futile.’412 As a result of the record’s engrained violence to that which it signifies, 
Blue finally decides that the only record worth pursing is one already marked by death:  
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I scorn myself for a fool for all the bookkeeping I’ve done; as if notations in a ledger can fix life, as 
if some marks in a book can control things. There is only one record to keep and that’s the one I’m 
writing now, across the red lines, over the old marks. It won’t help me nor anyone I know. “This is 
who’s dead,” it says.413 
This integration of annihilation into the logic of invention, in which, as Blue writes, ‘our 
end was in our beginning’, voices the self-destruction mechanism that, as we shall see, 
Derrida embeds within archival memorialisation.414 Records, Blue notes, serve to 
establish the town at the same time as they engrave its failure. With this knowledge, 
after the Bad Man’s second strike he obscures his second attempt to set down the town’s 
distribution of property by writing over it the narrative of its destruction: death, in 
Welcome, can be an archive’s only topic.   
 Whereas Billy Bathgate figures the archive as a means of envisioning and 
entering a possible future, Welcome sees in the future the necessary effacement of the 
archive and of that which it represents. Derrida provides a means of considering the 
archives of these two texts and their alternative relationships to the future alongside each 
other. He suggests that every archive subjects its objects to an ‘archontic principle’, or a 
‘principle of consignation’, that unites them into a system of agreement.415 This archival 
law possesses both ‘institutive and conservative’ functions, establishing the terms of the 
archive and conserving the past through its fabricated regime.416 Derrida’s concepts of 
the archive and the archontic principle counterbalance two relationships with the future: 
the future as it might come, such as the smoky jazz club Billy Bathgate and his friends 
fashion from Garbage’s mess, and the future of destruction that consumes both archive 
and town in Hard Times.417 On the one hand, the archive anticipates the future through 
its archontic principle, materialising the past and submitting it to a law that can be 
repeated over the course of time. As Mark Currie notes, the archive—as a ‘wager’, ‘a 
pledge’, and ‘a token of the future’418—‘structures the present in anticipation of its 
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recollection.’419 That is, from the standpoint of an imagined future, the archivist fashions 
its materials into a system of what ought to have been remembered.420 Yet, Currie also 
notes of Derrida’s thinking: ‘we post things out into the future on the basis of a kind of 
promise, but amid the possibility that things will go wrong, that our messages may not 
be received, or that the futures that we have envisaged may not come about.’421 In the 
case of the archive, the imagination of the future appears ensconced in a form that, while 
it strives to remember also actively works to forget.  
 Derrida twins the archontic principle, which fashions memory into a format that 
can be repeated in the future, with an amnesic drive that eliminates all trace of the 
archive. He argues that the principle that organises the archive is premised on an initial 
trauma that reduces the objects’ singularity into a homogenous system: ‘The One, as 
self-repetition, can only repeat and recall this instituting violence. It can only affirm 
itself and engage itself in this repetition.’422 This archival repetition at once invites the 
objectified past into a system of remembrance and encodes it with death, destruction, 
and the failure of order: 
if there is no archive without consignation in an external place which assures the possibility of 
memorization, of repetition, of reproduction, or of reimpression, then we must also remember that 
repetition itself, the logic of repetition, indeed the repetition compulsion, remains, according to 
Freud, indissociable from the death drive. And thus from destruction. Consequence: right on what 
permits and conditions archivization, we will never find anything other than what exposes to 
destruction, in truth what menaces with destruction introducing, a priori, forgetfulness and the 
archiviolithic into the heart of the monument.423 
The archive’s destruction, then, is written into its very superstructure from the moment 
of its inauguration. Thus, we find in Derrida’s ‘Archive Fever’ repetition twinned with 
destruction, a temporal logic present elsewhere in his writing.  
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 Derrida frequently twins novelty with repetition, when, for instance, in Specters 
of Marx, he terms the coming of the ghost, ‘Repetition and first time’.424 Currie notes the 
confluence of these seeming opposites in Derrida’s concept of invention: ‘The making 
of something new is indissociable from the discovery of something that was already 
there, and these are, at the same time, the two faces of truth, and two apparently 
incompatible concepts of time.’425 Derrida dares us to think of singularity and repetition 
together in the figure of the event-machine, which Currie suggests, forms ‘a model for 
intellectual change, based neither on the paradigm nor the event, the structure or the 
irruption, which sees the emergence of novelty as something unthinkable without a sense 
of what has already taken place.’426 The impossible event, for Derrida, is always hidden 
in and hidden from the possibilities of the present, and so the new, or the unforeseen, can 
only exist in relationship to the context from which it develops. We might apply this 
logic of change, of the coincidence of repetition and novelty, to the functioning of the 
archive. By consolidating a structure of repetition, the archive opens itself up to be 
undone by events or objects that its system cannot handle or consider. The archive, thus, 
institutes a framework of classification that hardens as it recurs, ensuring that the system 
will be dismayed by the arrival of items or information that structurally it cannot account 
for.  
 Homer and Langley explores this same scheme of archival disaster. The novel 
sets up this temporal formula through Homer’s attempt to distinguish between ‘anarchy’ 
and ‘evolutionary change’: ‘The one was the world falling to pieces, the other was only 
the inevitable creep of time, [...] the turning over of the seconds and minutes of life to 
show its ever new guise’ (25). In an essay on Einstein, Doctorow makes a similar 
distinction between sudden revolution and incremental evolution, before determining 
that the great discoveries of science emerge from both forms of temporality at once: 
‘Perhaps there is an evolving communal intellect, and its role is periodically to be 
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stunned and possibly outraged by the revolutionary ideas that it had not realized it was 
itself fomenting.’427 Here, Doctorow advances a theory of historical change in which the 
accumulation of data and its consolidation of a system of knowledge creates the 
conditions for that system to throw itself into disarray, producing a new theory that 
negates yet springs from that previous framework. As is the case with Derrida, 
Doctorow’s theory of systemic change refracts back into his notions of the archive and 
its eventual destruction. If the creation of a field of knowledge spells its eventual 
obsolescence, the gradual accumulation of objects once pinned down to a system of 
meaning leads to the archive’s collapse and, in Homer and Langley, the catastrophic 
deaths of the two Collyer brothers. Though Homer initially decides that Langley’s 
collecting and the decomposition of the house rest merely in the realm of natural 
evolution, its creeping repetition—and, as we shall see, its investment in a principle of 
repetition—develops into an anarchic system that can only eclipse itself. This 
slipperiness between ‘evolution’ and ‘anarchy’ is coded into their very definitions: 
within the archive, the slow movement of evolution literally is the anarchic ‘world 
falling to pieces’, historical events monumentalised into distinct pieces for display.  
 
Homer and Langley’s Archive Fever  
 Homer and Langley provides the most sustained consideration of archive fever in 
Doctorow’s corpus, and I will track its expression in the novel’s two archives: the 
ragpicker archive, more generally, and the newspaper archive through which Langley 
hopes to create a newspaper that will never fall out of date. Homer and Langley 
emphasises the archive’s engagement with the future, suggesting that its meaning takes 
shape and changes over time. As such, it agrees with Derrida’s assertion that the 
archive’s meaning defers itself to the future. Derrida writes, ‘The archive: if we want to 
know what this will have meant, we will only know in the times to come. Perhaps. Not 
tomorrow but in the times to come, later on or perhaps never.’428 We might consider this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
427 E.L. Doctorow, ‘Einstein: Seeing the Unseen’, in Creationists, pp. 151-63 (p. 156). Emphasis in 
original. 
428 Derrida, ‘Archive’, p. 27. Here, Derrida relates the temporality of the archive to the future perfect, or 




suggestion through Homer and Langley’s consistent deployment of archival objects as 
retrospectively prophetic at three moments in the narrative.  
 After the brothers have learned of his death, Harold Robileaux’s message 
recorded on a vinyl disc arrives at their door, temporarily vivifying his ghost and 
seemingly foretelling his demise. Although its postage stamp reveals that it predates 
Harold’s death, the record’s appearance temporarily convinces his grandmother that he 
is still alive. The funereal music that Harold plays, however, seemingly predicts his 
death and finally persuades her that he has in fact perished: ‘maybe it was that solemnly 
reflective dirge, the mournful tones filling all our rooms over and over, as if Harold 
Robileaux was prophesying his own death, that made her admit to herself, after all, that 
her grandson was gone’ (98). The record, then, is embedded with two forms of haunting: 
the past haunts the present, as Harold’s archival remains reemerge temporarily to throw 
his death into question. More significantly, with hindsight the present seems haunted by 
the future, Harold foretelling his own death in the mournful tune he opts to record. 
 Like the record inflected with Harold’s future death, so too does Langley’s 
television boast seemingly prophetic powers, Homer calling it, ‘the eye of an oracle 
looking into our house’ (111). Soon after Homer watches Vincent testify before a Senate 
committee, the gangster reappears many years after their initial meeting and 
commandeers the brother’s house as a hideout. Vincent’s sudden reentrance into the 
brothers’ lives affirms Homer’s ‘vague sense of expectation’ wrought from 
coincidentally encountering him on TV and, later, in a radio report (112). Vincent’s 
unexpected arrival, as a result, seems retrospectively predicted by the television that 
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reminded the brothers of his existence and projected his image into the living room he 
would soon occupy. Homer characterises this recurrence as ‘an improbability that had a 
certain logic to it’, and he explains it through desire: ‘I think now what happened I had 
wanted to happen’ (112).  
 A final impossible prediction occurs in the form of Central Park. At the novel’s 
beginning, Homer notes that as industrialisation became more widespread and more 
chaotic in his late-nineteenth-century childhood, ‘the more the American people 
worshipped Nature’ (8). The French journalist Jacqueline Roux, the muse of Homer’s 
diary, theorises that Central Park anticipated this corruption of and consequential 
fetishisation of nature: ‘But to me it suggests what they may not have intended—a 
foretelling—this sequestered square of nature created for the time coming of the end of 
nature’ (188). Yet, Homer argues that, ‘They built this park in the nineteenth century 
[...]. Before the city was there to surround it. Nature was everywhere, who would have 
thought about it coming to an end?’ (188). Although Jacqueline notes that Central Park 
was likely constructed as ‘a work of art constructed from nature’, her temporal remove 
from its origins allows her to read it anew, to understand it within history as an 
unexplainably prescient preparation (187).  
 Rather than lending it the quality of clairvoyance, these moments connote 
material memory’s openness to the unanticipated future for awarding retrospective 
meaning. As occurs in the examples above, the archive’s meaning shifts to 
accommodate unexpected events, imbuing it with the aura of prophecy. And yet, it is no 
mistake that these unexpected events, seemingly prefigured by their respective 
archives—the record, TV, and Park—accompany destruction and danger: Harold’s 
death, Homer and Langley’s capture, and Nature’s demise all appear encrypted into 
much more innocent documents. These hints of Derrida’s archiviolithic force emerge 
most fully, however, in the ragpicker archive, where Langley’s investment in historical 
repetition proves ruinous. The example of Central Park is particularly instructive. 
Jacqueline’s wonders if Central Park feels unique ‘[b]ecause it is so organized, so 
planned? A geometrical construction with such rigid borders’ (186). She hints that it is 




nature. This same quality of rigidity, I suggest, similarly becomes responsible for the 
failure of Langley’s two archival structures.  
 Like Derrida’s description of the archive, Langley orientates his collection 
towards the future, choosing inexpensive objects whose value, he trusts, will reemerge in 
time. Langley’s belief in recycling, in a form of historical repetition in which his 
outdated objects will find themselves useful once more, encodes the collection with 
anticipation. Along with saving money, Homer links Langley’s ragpicking with ‘finding 
value in things other people have thrown away or that may be of future use in one way 
or another’ (37). When Langley brings home the monstrous Model T Ford, Homer 
diagnoses its appeal: ‘he’d operated from an unthinking impulse, seeing the car on one 
of his collecting jaunts around town and instantly deciding he must have it while trusting 
that the reason he found it so valuable would eventually become clear to him’ (81). The 
same sense of temporal delay animates the other assorted objects. Homer lists ‘a worn-
out chaise longue,’ ‘an old refrigerator,’ and ‘stacks of roof shingles’ among the ‘things 
accumulated over the years that we had bought or salvaged in expectation of their 
possible usefulness sometime in the future’ (95). Objects that could seemingly be 
employed to bolster their crumbling abode remain ensconced in the archive awaiting a 
future utility that finally arrives in the form of Langley’s security system. 
 When Langley decides to heap his miscellany into precarious pyramids and other 
traps, Homer lends the collection the same retrospective soothsaying that he applied to 
Harold’s record, to his television, and to Central Park. Indeed, as I argued above, the 
impulse to invite the outside world into the home through collected objects seems 
already coded with a future where that outside world would need to be shut out. Homer 
notes that Langley ‘began to devise from the hoarded materials of our life in this 
house—as if everything here had been amassed in response to a prophetic intelligence—
the means of our last stand’ (200-1). Yet the finality of this statement—their ‘last 
stand’—starkly contrasts with the overwhelming sense of the future’s unpredictability 
that colours the novel. Martin Hägglund argues, in his explanation of ‘radical atheism’, 
that Derrida’s trace structure of time insists on ‘radical finitude’, on the threat of future 




constancy because only with the possibility of decay and destruction can objects of 
desire exist as such.429 Homer and Langley reiterates this same indeterminacy of the 
future.430 Homer tells a joke whose punch line depends on this very uncertainty: 
‘Someone dying asks if there is life after death. Yes, comes the answer, only not yours’ 
(101). The future, here, remains open to retellings and reinterpretations implied by 
Doctorow’s own ragpicker ethics. Indeed, as I suggested earlier, this novel functions as 
an insurrection into the mythic past, reconsidering the notorious case of the historical 
Collyer hoarders. Doctorow’s novel in the real world, and Homer’s diary within the 
world of the novel, thus answers the text’s crucial question: ‘How could we cope, once 
dead and gone, with no one available to reclaim our history?’ (200). By rebelling against 
Langley’s final arrangement, the archive thwarts the anticipated future and embraces 
indeterminacy and disruption. 
 Homer and Langley’s parable of archival destruction shares much with Derrida’s 
theory of archive fever. The archive’s concluding outburst coincides with the realisation 
of its promise of repetition: it is precisely when Langley discovers a second use for his 
hoarded objects that they rebel against his design and destroy him and his brother. The 
curation of the objects into a security system finally sees the archive’s organisation, the 
fruition of Langley’s trust in its future usefulness. Like Derrida does in his theoretical 
writings, then, Homer and Langley marries archival destruction with the principle of 
repetition: the accumulation of objects into a system leads to the detonation of the 
collection and, within the novel, the termination of the collector himself. In the next 
section, I link this process of archival accretion with the contemporary discourse of 
information overload, further elucidating the struggle between accumulation and 
systematisation in the novel. While typically in Doctorow’s oeuvre the archive provides 
a reservoir of historical knowledge and the impetus for historical narrative, Homer and 
Langley announces a newfound concern over a surplus of historical information that 
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might overpower meaning and consciousness itself. The specificities of archive fever 
and its interrelation with information overload come into greater focus with Langley’s 
attempt to create an eternally-relevant newspaper.  
 
Information Overload 
 Information overload has become a popular concept for describing the frenetic 
style of data consumption structured by digital technology, but Homer and Langley’s 
demise also allegorically connects with this contemporary anxiety.431 Nicolas Carr, in 
The Shallows, writes of our ‘cognitive load’ as the information the mind is tasked with 
handling at a given moment: ‘When the load exceeds our mind’s ability to store and 
process the information [...] we’re unable to retain the information or to draw 
connections with the information already stored in our long-term memory. We can’t 
translate the new information into schemas.’432 Nancy Van House and Elizabeth 
Churchill charge digital media with fostering such an overflow of personal objects, 
suggesting that the ease with which memories can be captured and stored has lead to 
‘curatorial overload: too much information, too difficult to organize and retrieve.’433 Like 
Carr, Van House, and Churchill, Daniel Rosenberg acknowledges the currency of 
information overload as a term for explaining contemporary experiences on digital 
platforms, but he also emphasises the concept’s long history, its salience to the explosion 
of printed information between 1550 and 1750. Rosenberg questions how such a 
historically-rooted phenomenon can recur with the illusion of novelty, lending 
information overload a cyclical temporality by asking whether those technologies 
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invented to quell overload in turn reproduce it in new forms.434 Katherine E. Ellison 
provides an analysis of information overload at a similar historical moment, noting its 
appearance in early eighteenth-century British literature. Ellison argues that it is at this 
moment in history that the concept of information comes into focus, with authors 
imagining it almost immediately ‘as a physically and psychologically threatening entity, 
at once material and immaterial, with the capability of overloading the human body and 
intellect.’435 
 The dual hazards of information formulated by Ellison both surface in Homer 
and Langley’s archive: I have already discussed the physical threat of the overload of 
archival objects and I now turn to the conceptual threat posed by information in the 
novel, specifically in the form of Langley’s newspaper project.436 Alongside his 
ragpicker archive, Langley hoards newspapers in the hopes of compiling from that vast 
archive a single edition that will never go out of date. Homer writes:  
For five cents, Langley said, the reader will have a portrait in newsprint of our life on earth. The 
stories will not have overly particular details as you find in ordinary daily rags, because the real 
news here is of the Universal Forms of which any particular detail would only be an example. The 
reader will always be up to date, and au courant with what is going on. He will be assured that he 
reads of indisputable truths of the day including that of his own impending death, which will be 
dutifully recorded as a number in the blank box on the last page under the heading Obituaries. (49) 
To develop this technology, Langley scours newspapers for repeated events, seeking out 
those occurrences most telling of human behaviour. In this way, the newspaper, like the 
ragpicker archive, implies a belief in historical repetition that Langley makes explicit in 
his Theory of Replacements. This principle articulates what Homer calls ‘a metaphysical 
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sort of idea of the repetition or recurrence of life events, the same things happening over 
and over,’ wherein the same roles, categories, and structures recur to be filled with 
members of successive generations (48). When stated most succinctly, the Theory of 
Replacements evokes Derrida’s combination of repetition and newness: ‘There is 
progress while at the same time nothing changes’ (14). For Homer, however, Langley’s 
insistence on historical repetition fails to accommodate the reality of radical historical 
transformation. In the previous section I argued that, by attempting to determine the 
archive’s meaning in the construction of the security system, Langley denies the 
uncertainty of the future and thereby ensures the objects’ rebellion. Here, similarly, 
whenever Langley attempts to nail down an archival law, ‘to fix American life finally in 
one edition,’ events occur that confound any system he might try to instigate (49). 
 Langley’s curatorial project betrays an attempt to control temporal flow through 
the development of an archival law that delimits those events that will recur over time. 
Homer reports: 
Langley’s project consisted of counting and filing news stories according to category: invasions, 
wars, mass murders, auto, train, and plane wrecks, love scandals, church scandals, robberies, 
murders, lynchings, rapes, political misdoings with a subhead of crooked elections, police 
misdeeds, gangland rubouts, investment scams, strikes, tenement fires, trials civil, trials criminal, 
and so on. There was a separate category for natural disasters such as epidemics, earthquakes, and 
hurricanes. I can’t remember what all the categories were. As he explained, eventually—he did not 
say when—he would have enough statistical evidence to narrow his findings to the kinds of events 
that were, by their frequency, seminal human behavior. (48) 
The dateless newspaper would appear to empty the future of unpredictability, suggesting 
that what is to come will always be a repetition of something that has already been. 
Building the newspaper, however, hinges on defining an archival system into which 
repeated events can be slotted, and this endeavour proves impossible: Homer notes, ‘it 
was a big organizational problem for him to cull from years of daily newspapers the 
signal episodes and kinds of activities that are timeless’ (166). Tom LeClair suggests, 
‘Overload results when the rate of information [...] becomes too high for the receiver to 
process, to sort and integrate within his operative categories.’437 This is precisely the 
organisational dilemma that confronts Langley. Like the volatile ragpicker archive, the 
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newspaper project sees Langley attempt to produce a final archival system—the dateless 
newspaper—yet the sheer quantity and variety of events explodes the universal system 
he seeks to devise. 
 As Langley strives to unearth the rules of historical repetition, he encounters 
occurrences without precedent that fit no archontic principle (49). The moon landing, for 
instance, prompts Langley to add a file for ‘technological achievement’, and he decides 
that the apotheosis of this category would be the ability to leave Earth for another planet:  
There will be none after that because we will reproduce everything that we did on earth, we’ll go 
through the whole sequence all over again somewhere else, and people will read my paper as 
prophecy, and know that having gotten off one planet, they will be able to destroy another with 
confidence. (136)  
Whereas Langley is able to interpolate the moon landing into his theory of historical 
repetition, his vast amounts of data struggle against the categories he delimits. ‘Where 
do you put this event?’ becomes the crucial question of the newspaper project: the 
bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church that killed four girls in 1963 drives Langley to 
develop a category for ‘the murder of innocents,’ into which he also slots the Kent State 
shootings and the murders of people registering others to vote (165). Although he 
considers classifying it under ‘Fashion’, the mass suicide at Jamestown in 1978 forces 
Langley to finally create ‘a pending file of one-of-a-kind headline events’ (166). In 
addition to Richard Nixon’s ‘[p]residential malfeasance’, Langley decides that he and 
his brother also reside in this pending file: ‘Unless someone comes along as remarkably 
prophetic as we are, I’m obliged to ignore our existence’ (167, 176). 
  The attempted curation of the newspaper repository into a dateless edition sees 
Langley strive to apply to the headlines of the past a concrete archival system. Langley’s 
struggle to discern a viable strategy for organising these events seems to confound his 
theory of history’s repetition and the predictability of the future. Those categories that 
are significant during one historical era recede in others, newly iconic types of events 
demanding the institution of fresh categories and files: Langley, for instance, develops 
‘the murder of innocents’ file to attend to the rash of those events during the civil rights 
upheavals of the 1960s. The impossibility of compiling a system of meaning broadly 




which, as Kristin Veel writes, ‘The process of appraisal and selection [...] is a continual 
one, and not just something that takes place when the archive is founded. That which is 
unexpected and overloads the archival system at one stage may be integrated into it at a 
later point.’438 Whereas, in Veel’s account, the digital archive is particularly well-suited 
to a fluidity that immobilises overload, Langley’s newspaper project, by attempting to 
deny unpredictability, ensures the eventual overload of its logical apparatus.  
 Yet, it is not just the denial of the future but also the sheer quantity of 
information that proves impossible for Langley and for the archive to handle, and in this 
respect Homer and Langley differs from Doctorow’s earlier account of conceptual 
overload in The Waterworks. Published a decade and a half earlier, The Waterworks 
provides a salient comparison by focusing, as Wutz demonstrates, on the relationship 
between data surplus and the archive—specifically the newspaper archive. The 
Waterworks is a detective story, in which the narrator, a newspaper editor, McIlvaine 
and trustworthy police officer Edmund Donne seek to track down the supposedly dead 
millionaire August Pemberton. Its setting is the quickly expanding and industrialising 
nineteenth-century New York, a metropolis defined in terms of ‘[e]xcess in 
everything—pleasure, gaudy display, endless toil, and death.’439 To become readable, 
McIlvaine suggests, this frenzied urban milieu requires new forms of mapping, 
embodied both in the newspaper and in the detective Donne: 
There was something else about Donne—he held the whole city in his mind as if it were a village. 
In a village, people don’t need a newspaper. Newspapers arise only when things begin to happen 
that people cannot see and hear for themselves. Newspapers are the expedient of the municipally 
dissociated. But Donne had the capacious mind of a villager.440  
Wutz argues that Donne and the novel’s supervillain, Dr. Sartorius, represent ‘two Lords 
of Information’ for their ability to deal with these swarms of data. Donne’s ability to 
transform the chaotic city into a placid and comprehensible village, his ability to keep in 
mind the various threads of the mystery simultaneously, emerges from adept sorting and 
storage and from recourse to the archive. Wutz argues: ‘only that which is absolutely 
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essential must be committed to memory; the rest, as with Donne’s arcane resources, 
need only be retrievable from other data banks and not block the human data bank, a.k.a. 
the brain.’441 
 The archives of The Waterworks, thus, operate as a resource to overcome 
information overload. Donne ensures mental acuity by filtering out unnecessary data, or 
information otherwise retrievable from archives, thereby freeing his mind to solve the 
mystery. This formulation, however, requires archives immune to overload, capable of 
storing and structuring the metropolis’s overwhelming output of data. Unlike the 
Collyer’s uncontrollable newspaper archive, The Waterworks’s equivalent proves just 
about manageable, despite being instituted to account for numerous papers printing 
increasingly voluminous amounts of information: 
Now we had three or four young men sitting down there with scissors and paste pots who were 
never more than a month or two behind—fifteen New York dailies a day were dropped on their 
tables, after all—and I could go to a file drawer fully confident of finding a folder marked 
Pemberton, August.’442  
Whereas The Waterworks’s archives allow Donne to navigate the mystery’s various 
leads and piece together the almost-supernatural narrative of Pemberton’s death, 
reappearance, and suspended animation, Homer and Langley interrogates the possibility 
of archives that can support the society’s vast fields of data. In the later novel, such 
broad archives refuse containment, imperilled by overload and threatening the well-
being of their owners. In Doctorow’s twenty-first-century reconsideration of information 
overload, the archive, thus, becomes infected by overload rather than a player in its 
defeat.  
 
Curation, the Newspaper, and the Novel 
 Matthew Reynolds notes the presence of several figures and objects from 
Doctorow’s previous novels within Homer and Langley’s pages. The Model T Ford, 
which attracts the racialised vandalism that instigates Ragtime’s conclusion, resurfaces 
in Langley’s collection but here, Reynolds’s notes, it ‘stays half-dismantled in the 
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dining-room’ like the archive’s other static machines.443 He continues: ‘In addition to the 
echoes of Ragtime, the hippies come from the world of The Book of Daniel; and the 
gangster Vincent, and the irritating fire inspector, from that of Billy Bathgate.’444 We 
might classify Doctorow’s re-imagination of previously explored characters as another 
act of ragpicking that resists adding new content to a historical moment already awash in 
narrative. Indeed, Joseph M. Conte argues that, today, the novelist’s job becomes 
filtering and shaping already-existing data into meaningful forms rather than 
contributing to what he calls the ‘superabundance of information’.445 Yet, unlike 
Doctorow’s previous novels that seem to valorise ragpicking, Homer and Langley also 
recognises the threat of information overload within the archive of recycled material to 
destroy systems of meaning and to overwhelm the archivist him or herself. Reynolds, 
contemplating the reappearance of these iconic figures from Doctorow’s oeuvre, writes: 
‘There is satisfaction in this elegiac review of his career, but also some self-criticism.’ 446 
Here, I locate that ‘self-criticism’ in Homer and Langley’s newfound wariness over wild 
conservation that complicates Doctorow’s typical interest in the politics of ragpicking.  
 In asking, through the threatening archive, whether it is possible to hold on to too 
much of the past, Doctorow throws into contention his previous theory that, when 
writing about history, ‘the important thing is to have as many sources of information, as 
many testimonies as possible—because if you don’t, history turns into mythology.’447 
Langley’s interminable newspaper project troubles this strategy of disseminating history, 
demonstrating how the apparatus of meaning can be overthrown by too much data, too 
many competing voices. On the one hand, Doctorow prioritises a varied diagram of the 
past that neither ignores any one account nor insists on weaving them into a seamless, 
consistent image. Homer and Langley, however, demonstrates that such an inclusive 
representational strategy introduces the threat of overload, of splintering the past into so 
many shards that they offer only violence to signification. This predicament, that there is 
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an ethical imperative to represent more historical narratives at a time of information 
overload, recalls Huyssen’s diagnosis of contemporary culture and the technologies that 
structure it, introduced at the beginning of this chapter. In articulating this paradox, the 
novel demands thoughtful curational strategies that filter the archive into intelligible but 
still-diverse arrangements. We shall see that, in proposing curation in the form of 
narrative attuned to musicality, the novel returns to a discourse of perspective that 
dismisses realist unification for the uncertainty of vision-in-blindness.448 In blindness, 
that is to say, the novel locates an ‘aletheic’ vision that can acknowledge and leave space 
for a diversity of perspectives.  
 Several times the novel implies the necessity of curation to curb the threat posed 
by the archive as it fills Homer and Langley’s home. Homer calls upon the possibility of 
future organisation when commenting on the G.I. ware that Langley leaves haphazardly 
strewn across the house: it is, he writes, ‘almost as if we were a museum, though with 
our riches as yet uncataloged, the curation still to come’ (102). The cull that might have 
rescued the brothers, however, never quite happens, although they are presented with 
several opportunities to purge their supplies. The police raid on the brothers’ tea dances 
leaves Langley’s objects in ruins, rooms cleared both of his bric-a-brac and those 
ornaments collected by his parents: ‘the house seemed cavernous. [...] I felt as if we 
were no longer in the home we had lived in since our childhood, but in a new place, as 
yet unlived in, with its imprint on our souls still to be determined’ (75-6). The police 
raid, thus, offers the brothers a clean slate to re-imagine the home as something other 
than a mausoleum. Langley does use the raid as an opportunity to organise his objects, 
approaching the rubble ‘as salvage, inspecting everything for its value [...] and filing 
things according to category in cardboard boxes’ (76). The Hoshiyamas, who housekeep 
for the brothers, similarly organise Langley’s objects: they ‘curate these materials, 
setting them out on furniture or in bookshelves, these odd jumbles of used and discarded 
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children’s things’ (83-4). In doing so, the Hoshiyamas restore to the home to working 
order, though one that will, of course, be short-lived. While these curatorial enterprises 
do not prevent Homer and Langley from collecting themselves to death, they do 
demonstrate the need to marshal the archive into meaningful arrangements before it can 
expand beyond containment.  
 The novel, however, also shows curation to be a violent endeavour. As we have 
seen, lending the archive a final organisation meant to sustain their independence ends 
up destroying the brothers; and, Langley’s attempt to categorise the newspaper archive 
can only produce blind spots that end up undoing the strength of the system. The 
violence of curation registers in the harsh clatter made by Langley’s fast-paced typing on 
the typewriter he uses to compile the dateless edition: this noise, amplified by its 
reverberations through the floor below, sounds to the gangster, Vincent, like gunshots, 
‘like another attempt on [his] life’ (120). In its interrogation of the newspaper as a form 
of curation, the novel again recalls The Waterworks, which envisions the numerous 
columns of the broadsheet as relaying the various coeval workings of the metropolitan 
environment when read concurrently: McIlvaine writes, ‘no meaning was possible from 
any one column without the sense of all of them in . . . simultaneous descent . . . our life 
of brazen terrors spending itself across seven word-packed columns of simultaneous 
descent . . . offered from children’s hands for a penny or two.’449 McIlvaine even uses the 
model of the newspaper edition (not the singular newspaper story) when composing the 
novel, as he moves self-consciously between various narrative threads whose overlaps, 
he insists, will become intelligible in the end: ‘let me assure you that finally all the 
columns will be joined to read across the page . . . like cuneiform carved across the 
stele.’450 Wutz argues that The Waterworks presents the novel, rather than journalism, as 
the archival form most adept at processing and disseminating historical information. 
Whereas the novel’s temporal remove enables it to ‘submit data to a winnowing or 
filtering process separating the wheat from the chaff, or the flotsam from the jetsam’, 
journalism, ‘bound to the world of verifiable fact and to the protocols of quick 
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information delivery, engages with the immediate present, without the privilege of 
retrospection and ripening reflection.’451 Wutz thus suggests that the novel emerges as a 
form of authorship suited to handling data overload, by providing the temporal distance 
needed for picking out relevant information.  
 As forms of curation, Homer and Langley also prefers the novel to the 
newspaper, literary fluidity to archival rigidity, but its rationale differs from the one 
Wutz decodes in The Waterworks. His argument too closely evokes, through its 
language of situational remove, the realist perspective that, as I previously argued, 
Doctorow circumvents by telling the Collyers’ story through the blind Homer. The novel 
notes several cases in which newspapers fail to report accurately on events, those men 
seeking donations door-to-door possessing more information about the Holocaust than 
the papers that fail to call attention to it or mention it only ‘on the back pages in dribs 
and drabs with no appreciation of the enormity of the horror’ (93). This failure of 
reportage leads Langley to charge news organisations with complicity in ‘our 
government’s do-nothing policy’, identifying the paper as the mouthpiece of official 
history rather than a voice of criticism or a multi-voiced compendium (93). The 
technology of the broadsheet, in this account, creates and stabilises fact even as it fails to 
represent it, a charge that Doctorow articulates in ‘False Documents’: Homer calls 
reporters ‘a class of disgustingly fallible human beings who turned themselves into 
infallible print every day, compounding the historical record that stood in our house like 
bales of cotton’ (175). Nowhere is this accusation felt more sharply than in newspaper 
stories about the brothers’ themselves whose apocryphal details, taken seriously, 
transform them into neighbourhood targets and historical oddballs.  
 Homer and Langley, thus, situates the newspaper within what Doctorow 
previously termed ‘the language of the regime’, the voice of sanctioned history that 
consolidates a universe of observable fact and omits alternative accounts. The 
newspaper, then, stands for just the mythology that the novel is designed to contest by 
plucking the brothers from the dust of history to creatively reexamine and re-imagine 
their story. Whereas in The Waterworks, the newspaper is lent a panoramic viewpoint 
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that renders immediately visible and accessible the vast space of the metropolis, Homer 
and Langley finds in it a narrowing down of critical perspectives. Langley comments:   
I look at all these papers [...] and they may come at you from the right or the left or the muddled 
middle but they are inevitably of a place, they are set like stone in a location that they insist is the 
center of the universe. They are presumptively, arrogantly local, and at the same time nationally 
bullish. So that is what I will be. Collyer’s One Edition for All Time will not be for Berlin, or 
Tokyo, or even London. I will see the universe from right here just like all these rags. (98-9) 
Langley criticises conventional newspapers for their incapacity to see beyond their 
cultural location, and, yet, he decides to co-opt the same perspectival bias for his own 
dateless edition. Langley’s volume, meant as a corrective for the reportage of traditional 
newspapers, remains complicit in the reduction of historical viewpoints, being, like 
them, of a singular geographical location. Similarly, Langley’s satisfaction with the 
various mergers between newspaper companies allies the ethos of his paper with 
standardisation. Langley reports to Homer ‘with some satisfaction’ these mergers ‘as 
early signs of the inevitable contraction of all newspapers to one ultimate edition for all 
time of one newspaper, namely his’ (67). The timeless paper, meant to unify human 
experience across time, becomes just another newspaper vying for predominance. In 
offering up an overview of history drained of diversity, the newspaper thus stands as an 
impoverished form of curation according to Doctorow’s own theory of historical 
composition, for its adherence to realism’s privileging of the unified point of view.  
 The technology of the newspaper, with its single perspective, can be integrated 
into what Langley views as a gradual decline in the breadth of reporting and opposed to 
Homer’s ability, as a blindman, to encounter the world from more than one viewpoint. 
Langley comments: ‘When you read or listen to the radio, he said, you see the scene in 
your mind. It’s like you with life, Homer. Infinite perspectives, endless horizons. But the 
TV screen flattens everything, it compresses the world, to say nothing of one’s mind’ 
(108, my emphasis). Langley’s assessment of blindness hints that Homer’s non-visual 
style of narration, because it forces him to invent a mental image of the surrounding 
world rather than rely on observation, might be more responsive than the newspaper for 
capturing the vagaries and nuances of the past. In this respect, Homer and Langley 
evokes Derrida’s writing in Memoirs of the Blind, which posits that the eye’s function is 




the blindness that reveals the very truth of the eyes, would be the gaze veiled by tears. It 
neither sees nor does not see: it is indifferent to its blurred vision.’452 Chloe Taylor 
situates Memoirs of the Blind within Derrida’s frequent critique of vision: for Derrida, as 
for Emmanuel Levinas, the certainty of the gaze, its conjunction in Western 
philosophical discourse with knowledge, ‘associates vision with an imposition of 
sameness on the other’.453 This masculine vision, she argues, stamps out alterity by 
assuming an impossible knowledge of the other rather than approaching it sensitively 
and hesitantly, and in doing so it fails to really see at all, encountering everywhere itself 
and not the other in its very diversity. Against this tyranny of vision to presume and 
project knowledge, Derrida presents the blindman who, perpetually at risk, tentatively 
explores the world with outstretched arms.  
 This searching and responsive form of learning, which we might associate with 
Levin’s ‘aletheic’ vision, contests the tendency to think of truth as singular and 
accessible only through observation. The tyranny of sight is evident in Homer’s one 
moment of vision in the novel. The only event we witness through Homer’s eyes, aside 
from the fading New York landscape, is his childhood encounter with a pornographic 
‘blue movie’, which, he says, ‘enthroned the idea that sex was something you did to 
them’ (11). This sadistic way of thinking about sex, engendered at the only moment of 
vision, connects sight with the acquisition of violent knowledge. Homer’s blindness, 
however, frees him from the illusion that his own perspective represents objectivity. 
Langley instructs him that ‘among the philosophers there is endless debate as to whether 
we see the real world or only the world as it appears in our minds, which is not 
necessarily the same thing’ (47). For Langley, the unavailability of the objective world 
to human eyes means that everyone is as blind as Homer. Yet, while others chain 
themselves to the fantasy of visual certainty, Homer remains open to new descriptions of 
external space. Such is the case with Julia, the brothers’ maid, who calls her hair ‘the 
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color of wheat’ and eyes ‘gray like a cat’, while several pages later Langley describes 
her ‘dull dark brown’ tresses and darting eyes (27, 35). Homer reports these incongruous 
depictions, but, even though he has previously caressed her face for information, he does 
not weigh in on their accuracy. They, instead, shimmer as possible interpretations of 
reality, which Homer need not decide between. 
 Taylor notes that, for Derrida, the ear rather than the eye becomes the key organ 
for learning of other people’s experiences, and Homer and Langley demonstrates the 
same aural preference.454 For Homer it is not the loss of sight but of hearing that is most 
isolating, Doctorow tellingly articulating this remoteness with reference to the terse 
discourse of the newspaper. By spelling out words on a Braille keyboard, Langley 
communicates with the deaf Homer, who receives ‘what news there is, briefly, as in a 
headline’ (204). In contrast to the limited discourse of the headline, Homer, in 
literalising Derrida’s ethical blindness, employs a style of narrative reliant on the ears 
and, thus, on an imaginative relationship to the outside world.  
 As Homer loses sensory contact with external reality, he retreats into his mind 
and tells his story through a narrative seeking to capture musicality through discourse. 
His muse and mentor, Jacqueline Roux, advises: ‘words have music and if you are a 
musician you will write to hear them’ (202). In tapping into the music of prose to 
communicate his life story, Homer mirrors Jacqueline’s own endeavour ‘to write about 
what cannot be seen’ (185). Not only do Jacqueline’s words resonate with Homer’s 
diary, which by necessity addresses that which the blindman cannot see, her imperative 
to translate unseeable secrets into discourse corresponds to Doctorow’s own novelistic 
method. In his non-fiction, Doctorow calls upon Henry James’s description of the author 
when discussing his own novel writing:  
[James] celebrates the novelist’s intuitive faculty ‘to guess the unseen from the seen,’ but the word 
guess may be inadequate, for it is a power, I think, generated by the very discipline to which the 
writer is committed. The discipline itself is empowering, so that a sentence spun from the 
imagination confers on the writer a degree of perception or acuity or heightened awareness that a 
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sentence composed with the strictest attention to fact does not.455  
Here, Doctorow ascribes to the rhetoric of fiction—or, the ‘language of freedom’—
heightened perception for its blindness to the world of fact. The absence of vision, he 
suggests, facilitates the imaginative work that opens the world up to a range of 
alternative considerations, denying supposedly factual accounts based on the veracity 
and the veneration of the witness. Such a formula raises invention and openness above 
visual certainty. 
 This competition between the self-certainty of observable fact and the tentative 
approach of blindness materialises in the personalities of Homer and Langley as well as 
the curational technologies they employ. While Langley’s lecture to the police is granted 
the quality of music, his later rants prove more ruthless and one-sided. When first 
speaking with Jacqueline, Homer narrates: ‘I was glad she wasn’t trying out her ideas on 
Langley—he wouldn’t have had the patience, he might even have been rude. But I loved 
hearing her talk, never mind that she had bizarre theories [...] her passionate engagement 
with her ideas was a revelation to me’ (188). In contrast to Langley’s rash initiative—
recall the violent clamour he makes on the typewriter—Homer lends his own flirtatious 
dialogue with Jacqueline ‘a rhythm’ (186). Homer’s willingness to listen and respond to 
outside voices—that is, to trust the ear rather than the eye—translates into a narrative 
form that refuses to insist on its own comprehensiveness, leaving room for others to 
complicate his story. 
 The same responsive quality that Derrida associates with blindness appears in 
Homer’s diary, the certainty of his account fading as it moves closer to his moment of 
writing:  
I will not pretend to a precision of remembrance as I try to tell of our life in this house in these last 
few years. Time seems to me a drift, a shifting of sand. And my mind is shifting with it. I am 
wearing away. I feel I have not the leisure to tax myself for the right date, the right word. The best I 
can do is put things down as they occur to me and hope for the best. Which is a shame for as I’ve 
kept to this task I’ve developed a taste for an exact rendering of our lives, seeing and hearing with 
words if with nothing else. (175) 
Unlike the realist text that concludes with an assertion of harmony and the archive that 
dooms itself to overload when it asserts an immovable final form, Homer’s narrative 
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moves towards uncertainty. Homer does not know whether he met Jacqueline for a 
second time: ‘At this point I can’t be sure of anything—what I imagine, what I recall—
but she did come back, I’m almost sure of that, or let us say she did’ (201). Contacting 
the past through language rather than vision exonerates Homer from making his 
narrative cohere and claiming his own ultimate veracity. As a result, his account can 
remain attentive to outside voices and refuse to close off the possibility of other 
legitimate narratives. Homer, then, assumes what he imagines is Jacqueline’s vocation 
as a writer: ‘going around the world and making up things about it’ (189).  
 Throughout, Homer betrays a difficulty pinning down the passing of time. For 
instance, he cannot recall how long his piano student lived with them (41), how long he 
rebelled against the police when they came to apprehend the Hoshiyamas (89), when 
Langley first voiced his Theory of Replacements (13), or which year of WWII Harold 
Robileaux joined the army (94). This temporal indeterminacy matches Homer’s own 
compositional method and correlates with Langley’s newspaper project. Following 
Jacqueline’s advice ‘to be fearless and write what comes to mind’, Homer’s narrative 
follows his own syncopated remembrance of the past, often pursuing one story into the 
future and then retreating to take up another angle of the narrative (51). This meandering 
technique, taken to its extreme at the novels conclusion, gestures towards Langley’s 
newspaper project: ‘But now I am not sure when all of this happened. Either my mind is 
turning in on itself and its memories are eliding, or I have finally understood the 
prophecy of Langley’s timeless newspaper’ (169). By forgoing precise chronological 
order, Homer realises Langley’s thesis about historical recurrence, where the inevitable 
repetition of events renders temporal order meaningless. Homer’s diary, however, 
achieves a balance inaccessible to the dateless newspaper for its elimination of temporal 
momentum. Through his occasional use of prolepsis, Homer tracks historical echoes and 
portrays the suspended repercussions of earlier events, while at the same time following 
a broadly forward movement through history. The diary, then, loosely links events both 
thematically and temporally, its arrangement determined not by a rigid scheme but by 
the wavering movements of Homer’s mind. Much earlier in the novel, Homer makes this 




impressions amounted to a kind of vision’ (45). The lesson of Langley’s failed 
newspaper, achieved in Homer’s diary, then, is that history discovers new resonances as 
it floats provisionally into new arrangements, and these orientations produce a vision of 
the past missed by typical modes of observation and rigid forms of curation.  
 Homer’s method of composition, its unplanned direction, resembles Hélène 
Cixous’s own myopic strategy of writing. Cixous advocates ‘writing blindly’, closing 
the eyes in order to transcribe a book that seems to write itself.456 This process of 
tracking the too-quick movements of the present cannot occur with a preplanned 
trajectory: ‘But no manufacturing, no mechanical fabrication. Astounding or stunning 
sentences come by surprise. Like divine messages: prophecies of the present.’457 
Attuning oneself to the moment through distraction produces a poetic sensibility that 
gestures towards the future without any definite plan, ‘never reach[ing] a goal hoped for’ 
though, she writes, ‘we can reach a goal unhoped for.’458 Cixous echoes Homer and 
Langley when she relates this mode of composition to music: ‘One must play language 
quick and true like an honest musician, not leap over a single word-beat. Find the 
slowness inside the speed.’459 Homer’s narration jumps through time when convenient—
such as when communicating his initial run-in with the gangster and, subsequently, the 
prostitutes he sends to the brothers’ house—but it also refuses these trajectories for 
insistently individualistic reasons. He, for instance, refuses to track Mary-Elizabeth 
Riordan’s story to its melancholy conclusion until much later in the novel because of the 
emotional distress it causes him: ‘I cannot at this moment bear to speak of what became 
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of Mary Elizabeth Riordan’ (43). After narrating Mary Elizabeth’s departure, Homer 
transitions to an earlier stage in his life with the comment, ‘But memories are not 
temporally driven, they detach themselves from time’ (43). Just as he announces towards 
the novel’s conclusion, here Homer notes that over time memories slip into isolated 
events whose chronological order becomes increasingly murky.  
 The musical ear with which Jacqueline tells Homer to write his diary allows it to 
conquer overload, to mull over a large archive of events in a relatively abbreviated 
narrative. Tom LeClair has argued that the encyclopaedic scale of several post-1970 
American novels is integral to their project of representing and mastering information 
overload while foisting that excess of data upon their readers.460 Unlike those novels, 
Homer and Langley demonstrates a strategy to curtail overload through the canny 
imagination of reality into a discourse sensitive to musicality. Reynolds comments that 
writing through the avatar of Homer allows Doctorow ‘to write more poetically, relying 
on tone and rhythm, and taking history as a series of images to be contemplated rather 
than scenarios with which to become involved.’461 But, this melodic writing, within the 
logic of the novel, belongs to Homer, his musical talents creating a document with 
rhythmic prose and syncopated temporality. If the diary can be seen as one attempt to 
curate Langley’s overloaded collection, its musical intonation permits the book to 
transmit a vast quantity of data in a small volume. Sarah Churchwell observes: ‘The 
cleverness of Doctorow’s tactic is to let his story contract, rather than expand’.462 Indeed, 
Homer compares his diary to Langley’s newspaper project for ‘its overreaching’, for the 
vast terrain it covers but clearly not for its immense size (201). Through its carefully 
articulated and attenuated form, the music of the discourse and its movements back and 
forth across time, Homer’s diary conveys a curational strategy that condenses the vast 
archive into a readable form while refusing to fantasise about its ultimate veracity, 
canonicity, and harmony. These strategies grant the diary a kind of blind vision, capable 
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of imagining various perspectives and, thereby, dodging both the ideological failures of 
realist agreement and the violence of information overload. 
 
Ghosts and Computers 
 Doctorow’s most recent novel, Andrew’s Brain, overlaps with Homer and 
Langley’s treatment of the master archive and its promotion of sympathetic blindness. 
The narrator Andrew envisions a future computer designed with the developing insights 
of cognitive science, with ‘the capacity to record and store the acts and thoughts and 
feelings of every living person on earth once around per millisecond of time.’463 This 
data coupled with advances in genetic research, Andrew suggests, would, like Langley’s 
newspaper, master time and in doing so eviscerate the notion of temporality. After 
revealing the tragic story of the deaths of his first daughter and his second wife, Andrew 
begins to feel psychically tethered to those around him and even to people now dead. 
Melancholy has transformed him into that computer, capable of understanding and 
sympathising with others outside of the bounds of time. Andrew wonders, ‘Perhaps I’m 
carrying in my brain matter the neuronal record of previous ages.’464  
 Like Homer’s blindness, we might associate Andrew’s depression with Derrida’s 
blindness-in-tears, permitting a communal vision and producing a document whose 
ambiguous accuracy facilitates voicing a range of personal perspectives: seeing with 
Doctorow’s ‘multiplicity of witness’. Indeed, throughout Andrew’s Brain, the reader 
remains uncertain of Andrew’s present whereabouts and to whom he is speaking, and his 
claims—like being George W. Bush’s university roommate and one-time visitor to the 
Bush family’s Texas homestead—begin to seem implausible. Projecting an uncertain 
veracity, however, is part of the novel’s point. Andrew, in a climactic speech, chastises 
Bush and his advisors for believing in their own infallibility and access to truth. 
Applying the name ‘Pretenders’ to the government administration, Andrew renames 
himself a Holy Fool, who ‘mourns for his country’, grieving the unbelievable historical 
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situation that surrounds him.465 In place of a computer that could hold the entire world 
and its history, Andrew’s Brain locates the melancholic who, ethically unwilling to 
pretend that he or she knows the absolute truth, can tentatively access and imagine the 
lives and the perspective of others.  
 Homer and Langley’s answer to the master archive—here, the newspaper as 
opposed to the computer—is similarly a novelistic enterprise whose very unwillingness 
to assume its own reliability and to offer up a unified conclusion allows it to speak from 
a multitude of perspectives. Comparing Homer and Langley with Andrew’s Brain, 
however, permits us to place the capabilities of blind writing in competition not just with 
the newspaper but with the computer. Doctorow, indeed, suggests the salience between 
Langley’s massive archive and digital memory when, in an interview, he called the 
brothers ‘aggregators. Sort of like Google.’466 With this in mind, the eternal newspaper 
and the novel become two means of addressing the flow of information accessible in the 
digital moment. This chapter has suggested that, in an era characterised by an unsortable 
surplus of data, the archive as a strict structure of memory loses its potency to make 
sense of the past. As Langley strives to sort his various editions into a complete 
summary document, his historical categories fold into each other, collapsing like the 
walls of objects that eventually crush him. Out of the rubble of this catastrophe emerges 
Homer’s diary as a palliative to this information overload, dexterously threading through 
time, situating historical events in a personally meaningful and compelling order. 
Homer’s indeterminate diary, thus, stands as a form of curation suited to combating the 
surfeit of archival memories in a digital age. 
 In the previous chapter, I confronted Baudrillard’s theory of the collection as a 
space of self-mastery with Siri Hustvedt’s novel What I Loved. Hustvedt, I argued, 
problematised Baudrillard’s thinking by looking at the creative play that can take place 
within an object space infused with one’s subjectivity. Homer and Langley, I have 
argued, similarly disputes that the personal archive rests indelibly under the thumb of the 
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collector. Here, the archive overruns the house, kills the brothers, and thwarts conceptual 
understanding. The self-archive poses the opportunity for thinking through one’s past 
and for writing a personal and political history, which Homer achieves in his diary, but, 
at the same time, it threatens to suffocate the self with informational and material stuff. 
This novel, then, turns its insights on nineteenth-century realism, its monolithic method 
of narration and its emphasis on mass ornamentation, into a lesson for digital-age self-
preservation. In Mechanisms, Matthew Kirschenbaum argues that, while the 
technological apparatuses of conservation should not be ignored, in the digital age 
‘effective preservation must rest in large measure on the cultivation of new social 
practices to attend our new media.’467 Doctorow’s analysis of two means of archival 
curation considers how the immense storage capacities of technological devices might 
best be put to personal use. After realism, in this next era of self-display, Doctorow 
promotes not the archive, with its charted boarders and logical categories, but a narrative 
that twists through time; not an archive that demands to be taken as literal truth and that 
coheres a landscape of information, but a blind narrative that is suggestive but refuses to 
pretend to master reality. 
  The continued relevance of the Collyer brothers’ myth to contemporary self-
curation online or off is suggested by their ghostly appearance at the novel’s conclusion: 
‘we had metamorphosed, we were the ghosts who haunted the house we had once lived 
in’ (198). Likewise, of his fading memories, Homer narrates: ‘They become more and 
more ghostly’ (207). Indeed, while we know how the brothers perished from real-life 
newspaper reports, within the novel neither can die with any certainty. Homer hears the 
crash that we know has crushed his brother but cannot report that outcome nor, as the 
storyteller, can he narrate his own death. The brothers’ turn towards the ghostly indicates 
not only their haunting of the present. Derrida argues that, both material and immaterial, 
their eyes hidden behind a visor, ghosts cannot be seen and, in particular, cannot be 
encountered by the scholar who believes ‘in the opposition between what is present and 
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what is not, for example in the form of objectivity.’468 Derrida insists that listening to 
ghosts, considering the present moment as it relates to the past and to the future, is 
necessary for a just society, but that to do so requires overcoming a bias towards visual 
knowledge.469 Doctorow, by employing a blind narrator who cannot offer a distanced 
perspective on the historical archive and whose own certainty wavers, demonstrates an 
ethical means of attending to ghosts, of allowing them to speak even today against and 
within an overwhelming mass of historical data. 
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Archive 2.0: Blank Spaces and Database Surveillance  
in Jennifer Egan’s A Visit from the Goon Squad 
 Writing in The Guardian, the journalist Laura Miller observed that, as of 2011, 
few mainstream American authors had attempted to novelise the cultural and personal 
effects of the Internet, despite its infiltration into the most fundamental domains of 
everyday life.470 While in the last chapter I argued that E.L. Doctorow implicitly 
contemplates information overload in the historical novel Homer and Langley, in this 
chapter I approach a text that, as Miller notes, overtly meditates on the parameters of the 
digital age: Jennifer Egan’s A Visit from the Goon Squad. Although Miller focused 
exclusively on Goon Squad’s final, futuristic chapter, a concern with the digital 
revolution and its cultural, political, and personal implications runs through much of 
Egan’s recent fiction and journalism. Goon Squad is composed of a series of interrelated 
stories, featuring a cast of connected characters, often involved in the music industry. Its 
chapters move peripatetically through time, beginning in the mid-2000s, reaching as far 
back as the 1970s, and concluding with two futuristic chapters set in the 2020s. While 
digital technology is implicated in almost all of the chapters, it is in these two final 
stories that Goon Squad fully reveals itself as what N. Katherine Hayles calls an 
‘information narrative’, a text that ‘show[s], in exaggerated form’ the paradigm shift 
that attends the digital revolution.471 It is just this quality of the final chapter, ‘Pure 
Language’, that I mobilise, using its satirical and dystopic embellishments to anchor my 
analysis and to throw into relief the digital concerns of the earlier chapters.  
 In Egan’s work, new technologies are frequently twinned with a budding 
archival impulse. In Look at Me, for instance, the model Charlotte Swenson’s initial 
interaction with the Internet occurs through a proto-social network website on which she 
is paid to archive her experiences.472 The archival heart of technology is rendered more 
subtly in Goon Squad. In its chronologically earliest chapter, ‘Safari’, Mindy remarks on 
the sense of privacy created by a portable cassette player, ‘the way it transforms her 
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surroundings into a golden montage, as if she were looking back on this lark in Africa 
with Lou from some distant future.’473 Mindy’s language evokes the temporality of 
Derrida’s archive fever, defined by Mark Currie as ‘a present lived as if it were the 
object of a future memory’.474 By the time we reach the final chapter, where handheld, 
smart phone-like ‘T’ devices predominate, archive fever is felt even outside the 
mediation of technology. As Alex watches Scotty’s acoustic concert, he feels ‘what was 
happening around him as if it had already happened and he were looking back’ (344). 
Whereas the Walkman generated a temporary sense of archive fever, Alex experiences 
this effect without technological intervention. The archival ethos so saturates Alex’s 
perception of reality, his surrounding space replete with people recording the concert on 
their handsets, that he experiences the event as already past and always documented. The 
trajectory of Goon Squad, from the 1970s to the 2020s, is thus, on one hand, an account 
of the spread of both new technologies and an archival mode of perception. Yet, I argue 
that, as the social milieu becomes increasingly archival and transitions to digital 
platforms, the archive is co-opted by surveillance institutions and repurposed into the 
cultural system of subjection. 
 Goon Squad’s concern with digital surveillance, with who is given access to the 
archive and authority to interpret it, likewise informs Allegra Goodman’s The Cookbook 
Collector. As a prototypical collector of expensive and rare artefacts, George, we are 
informed, ‘told his life history with objects’ such that, in his future wife Jess’s 
estimation, he becomes a museum object himself, ‘a fly caught in amber’.475 The archive, 
here, is imbued with its owner’s biography, including his or her secrets. When Jess 
believes she has unearthed a scandalous affair by deciphering the titular cookbook 
collection, George condemns her revelation: why go delving into personal archives for 
dead mysteries and family controversies that will only upset the living? Like Jonathan, 
whose betrayal of his fiancée, Emily, comes to light at his funeral, in death the 
cookbooks’ previous owner abdicates control over both the archive and the undisclosed 
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past it might hide. While portraying the initial optimism around new technologies—to 
promote ecological sustainability by replacing paper—archivist George refuses to move 
onto the digital platform, because ‘[h]e feared government control of information and 
identity’.476 Emily’s start-up, whose system of data storage is inspired by a collection of 
take-out menus, acknowledges George’s concern. Without her consent, her employees 
pursue data fingerprinting software, an idea stolen by Jonathan and, after his death, 
marketed to a fearful post-9/11 American government. That the Internet, despite Emily’s 
remonstration, is becoming inextricably bound up with surveillance lends a sinister edge 
to her future project: social networking. The collection always contains traces of its 
owner, secrets that can be decoded, correctly or incorrectly, after his or her death. 
Through data mining and fingerprinting people lose control over their information, 
government and corporate groups surreptitiously collecting it and analysing it with 
uncertain accuracy and uncertain repercussions in the real world.  
 Goon Squad pursues this evaluation of digital collecting as a mechanism of 
surveillance, critiquing the cultural belief in data as the defining element of the self and 
questioning how this form of subjection might be resisted. This theme occupies the 
fulcrum of the novel’s final chapter, ‘Pure Language’, set in a future New York whose 
population is in thrall to its T handsets. Here, Alex reluctantly agrees to organise a ‘blind 
team’, an illicit advertising scheme, for record producer Bennie. With the help of 
Bennie’s assistant, Lulu, Alex betrays his previous morals to furtively compile a group 
of people whom Bennie will pay to publicly intimate enthusiasm for Scotty’s upcoming 
concert. Alex cites the inclusion of his information ‘in the databases of multinationals’ 
as his reason for abandoning an ethical compass that was once integral to his sense of 
self (324). Paradoxically, Alex links the stark inversion of his ethical bearings to a 
technology seemingly structured to preserve: the archival database. Rather than 
stabilising his identity, however, the database provokes a subjective renovation, a 
narrative logic that, I will show, emerges in Egan’s earlier novel Look at Me. I thereby 
demonstrate in this chapter the interweaving systems of, on the one hand, the staccato 
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rhythms of postmodern temporality and, on the other, the deep memory of digital 
technologies.  
 I return frequently to Alex’s submission to the database, which provides the 
central terminology of my argument. The database is a digital derivative of the physical 
archive, an evolution of its material ancestors that, Meredith McGill states, ‘imitat[es] 
and incorporat[es]’ the archive as it supersedes it.477 This chapter considers the database 
both as a textual form and, what Foucault calls, a ‘technology of the self.’478 Lev 
Manovich defines the database as a non-sequential collection that eschews the thematic 
or formal development of a story, casting it as the key ‘symbolic form’ of the computer 
era and the antagonist of narrative.479 Manovich’s influential book has provoked an 
analysis of the database structures of texts from several different artistic media, 
including film,480 fine art,481 and electronic literature.482 Implicitly structured around the 
possibility of its chapters being reshuffled, Goon Squad, I argue, mimes the database’s 
flexibility under the constraints of the codex book. This malleability, in turn, creates an 
aesthetic effect emphasising that the characters’ futures have already been decided, a 
loss of agency to the novel-as-database that mirrors the database surveillance that forms 
the second component of my analysis. Hayles notes the increasing association of 
information with discipline: ‘First the dream of information is figured as an escape, but 
the more powerfully it exerts its presence as a viable place in which to live, the more it 
appears not as an escape at all but rather as an arena in which the dynamics of 
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domination and control can be played out in new ways.’483 As characters are increasingly 
defined by their information, detailed in databases, they in turn feel estranged from 
themselves, possessed by institutions who own their details. Egan, I suggest, positions 
the database as the digital era’s new mode of surveillance, social control, and subjective 
conditioning. The database, then, in addition to being a ‘technology of the self’, is a 
‘technolog[y] of power,’ which, for Foucault, ‘determine[s] the conduct of individuals 
and submit[s] them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject.’484  
 In the final section, I look back to the novel’s treatment of the material 
collection, which appears to resolve the problems of the digital and the database. 
Whereas the database appears to unlock the self through its definite language, the 
material collection hides it in an inscrutable and personal patois that resists interpretation 
by outsiders. Whereas the database renders information inaccessible and veils the ways 
institutions are applying it, the material collection decomposes along with the 
symbolism it contains. Ultimately, I contend that Goon Squad employs a sustained 
aesthetic of gathering and dispersal, of clarity and muddiness, of coherence and 
illegibility. Consistently it warns against ascribing to the ideology of the digital screen, 
the belief in the purity of its aesthetic and its language, promoting instead the necessity 




 Egan’s 2006 novel The Keep provides an instructive gateway into her vision of 
digital subjectivity. Its meta-narrative centres on Ray, who enrols in a writing course 
while in prison. The nonfiction account that he writes while incarcerated, which focuses 
on Danny’s trip to Europe to help his cousin Howie renovate a castle, meditates at length 
on the digital condition. Danny is obsessed with being ‘wired in’, and this reliance on 
connectivity is explained by his brain’s refusal ‘to stay locked up inside the echo 
chamber of his head—it spilled out, it overflowed and poured across the world until it 
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was touching a thousand people who had nothing to do with him.’485 Danny’s capacity to 
adapt, to read others’ desires and to mould himself according to them makes him an 
ideal second-in-command. It is in reference to this quality that Danny is rendered in 
technological terms: ‘he had radar for how people wanted to be talked to and could 
switch from one person’s way to another person’s way without thinking. But right now 
Danny’s radar was down, he was out of range, or maybe he just needed to be reset and 
programmed in this new place, like his satellite dish.’486  
 Like Donna Haraway’s cyborg, the site of subjective and technological 
intermingling that I described in this dissertation’s Introduction, Danny believes he can 
sense WiFi on his skin and likens his memory to that of a computer. For Danny, digital 
technologies and their metaphors produce and sustain his sense of himself as decentred 
and porous. Danny’s subjective multiplicity—he possesses more online identities than 
online friends—affiliates him with the posthuman, linking digital technology with the 
production of a subject whose boundaries seem indistinct.487 Raymond Barglow suggests 
that, unlike other technologies that shore up a sense of personal mastery over external 
space, the computer encourages users to re-inhabit a time before the solidification of 
identity. Computers, Barglow writes, are ‘internal objects harking back to a time in 
children’s lives prior to personal differentiation and identity.’488 Representative of this 
amorphous digital subjectivity, Danny’s sense of his own multiplicity carries with it 
certain relationships to time and space.  
 Danny struggles throughout the novel to compute historical time, to understand 
the past through a schema of narrative development. He expresses ‘trouble even 
believing that one chain of days connected his first day in New York to this day, right 
now—that so many years could have passed in such a thin stream, day by day by day.’489 
This temporal experience can be linked to Danny’s attempt to mould his memory after 
that of a computer, ‘pictur[ing] himself deleting things, disconnecting them from his 
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brain so they disappeared the way digital stuff disappears—without a memory.’490 
Although Danny can still sense the shadows of memories after ‘deleting’ them, he 
nevertheless feels dissociated from the past. He, for instance, struggles to connect his 
memory of a weak, pale, and portly cousin, Howie, with the powerful, blonde, and fit 
man he grows into, identifying in this dissonance just ‘a distant connection.’491 In 
Danny’s experience, his own history refuses to take the form of a narrative, to betray a 
trajectory of maturity, instead detaching into moments without proper coherence. Within 
the present moment, however, Danny appears prone to multitask across a variety of 
settings concurrently. For Danny, in addition to fracturing temporal development, digital 
technologies have naturalised a new sense of homeliness, defined not by emersion in one 
place but by being divided across multiple sites simultaneously: ‘Being at home meant 
being in an even mix of locations’.492 Goon Squad, as I show in the next two sections, 
explores Danny’s diachronic and synchronic fragmentation, which I later connect to 
postmodern and digital discourses. 
  
Liquid Postmodern Time 
 Goon Squad features a cast of characters straining to make a story out of their 
lives and the lives they see around them, but their attempts to narrativise their 
biographies are constantly frustrated. Sasha pictures her therapist as a collaborator with 
whom she is ‘writing a story of redemption, of fresh beginnings and second chances’, 
the story of her recovery (9). However, when she allows Alex to trespass on her 
collection of stolen goods, emblematic of her kleptomania, she is unsure whether this is 
a sign of recuperation or regression—‘toward the happy ending, or away from it?’ (17). 
Rarely can Egan’s characters predict, nor can they understand, the direction their lives 
take, narratives exploding into shards that resist cohesion. Goon Squad describes its 
subjects in terms of multiplicity and incoherence, a position explicitly articulated by 
Alex early in the novel: ‘you have no fucking idea what people are really like. They’re 
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not even two-faced—they’re, like, multiple personalities’ (13). The most detailed 
deconstruction of the subject is sketched by Jules Jones, who imagines both the actress 
Kitty Jackson and her waiter through the metaphor of a sandwich: the bottom bread 
represents continuity with the past, the waiter’s typical languor or Kitty’s pre-fame 
suburban adolescent behaviour; the middle layer is the shock experience of the 
present—for the waiter, an unexpected run-in with the famous actress, and for Kitty the 
unprecedented experience of her recent stardom; in this model, the upmost piece of 
bread indicates the ‘attempt to contain and conceal this alien middle layer with some 
mode of behavior that at least approximates the bottom layer [...] that is [the] norm’, 
masking surprise ‘with a simulation of [the] normal, or former, self’ (178-9). In short, 
the present action denotes the struggle to maintain a stable subjectivity, constant through 
time, in the face of unexpected and turbulent events. 
 Goon Squad frequently bears witness to characters caught in the predicament of 
Jules’s sandwich model, attempting to keep hold of an engrained self constantly 
threatened by unpredictable shifts. After her public downfall, Kitty attempts to reenact 
her previous innocence in Dolly’s public relations scheme, designed to redeem the 
dictator, B. Dolly notes, however, upon their reunion, ‘She wasn’t Kitty Jackson 
anymore’, her youthful face now blemished by a ‘sardonic expression’ (156). While 
Kitty mimes her previous charm temporarily, these traces of her adolescent purity 
ultimately fail to mask the turn in her personality. Kitty’s evolution refuses to permit her 
to re-inhabit a previous inexperience, and she insults the general in a move confirmed by 
her ‘fervid, self-annihilating eyes’ (169). Twice the text announces that the ‘goon’ of its 
title is time itself, estranging characters from themselves, or the bottom-bun notion of 
themselves that feels authentic. This precariousness of history is most pointedly 
articulated by Jules who, after serving time in prison, remarks: ‘I go away for a few 
years and the whole fucking world is upside down’ (130). Characters who identify a 
personal change cannot assimilate it into a cause-and-effect trajectory. When Scotty 
revisits his childhood friend, Bennie, he demands ‘to know what happened between A 
and B. [...] A is when we were both in the band, chasing the same girl. B is now’ (106). 




release A to B, because ‘that’s the question I want to hit straight on: how did I go from 
being a rock star to being a fat fuck no one cares about?’ (134). Bosco even fails to plan 
his own death in a suicide concert tour, a future chapter revealing that he ‘ends up 
recovering and owning a dairy farm’ (265). Like the past, which cannot be preserved, 
the future withholds its design, thwarting attempts to fuse life into a comprehensive 
narrative.   
 The tension between the pull of unnoticed change and the desire to nourish an 
anchored self validated by time, the conflict expressed in Jules’s sandwich model, 
frequently erupts in nostalgia for a lost openness to instability. After hearing about 
Bosco’s planned suicide tour, Steph recalls her early years with husband Bennie as a 
reckless time of rampant drug use and carefree sex suffused with possibility, a period of 
life when ‘none of it was serious’ (139). Yet, in the present moment, she worries that 
‘everything is ending’ (138). Steph’s language echoes Zygmunt Bauman’s writing on 
Liquid Modernity, today’s era of precariousness where change happens ‘faster than it 
takes the ways of acting to consolidate into habits and routines.’493 Bauman envisions 
‘liquid life’ as ‘the story of successive endings’, where success is measured by the 
‘inconspicuousness of the graves that mark its progress’.494 For Bauman, to thrive in a 
time of ceaseless and sudden change means to remain flexible, to deflate radical change 
into smooth transition. Goon Squad’s characters eulogise not only their lost selves but 
also their former receptivity to the future, to unplanned transformation. In ageing they 
identify the foreclosure of transience, the loss of the very substance required to prosper 
in Liquid Modernity. For Steph, for instance, the seeming imminence of Bosco’s death 
is contrasted to her youth when, ‘If they didn’t like the result, they could go back and 
start again’ (139). With maturity, however, Steph has compromised her ability to 
comfortably leave the future uncharted. 
 The dream of turning back time emerges specifically when characters imagine 
encountering in the present a previous version of themselves or their friends. Jocelyn, 
like Steph, speaks of the demise of her youthful openness to the possibilities of the 
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future. Whereas her initial encounter with Lou as a hitchhiker ‘could be the beginning of 
an exciting story, a story where anything might happen’, it now sounds to her like ‘a 
punch line’ (91). When Jocelyn visits Lou, now aged and ill, she cannot reconcile his 
feeble body with the aura of youth and beauty that once surrounded him. She imagines 
this historical Lou, for her the ‘real Lou’, still alive and lounging by the pool, ready to 
attack the old man who has stolen his place: ‘the real Lou and this old Lou will have a 
fight’ (92). Jocelyn, dividing Lou into his youth-obsessed past and his decrepit present, 
indicates the immensity and the finality of a change explained by Lou’s own comment, 
‘I got old’ (93). It is the previous Lou, however, the one lost to the past, that Jocelyn is 
interested in accessing. She achieves contact with the lost Lou by performing precisely 
the violent task she imagined him performing on his aged doppelganger. After tackling 
the feeble Lou into the pool, she at last makes contact with the Lou of her memories: ‘I 
can see him’, she narrates, ‘[t]he old smile, back again’ (95). But, as they climb out of 
the water, her connection to the past is endangered by the physical reality of Lou’s age 
and illness. Jocelyn at once feels that his hand is ‘not the same hand as before; it is 
bulbous and dry and heavy’, and yet she narrates, ‘We’re there, the three of us, like 
before. We’re back to the beginning’ (95). The precariousness of this momentary 
connection, Jocelyn’s struggle to contact the past and retain some temporal longevity, 
surfaces again in the final words of the chapter, Lou pleading for ‘[a]nother minute [...] 
One more. Like this’ (96). 
 In ‘Pure Language’, Alex similarly imagines an avatar, this time of himself, left 
behind in Sasha’s apartment following their Internet date, an episode that comprises 
Goon Squad’s first chapter. The disjunction between his current, final-chapter subject 
position, willing to compromise his morals for money, and this idealistic past self is 
expressed in Alex’s inability to recall details from his encounter with Sasha. Indeed, in 
the first chapter, Sasha anticipates his struggle, predicting that she would become ‘a glint 
in the hazy memories that Alex would struggle to organize a year or two from now’ (14). 
When Bennie reveals that Sasha had been a thief, providing information vital to solving 
their date’s central mystery, Alex cannot reconstruct that episode: ‘A connection was 




conflated the episode of the lost wallet, which Sasha had stolen and returned 
unbeknownst to him, and her theft of a scrap of paper from his own wallet: he 
remembers ‘something about a wallet, of all things, but had it been lost? Found? Stolen? 
The girl’s wallet, or his own?’ (318). As Alex and Bennie walk by Sasha’s old 
apartment, he begins to remember its particulars, including the bathtub in the kitchen 
that had been so evocative during their date. As these details resurface, Alex bifurcates, 
his present state contrasted with his previously open prospects: he ‘imagined walking 
into her apartment and finding himself still there—his young self, full of schemes and 
high standards, with nothing decided yet’ (348). Alex occupies a position akin to Jocelyn 
and Steph, sensing that he has sacrificed a youthful ability to live with the future’s 
indeterminacy and longing to return to that state. Alex, however, dismisses this fantasy 
as a ‘crazy pantomime’, his present condition incompatible with that previous self, time 
having rendered them irreconcilable (348).  
 In the language of Jules’s model of the subject, the ghostly traces of Lou and 
Alex correspond to the sandwich’s bottom bun, their old, historical selves that are felt to 
be genuine. When rendered discretely, however, these visions emerge as strangers, 
distinct and even antithetical to the present-day Lou and Alex, the sandwich dissembled 
into scraps. Bennie attributes Alex’s self-estrangement to the same temporal goon that 
withered Lou: ‘You grew up,’ he explains (348). While in Jules’s model, people are 
meant to approximate their historical manners, Alex finds that, almost unaware, he has 
been driven so far from that previous life that he can no longer mimic its behaviours. 
Not just failures of memory, these moments articulate the fracturing of time into pieces 
that withhold narrative coherence. Yet, it is when they register the vagaries of their pasts 
that these characters lose the ability to embrace the future’s inscrutability, the 
characteristic that Bauman deems necessary to thrive in Liquid Life. This temporal 
fracturing repeats in the novel’s structure, but before engaging with these formal 
qualities, I first turn to the novel’s treatment of intimacy and home as another site of 






Space and Intimacy in a Digitised Culture 
 The digital turn, in Egan’s work, brings with it a reorganisation of space, 
levelling the home in favour of a connectivity that overrides proximity. Bauman’s 
account of Liquid Modernity identifies a ‘new irrelevance of space’, which is 
constitutive of the scattered temporality I discussed in the previous section.495 For 
Bauman, with the ‘no time’ of exchanges on digital platforms, ‘the difference between 
“far away” and “down here” is cancelled.’496 By vexing the significance of the nearby, 
digital technology redefines the meanings of home and intimacy. In the ubiquitous term 
‘connectedness’, Bauman identifies an attempt to safely mediate between ‘loneliness and 
commitment, the scourge of exclusion and the iron grip of bonds too tight’.497 Digital 
technology facilitates the renegotiation of social bonds, complicating the stability of 
presence and absence and producing a ‘blurring of intimacy and solitude’, as Sherry 
Turkle writes in her aptly titled Alone Together.498 While Turkle worries that the 
meaning of intimacy has been recast by flimsy digital connections, Paul Virilio identifies 
a concurrent reaction against the nearby: he writes, ‘getting closer to the “distant” takes 
you away proportionally from the “near” (and dear)—the friend, the relative, the 
neighbour—thus making strangers, if not actual enemies, of all who are close at hand’.499 
These theorists, thus, implicate technology in the eradication of a traditional sense of 
home based on proximity, replaced instead by relationships mediated by the digital 
screen.  
 In this environment of fast-paced information exchange, Anthony Elliott and 
John Urry suggest, the self is structured around portable technologies—or ‘miniaturized 
mobilities’—that store and make accessible materials charged with affect.500 Goon Squad 
tracks the development of miniaturized mobilities, its chronologically earliest ‘Africa’ 
chapter featuring the portable music player and its futuristic final chapter witnessing the 
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omnipresence of handheld T devices. Via the work of Paul du Gay et al, Elliott and Urry 
correlate the Walkman with making commonplace the experience of ‘being in two 
different places at once,’ Danny’s definition of home.501 More specifically, du Gay et al 
accuse the Walkman of unsettling the public/private division by allowing the previously 
domestic pleasure of private music listening to be taken into public, headphones creating 
a transportable but permeable isolation.502 This is precisely the uncanny privacy that 
Mindy attributes to the music player, in a scene I have already related to the 
technological basis for archive fever in the text. In her feeling of public isolation while 
listening to the music player, we find early rumblings of the demise of domesticity and 
the emergence of digitised familiarity that reach their fullest pitch in ‘Pure Language’.  
 In this future, Alex’s tiny apartment with his wife, Rebecca, and their child is 
unsellable, because the neighbouring high-rise, still in construction, threatens to ‘seal off 
their air and light’, to leave the home ‘dark and airless’ (321, 324). As Alex messages to 
Lulu in T-speak, they are ‘stuk’ (335). The ever-presence of stringent war measures 
security, as well as hints of environment crisis, further stresses the austerity of this future 
space. Not only is Alex’s New York threatened by rising tides, but the text’s other future 
chapter is set in the inhospitable desert, where solar panels are ‘mending the Earth’ 
(299). As the stability of the home-space diminishes, intimacy moves onto the handheld 
device. When Alex plans to reveal to his wife the unsavoury details of his job with 
Bennie, his impulse is to ‘T Rebecca’ even though she is walking alongside him. He 
‘even found himself mentally composing the message: Nu job in th wrks. big $ pos. pls 
kEp opn mind’ (333). The crawl screen becomes a confessional space. It is through her T 
device, for instance, that Lulu reveals that her father ‘Dyd b4 I ws brn’ (329). When 
Alex vocally expresses sympathy, ‘his voice seemed too loud—a course intrusion’, and 
he reverts to T-messaging, ‘Sad’ (330). T communication becomes the principle mode of 
personal revelation, the location where relationships are brokered, because, in Lulu’s 
words, the devices are ‘pure—no philosophy, no metaphors, no judgments’ (329).   
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 The reorganisation of relationships and of space in the digital age is specifically 
connected to a restructuring of sight. When Alex and Rebecca are separated at the 
concert, he overcomes his desire to be with her through his handheld T. After his T 
locates Rebecca’s approximate position, its zoom function allows Alex to spot her in the 
throng; after sending her a message, he watches as she receives it on his magnified 
screen (345). Here the T increases the domain of the visible, permitting Alex 
voyeuristically to overcome his pangs of longing. The digital’s swelling of the visible, 
enabled by the instantaneity of transmission across long distances, is for Virilio a matter 
of horizon: the decisiveness of ‘the line of the visible horizon’—its border on the 
visible—stabilises the notion of reality.503 The newfound impotence of the horizon to 
divide the visible from the hidden, short-circuited by the faculties of the digital screen, 
‘caus[es] confusion of near and far, of inside and outside, disorders in common 
perception that will gravely affect the way we think.’504 Goon Squad literalises the 
demise of the horizon in its future New York, a ‘water wall’, built to combat rising tides, 
concealing the sunset and obscuring the horizon from view (331).  
 The implications of Virilio’s theory of the demise of the horizon are present in 
Goon Squad most immediately in the character of Lulu. While earlier we witness a nine-
year-old Lulu ‘doing homework on her laptop and IMing her friends’ (154), by the final 
chapter she has matured into ‘a living embodiment of the new “handset employee”: 
paperless, deskless, commuteless, and theoretically omnipresent’ (325). Emphasised in 
this description is the erosion of space: Lulu’s authority can be asserted from anywhere, 
to anywhere, proximity having become irrelevant. This is just how Alex relates to her, a 
being perpetually present, someone ‘who lived in his pocket, whom he’d ascribed her 
own special vibration’ (335). Yet, the T generation also operates with a new zone of 
secrecy, which complicates a simplistic theory of the magnification of the visible in the 
digital age. In her article on the online lives of gay teenagers, Egan argues that, while the 
Internet facilitates forming connections over large distances, ‘in the end, you’re never 
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really sure who they were in the first place. And they don’t really know you.’505 By 
permitting exchanges between remote locales, the digital’s absent horizon also allows 
communication to occur while out of sight, under a fictional or anonymised identity. 
With this possibility, the digital inaugurates a novel form of paranoia and uncertainty in 
Egan’s fiction. 
 In The Keep, the comfort and the security Danny derives from being divided 
across sites collapses into suspicion when confronted with the phantasmal quality of 
digital connections. His comfort with digital displacement, with ‘[b]eing somewhere but 
not completely’, finds an unanticipated correspondence with inmate Davis’s suggestion 
that the characters in Ray’s story are ghosts because they are caught ‘in-between’.506 He 
explains, in terms that evoke digital cross-horizon connection, ‘I can see them, I can hear 
them, I know them, but they’re not in this room. [...] They’re in some other place.’507 It is 
for this reason that Howie concludes that ours is ‘a supernatural world’ where ‘[w]e’re 
surrounded by ghosts’, haunted by disembodied voices emanating from cell phones and 
computer monitors.508 What is most unsettling for Danny is again a matter of vision. 
Danny calls his ideal relationship with his surroundings ‘alto’, defining this ecstatic 
experience in terms of mutual recognition: ‘you saw but also you could be seen, you 
knew and were known.’509 Danny feels ‘alto’, for instance, when he witnesses a fraught 
exchange between Mick and Howie’s wife, learning of their previous affair; that he 
cannot be seen does not seem to matter here.510 Likewise, when he locks eyes with Mick, 
‘alto swamped Danny’s mind’, and he intuits Mick’s imminent violent attack.511 If alto 
requires ‘[t]wo-way recognition’, the ability to see and to be seen by one’s interlocutor, 
and thereby to intuit information hidden within a physical encounter, it seems 
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specifically at odds with the long-distance digital communication Danny simultaneously 
craves.512  
 Hidden behind a cell phone, Danny’s ability to meet the gaze of the person on 
the end of the line disintegrates. When Danny calls his lover on Mick’s mobile phone, 
the experience feels ‘dreamlike’, his separation from digital devices making the phone 
appear ‘alien, unfamiliar.’513 Over the course of their conversation, both lose confidence 
in the veracity of the other’s identity: Danny wonders, ‘How could he tell where the 
voice was coming from?’514 Since he cannot verify Martha’s presence with certainty, he 
does not trust that it is really her on the line. The opacity of the technology erupts in 
paranoia, and Danny neurotically worries that ‘the voice could be coming from inside 
[the castle]’.515 By allowing users to communicate while out of sight, the cell phone 
disables the potential for an experience of ‘alto’, for registering information contained in 
materiality and in the returned gaze. Rather it fosters what Danny refers to as ‘the 
worm’—feelings of doubt, uncertainty—in this instance, nourishing an anxiety that 
Howie is secretly spying on him. Digital communication in The Keep relies on the 
habituated faith that we know who we are speaking to or messaging with, even if we 
cannot see them, a certainty always on the brink of collapse. 
 ‘Pure Language’ similarly explores, within its dystopic future setting, the 
disquiet engendered by the simultaneous expansion of the visual field and the 
complication of traditional optics. Alex is given the task to compile a ‘blind team’ for 
Bennie, and the ability to operate using T devices enables participants to act in secret: 
Alex provides the list of possible ‘parrots’ to Lulu, who contacts them individually on 
their Ts, meaning that no actors are aware of Alex’s place on top of the pyramid nor can 
they identify any of the other participants. The murkiness of this system breeds an 
internal crisis of authenticity, by hiding misdemeanors in the digital sphere while 
preserving the appearance of morality. Alex keeps his role a secret, and is comforted 
that, even if Scotty is a disappointing performer, no one will know that he was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
512 Ibid., p. 6. 
513 Ibid., p. 167. 





responsible for leading them there: he thinks, ‘no 1 nOs abt me. Im invysbl’ (338). That 
this thought appears as a ‘brain-T’ suggests that the message’s ‘me’, its sender, is not 
strictly the same Alex who receives it. Rather, Alex appears divided between the guilt of 
betraying his ethical tenets and the internal thrill of pulling off the advertising coup. 
Indeed, the ability to carry out this type of mass deceit while hidden from view is, Alex 
notes, psychologically appeasing, structurally designed to ‘reduce the shame and guilt of 
parrothood by assembling a team that doesn’t know it’s a team’ (326). 
 If Jules’s model of the self indicates a desire for temporal constancy, the digital 
platform provokes an easy surrender of a subjectivity confirmed by history. When 
compiling the ‘blind team’, Alex notes, ‘What he needed was to find fifty more people 
like him, who had stopped being themselves without realising it’ (324). The digital 
initiates, facilitates, and exposes an overriding sense of self-alienation, of the loss of the 
authentic self that Jules envisions people perpetually striving to maintain. The practice 
of purchasing opinions is, we learn, widespread in this future world. The text alludes to 
the ‘Bloggescandals’, in which politicians purchased the public advocacy of 
commentators, resulting in a cultural ‘suspicion that people’s opinions weren’t really 
their own’ (322). When Alex and Rebecca encounter the ‘parrot’ Zeus on the day of the 
concert, his face bears no ‘visible sign of parrothood’ but appears ‘the same right down 
to his soul patch,’ a mark of authenticity: ‘he’d kept [it] all these years since they’d gone 
out of fashion’ (337). Yet, there remains a latent aura of suspicion that undermines the 
intimacy of personal relationships. Not only is Natasha, Zeus’s girlfriend, unaware of his 
involvement in the scheme, she knows that people have been paid to advertise the 
concert; she neither fully knows her partner nor can she trust those around her. The same 
is true of Rebecca, who says of the parrots, ‘But these are people I know,’ while 
standing beside her partner, who, without her knowledge, orchestrated the plot (337).  
 There thus emerges out of the digital platform and its particular secrecy an 
anxiety over authenticity. This crisis is experienced both as alienation from the familiar 
and from the self. By offering a platform over which to act deviously but out of sight, 
the T devices—like many digital technologies—yields a bifurcated subject, split 




his unflappably moralistic self in the physical world from the one enacting the illicit plot 
in the digital sphere. Yet, the distinction between the two antithetical selves always 
threatens to give way. When Rebecca questions his reasons for allowing their daughter 
access to his T, breaking their long-established rule, Alex worries that she deduced his 
participation in the ‘blind team’. Although compartmentalised into separate spheres, 
Alex worries that his digital indiscretions will imprint themselves in the real world: 
‘What does she know?’, he nervously wonders, suspecting that his wife is aware of his 
nefarious scheme (333). Indeed, as I argued above, by the chapter’s end, Alex finally 
severs himself from his chimerical ideals. He is no longer the ethical and open person he 
was with Sasha, even if his misdemeanours are lodged behind the screen of his T device. 
His unlawful actions serve to expose and to solidify the gap between his current and his 
previous self.  
 In this section, I suggested that by eliminating the distinction between distant and 
nearby, digital devices in Egan’s fiction create a new but precarious sense of home. As 
the domestic space erodes in Goon Squad, intimacy is transferred to the digital T 
devices, and yet these technologies serve to generate a culture of suspicion where 
anyone could be profiting from unethical behaviour, falsely espousing opinions for the 
sake of income. Opening up a domain of secrecy, the T devices create a general 
uncertainty about the self that undermines the possibilities of intimacy. Not only are 
characters in this digital future unable to trust—to know with confidence—those around 
them, neither can they understand themselves as coherent and stable. If in the previous 
section I noted a fragmented temporality in which subjects are divided across time, here 
I revealed the digital’s insistence on a self divided in the moment into seemingly 
autonomous, antagonistic entities. This extension of the subject’s dispersal, from 
fragmentation across time to fragmentation at the same time, is the subject of the next 
section.  
 
Parallel Personhood and the Representation of Simultaneity 
 Between the publications of Fredric Jameson’s ‘Postmodernism, or the Cultural 




(2008), digital technology changed the possibilities of signification, altering the subject 
and its relationship to time. Jameson theorises postmodernity in terms evocative both of 
Bauman’s Liquid Modernity and the challenge, in Goon Squad, of discovering narrative 
development within a lifetime of changes. He explains postmodern temporality through 
the schizophrenic breakdown of the sentence into isolated parts, time chopped up into a 
series of unmoored presents, the distinctiveness of which elides any causal or narrative 
connections.516 Ursula Heise implicates computer technology in fostering this 
fragmented temporality, because it drives users to focus their attention ‘on the present 
understood as a narrowly defined time period unhinged from past causes and future 
extensions or effects.’517 Jameson’s literary example of this schizophrenic mode is the 
poem ‘China’ by Bob Perelman, composed of a series of captions written for postcards 
unavailable to the reader. Generating a ‘new mode of relationship through difference’, 
this collage-like postmodern art, Jameson suggests, makes ‘the proposition that 
“difference relates”.’518 As a result, reading postmodern works become an exercise in 
‘thinking relationships’ anew, which, for Jameson, means approaching every fragment 
of the collage image or text simultaneously.519 Writing on Nam June Pak, who 
distributes televisions throughout his art installations, he asserts that the viewer ‘is called 
upon to do the impossible, namely, to see all the screens at once, in their radical and 
random difference’.520 This call to experience every part of the distributed artwork 
requires the viewer to splinter its vision across several narratives or objects that make up 
the collage, to witness it simultaneously rather than linearly along a narrative path.  
 The possibilities and the norms of the collage image, however, shift with new 
technological developments, moving from a fragmented to a pristine visual ecology. Lev 
Manovich observes that computer culture in the 1980s and ‘90s provokes a change from 
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the visual dissonance of montage to ‘the aesthetics of continuity.’521 This move is 
typified by the digital composite, ‘in which different spaces are combined into a single 
seamless virtual space,’ eliminating the discordant breaks between collage elements of 
which Jameson insists the art viewer must take stock.522 Thus, digital technology allows, 
through compositing and layering, the creation of a collaged, many-sourced image 
whose dissonance hides itself. Brian Rotman writes similarly about the increasing 
flexibility of the digital image: ‘an image can overlap another, be added to, combined, 
composited with, juxtaposed, superimposed, interpenetrated, and merged with any other 
image to form just another image.’523 Not a collage, these ‘imaged images,’ he insist, 
‘have become a default contemporary visual paradigm which, by presenting many 
images simultaneously within a single optical act, calls for a visual self engaged in a 
mode of parallel rather than serial seeing.’524 Thus, we find in digital representation the 
possibilities of spectatorship changed, the ‘visual polyphony’ that was an impossible 
dream in Jameson’s theory emerging as a standard paradigm.525 
 This new mode of a parallel vision and representation promotes, for Rotman, a 
‘psychic restructuring’ in the subject, a move from a self premised on alphabetic 
seriality to digital simultaneity.526 Rotman argues that the dominant mode of 
representation contours the self, and thus the ubiquity of the imaged image promotes a 
parallelised subject, ‘a post-literate self [...] patterned not on the word—stable, integral, 
fixed, discrete, enclosing a unique, interior meaning, ordered, sequential—but on the 
fluid and unordered multiplicities of the visual image.’527 Whereas the lettered self is 
serial and contained, subject to and defined by the linear requirements of writing and 
reading, Rotman describes a digital ‘para-self’ that functions across various platforms 
concurrently: ‘In short, a self becoming beside itself, plural, trans-alphabetic, derived 
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from and spread over multiple sites of agency, a self going parallel’.528 If Rotman’s 
‘para-self’ develops in response to the seamless layering accommodated by digital 
imaging, Sherry Turkle formulates a similar notion of the digital self ‘as a multiple, 
distributed system’ through the metaphor of the computer window.529 She notes that 
when users work on their computers, they tend to operate in various windows, 
representing different settings and contexts, simultaneously. The computer window, she 
thus decides, promotes an experience of the self that is not fractured across time, 
entering into several distinct roles over the course of the day, but one ‘that exists in 
many worlds and plays many roles at the same time.’530 
 Goon Squad’s digitised future is described in the same terms Turkle and Rotman 
use to define digital subjectivity. Lulu suggests that the temporality of information 
exchange has exceeded linear models of ‘connect[ion]’ and ‘transmi[ssion]’ (324). 
Evoking ‘particle physics’, she notes that ‘reach’, or influence, ‘isn’t describable in 
terms of cause and effect anymore: it’s simultaneous’ (325). Rebecca’s academic 
research similarly indicates that the terms ‘story’ and ‘change’ have been ‘shucked of 
their meanings’, the immediacy of digital communication outrunning the capacities of 
narrative development (331). Elsewhere, Egan has reflected on the difficulty in 
communicating simultaneity in fiction:  
Writing is very different from, let’s say, filmmaking, because simultaneity is so difficult to achieve. 
[...] There is always a tension that a writer grapples with: you are trying to make a number of things 
seem to happen at once, but you can only proceed word by word. With writing it’s such an essential 
problem, and I think it’s one reason people are drawn to other artistic forms: they feel more liberated 
from the limitations of chronology.531 
Here, Egan is articulating a dissonance between the linearity of writing and the lived 
reality of simultaneity, experiences of which are fundamental to Rotman’s and Turkle’s, 
as well as Lulu’s and Rebecca’s, understandings of the digital present. In this interview, 
Egan points to the penultimate scene of Look at Me as one attempt to render simultaneity 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
528 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
529 Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1995), p. 14. 
530 Ibid. In her article on gay youth Internet culture, Egan cites Turkle’s work and observes that this many-
windowed style of Web browsing is typical of adolescents. See Egan, ‘Lonely’. 
531 Jennifer Egan, ‘An Interview with Jennifer Egan’, interviewed by Charlie Reilly, Contemporary 




in writing. Here, Egan interweaves several narrative threads, moving between moments 
from three stories and creating a narrative collage, such that readers must keep in mind 
all three strands at once. In The Keep and Goon Squad, I suggest, Egan similarly 
employs techniques of fragmentation and gathering in order to convey simultaneity, 
seeking recourse specifically in archival modes of representation. While in The Keep 
Egan explores listing as a means of rendering simultaneity, Goon Squad takes on a more 
complex variation of this form: the database. 
 In a blog post published in anticipation of her Twitter short story ‘Black Box’, 
Egan articulated a long-standing interest in ‘fiction that takes the form of lists’.532 ‘Black 
Box’, a succession of brief directives, each conforming to Twitter’s 140-character limit, 
and the short story ‘To Do’, a numbered itinerary of one woman’s sinister daily chores, 
are the two most overt examples of this writerly interest.533 The Keep, however, explores 
the list more obliquely, the amateur author Ray often relying on it to untangle fraught 
moments, ideas, and experiences. Francis Spufford reads the list of excess in Rabelais as 
a ‘tower of words’ that interrupts the ‘march across the horizontal plains of narrative’.534 
Ray’s lists, similarly, carve out a space where a loaded moment can be dissected into 
comprehensible parts. In its first chapter, Ray struggles to render in prose the 
instantaneity of young Howard’s fall. He narrates, ‘It happened faster than I’m making it 
sound: Howie looked at Danny and Danny shut his eyes and shoved him into the pool. 
But even that’s too slow: Look. Shut. Shove. / Or just shove.’535 Here, listed single words 
isolated by periods strive to convey a sense of immediacy. Similarly, when describing a 
rank smell, Ray narrates, ‘If I knew how to give you that smell in words I wouldn’t need 
a writing class. All I can do is name some stuff that’s in it—cigarettes, germ killer, 
sweat, chow, piss—but the mix is so much worse than those smells combined could ever 
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be’.536 The list unravels complexity into representable parts that, sitting alongside each 
other on the page, strive to invoke synchrony. Such is the case when Ray attempts to 
narrate the ‘riot inside Danny’s head’, writing it ‘piece by piece like a conversation’ 
even though ‘[i]t was a knot, a confusion, a chaos’.537 Similarly, when Danny feels ‘a 
mess of reactions [...] that he couldn’t separate out’, Ray narrates these emotions in a 
numbered list.538  
 The list, thus, operates as a symbolic tool that allows Ray to convey overlapping 
moments or overlaid meanings. Frequently, as we have seen, Ray utilises the list when 
his untrained writing cannot capture complexity in narrative language. Yet, as Patti 
White has noted of lists in general, the muddled-quality of the data they attempt to order 
threatens lists with ‘conceptual breakdown at every moment’.539 It is for this reason that 
when Ray attempts to respond to a list of three questions, he answers the third within his 
response to the second because, he says, ‘that’s where it fits’.540 Their distinction, Ray’s 
reply suggests, is artificial, the list’s order dissolving against the complexities of reality. 
Thus, The Keep, makes use of the list as a precarious mechanism to dissect moments of 
simultaneity into representable parts. Goon Squad, I argue, similarly employs a list, or 
database, structure in order to gesture towards and to present simultaneity, the key 
temporality of digital culture.  
 In 2001’s The Language of New Media, Manovich instigated the analysis of the 
database as a symbolic form that, he argues, typifies the logic of digital devices and is 
antithetical to traditional narrative. He writes, ‘As a cultural form, the database 
represents the world as a list of items, and it refuses to order this list. In contrast, a 
narrative creates a cause-and-effect trajectory of seemingly unordered items (events). 
Therefore, database and narrative are natural enemies.’541 Adhering to the structure of the 
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list, the database form supplies a means of expressing the simultaneity that Turkle and 
Rotman see as indicative of the subjective experience of the present digital era and Lulu 
and Rebecca view as the dominant paradigm of digital culture in ‘Pure Language’. 
Kristin Veel elucidates this quality of database narrative by rethinking Manovich’s 
definition in temporal terms: ‘in the database we find that a narrative conception of time 
as a sequence of causally connected events is replaced by a notion that everything is 
potentially present at the same time—linearity is replaced by simultaneity.’542 Reading a 
database where parts can be reordered, she suggests, produces a sense that pieces of the 
text are not mired in a causal trajectory but run concurrently. Timothy Barker, in his 
discussion of digital art, similarly, writes:  
the duration of the database contains other multiple durations of a smaller scale. These durations are 
not arranged in a line or series, as we traditionally experience them in the everyday. Rather these 
multiple durations are organized in a hierarchical structure, which places multifarious events in 
simultaneity and results in multi-temporality.543 
Thus, I suggest, the database works towards representing the simultaneity of the para-
self and the simultaneity that Lulu attributes to digitised life. In this sense, I am reading 
the novel’s form through ‘Pure Language’, which, in calling attention to simultaneity in 
its dystopic image of the digitised future, encourages us to think through its implications 
within the entire novel.  
 In Goon Squad, moments of simultaneity are always underwritten by a logic of 
subjection. In the chapter ‘Ask Me if I Care’, set in the 1970s, a character uncannily like 
Jameson’s many-eyed art spectator appears in the form of a drugged-up teenager: after 
taking a hit of cocaine, Rhea narrates, ‘I’ve got eyes blinking all over my head, seeing 
everything in the restaurant at once’ (52). This vision not only results from an 
abnegation of self-control to a narcotic, but it is experienced as terrifying 
overstimulation when the band’s concert turns violent and Rhea witnesses an aggressive 
sexual encounter that her many eyes cannot stop seeing. Jules’s portrayal of Kitty’s 
effect on the surrounding social atmosphere more explicitly links simultaneity to power. 
He describes the instantaneous awareness of the celebrity’s presence throughout the 
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restaurant in terms of ‘a simultaneity that can only be explained using principles of 
quantum mechanics, specifically, the properties of so-called entangled particles’ (177). 
Here, Jules turns to the same ‘particle physics’ metaphor that Lulu employs in the final 
chapter. The patrons are ‘entangled particles,’ registering at the same time the proximity 
of an influential actress, which in turn flattens their individuality. Jules explains, ‘so 
indistinguishable are we from every other non-Kitty Jackson in our vicinity that when 
one of us sees her, the rest simultaneously react’ (177 n 1). This moment, in which 
Kitty’s presence diminishes all around to mere non-Kittys, reflects Scotty’s remark 
about power: ‘Power is like that; everyone feels it at once’ (109). 
 The affiliation of simultaneity with authority and control repeats in my analyses 
of the database as a textual form and as a platform for the self. In both cases, the 
database seems to control characters, to seize hold of their self-determination. In the 
following two sections, I scrutinise the database characteristics of Goon Squad’s 
structure, applying the writings of Norman M. Klein on his own computerised database 
novels to Egan’s material text. Klein emphasises the importance of gaps to the practice 
of database literature, gaps that Goon Squad materialises in the deep disjunctions 
between its diverse chapters. I contextualise Klein’s writing within Wolfgang Iser’s 
work on reader-response theory, situating Goon Squad’s database gaps in a new era of 
literary indeterminacy. Iser asserts ‘that since the eighteenth century, indeterminacy in 
literature—or at least an awareness of it—has tended to increase.’544 Veel situates 
database art’s ‘rel[iance] on gemmating plot structures and the shuffling of fragments’ 
within ‘a long cultural tradition of fragmentation, excess and the challenge to 
linearity’.545 I suggest similarly that, in the database novel, the depth of the gap has 
intensified to the point that events become unmoored, allowing the reader to tessellate 
them according to various organisational schemes. I insist that, in Goon Squad, the 
database structure removes both the author’s authority over the text and the character’s 
semblance of agency. Like Alex, whose information is owned by the database, the fates 
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 Like the experience of its subjects, Goon Squad’s form is episodic. Its chapters 
are short vignettes taken from the lives of its characters—Sasha and Alex’s blind date, 
Lou’s trip to Africa—punctuated by gaps and elisions. In interviews Egan frequently 
indicates three rules that governed Goon Squad’s composition: that (1) each story should 
take a different protagonist and (2) a different technical or narrative style, and that (3) 
each could be read in isolation from the collection.546 While Sarah Churchwell suggests 
that the various interrelations between the characters create some continuity, Egan’s 
compositional rules ensure a stark separation between chapters, caused by abrupt 
disjunctions in time, point of view, tone, and style.547 In his theory of the computerised 
database novel, Klein focuses on apertures, bleeds, in-between spaces, and wormholes, 
suggesting that database literature should consciously institute gaps that are identifiable 
to the reader yet whose contents remain mysterious. For Klein, these narrative elisions 
must be engineered such that they are immersive for the reader, inviting them ‘to guess,’ 
to fill-in the missing content ‘through the research provided.’548 Such a text would lay 
bare its economy of textual indeterminacy, displaying those indefinite moments when, in 
Iser’s reader-response theory, the reader is compelled to help compose the literary 
work.549  
 Goon Squad materially reflects Iser’s and Klein’s models, requiring that the 
reader imagine beyond the limited confines of each chapter to devise connections 
between characters and storylines. As Iser’s theory dictates, the variability of Goon 
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Squad’s chapters embed blank spaces through ‘the abrupt introduction of new characters 
or even new threads of the plot, so that the question arises as to the connections between 
the story revealed so far and the new, unforeseen situations.’550 If attending to gaps 
occurs in every literary reading, Goon Squad manifests these conditions for 
interpretation in the untold linkages it leaves between storylines and between chapters, 
breaks ensured by the rules under which Egan composed the text. Yet, as I will argue, 
Egan’s writing also notes a scarcity of silence in the digital age that impedes the 
possibilities of imaginative reflection and an awareness of the surrounding environment. 
In adopting the digital database form, Goon Squad paradoxically institutes the necessary 
spaces for its readers’ imaginative reflection. 
 While in Iser’s model literary engagement requires attention to gaps and 
indeterminacy, in Goon Squad the introduction of new media makes silence more rare 
and less distinctive. Music industry tycoon Bennie, in Goon Squad, laments the loss of 
‘muddiness’ in digital recordings, ‘the sense of actual musicians playing actual 
instruments in an actual room. Nowadays that quality (if it existed at all) was usually an 
effect of analogue signaling rather than bona fide tape’ (23). New digital technologies, 
even in media other than audio, eliminate gaps. He complains: ‘Too clear, too clean. The 
problem was precision, perfection; the problem was digitization, which sucked the life 
out of everything that got smeared through its microscopic mesh. Film, photography, 
music: dead. An aesthetic holocaust!’ (24, emphasis in original). The discrepancy 
between the complexity of the real world and the unspoiled sheen of the digital is 
similarly expressed by Jocelyn, who sees in Lou’s ‘new, flat and long’ television ‘a 
nervous sharpness that makes the room and even us look smudged’ (91). Here, Bennie 
and Jocelyn echo an observation made by Jacques Derrida who notes a shift in the 
palpability of deletions from writing to word processing. While in traditional writing 
erasures and insertions take physical and mental shape, leaving ‘a sort of scar on the 
paper or a visible image in the memory’, on the computer screen ‘everything negative is 
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drowned, deleted; it evaporates immediately, sometimes from one instant to the next.’551 
Muddiness in the digital text, as in Bennie’s account of digital music, photography, and 
film, does not exist, eliminated by the purity of the computer screen.552  
 Bennie condemns digitisation for effacing the imperfections of reality, and it 
does so at the expense of information that is accessible only in the very moments of 
silence that it suppresses. The Keep, for instance, meditates on the dearth of silence in 
the digital age and, as in Iser’s reader-response model, positions such moments as 
preconditions for creative engagement. Against Danny’s addiction to the hum of 
connection, to the dial tone, Howard casts his hotel as a silent haven premised on the 
elimination of technology. Unlike the digitally-minded Danny, who professes 
indifference to his imagination, Howard is interested in the capacity of his castle’s 
‘thick’ silence to revitalise personal creativity.553 Divorced from technological devices at 
the gates, he envisions his guests reclaiming their imaginative faculties through an 
immersion in silence, replicating medieval times when ‘imaginations were more active 
[and] inner lives were rich and weird.’554 In the meta-narrative, this judgment seems 
accurate, the stillness and isolation of the jail turning its prisoners into bricoleurs, who 
creatively turn objects at hand into needed or wanted gadgets.555 Inside the jail, ‘A 
broken pen is a tattoo gun. A plastic comb is a shank, meaning a knife. A couple of 
plums and a piece of bread are next week’s hooch.’556 It is, likewise, in the silence of his 
sham radio, made of bits of dust and other bric-a-brac, that Davis divines the voices of 
the dead.557 Here, the jailhouse silence instigates creative engagement, the imagination 
thriving undistracted by the digital and metropolitan noises that typically entrance 
Danny. 
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 There is always something lingering behind a silence waiting to be revealed, a 
relationship with the surrounding space that, I have indicated, is threatened in the 
horizon-less digital space. Yet, it is just these silences, Egan suggests, that are imperilled 
in the digital era. In his futuristic chapter, the sounds of ‘choppers, church bells, a distant 
drill’ make Alex unable to concentrate on Scotty’s analogue music (321). Giving voice 
to Howie’s worry that the digital present lacks quiet, surveillance helicopters in Goon 
Squad’s final chapter are inescapable in the urban environment. It is only during ‘the 
dead of night’, ‘[w]ithout the rant of construction and omnipresent choppers’ that 
‘hidden portals of sound opened themselves to [Alex’s] ears’, distributing an awareness 
of the environment (322). If, as I have suggested, in ‘Pure Language’ the T handset 
undermines engagement with the physical environment by siphoning attention onto the 
digital screen, these moments of silence facilitate a reengagement with the human 
scaffolding of the surrounding space. Through the gaps it institutes between its chapters, 
which offer an opportunity for re-engagement, I suggest that Goon Squad compensates 
for its anxiety over the dearth of silence and the difficulty of reflection in the 
contemporary, digitised context. 
 Nowhere does the text more overtly consider the nature of the pause than in its 
infamous PowerPoint chapter, ‘Great Rock and Roll Pauses’. Mimicking the text’s 
general structure, Alison’s PowerPoint journal by necessity institutes spaces in between 
each slide, gaps that eliminate the possibility of a flowing story and associating it with a 
list-like structure.558 Egan says of writing PowerPoint fiction that ‘it breaks down a 
narrative into a sequence of moments that basically hang in the air, and then give up 
their place to the next moment.’559 Indeed, even within her slides, Alison refuses linear 
expanses, conforming to the slogan, ‘A word-wall is a long haul!’ (262). The 
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presentation, thus, exposes the process of literary meaning-making, requiring that the 
reader devise the connective thread that is traditionally provided by the text itself. That it 
is the reader’s job to perform this linking task within the text’s gaps is hinted at by the 
chapter’s connoisseur of silence. Alison’s brother, who fastidiously records and plays 
the silences in rock-and-roll songs, is telling named Linc.560 This correspondence 
between Linc/link and aesthetic silences implies that in the gaps between PowerPoint 
slides and between the text’s chapters are, in the words of Iser’s reader-response model, 
moments when ‘the different segments and patterns of the text are to be connected even 
though the text itself does not say so.’561 
 Alison pursues this process of engaging with silences within her journal. One 
slide, ‘Lincoln Wants to Say/Ends Up Saying’, attempts to decipher the shadow linkages 
underlying his autistic thought pattern, presented as blocked sentences causally joined 
by arrows. Alison speculates on the notes, lost to silence, that connect Lincoln’s 
unexpressed sentiment, ‘I love you, Dad’, to the comment he actually makes about the 
Steve Miller Band (255). When applied to the text at-large, this slide suggests that, in the 
gaps between its chapters, readers can attempt to unfurl its discreet connections. This 
analysis is confirmed when Sasha suggests: ‘The pause makes you think the song will 
end. And then the song isn’t really over, so you’re relieved. But then the song does 
actually end, because every song ends, obviously, and THAT. TIME. THE. END. IS. 
FOR. REAL.’ (289). To consider the silence as a possible end, or as an end until the 
music or the story picks up again, labels it as a space where the audience confers order 
and meaning on the preceding text. Frank Kermode, for instance, suggests that ‘[w]e 
project ourselves [...] past the End, so as to see the structure whole, a thing we cannot do 
from our spot of time in the middle.’562 If the end is a time of necessary reflection where 
the past becomes available to interpretation, Sasha’s pronouncement of gaps as pseudo-
ends further implies that they are times to consider textual patterns.  
 In Goon Squad, pauses and silences are endangered by a digital world in which 
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the muddiness of analogue music is cleaned up and the daytime hours of the metropolis 
are ceaselessly haunted by the din of surveillance helicopters. Yet, as one of Alison’s 
slides pronounces, Egan’s texts also demonstrate ‘Proof of the Necessity of Pauses’ 
(314). Blank spaces and moments of silence emerge as necessary provisions for 
reflection, instituted into the text to flout the increasing fluidity of the digital writing 
surface. Where the digital troubles the integrity of the home-space, silences are havens 
that re-inscribe intimacy with the nearby. Goon Squad, then, can be read as an 
insurrection against a digital space where silence and blanks are eliminated, instituting 
these scarce substances into the fabric of the text. Klein identifies a similar cultural and 
aesthetic trouble with ‘locat[ing] “moments of being,” silences.’563 Rather than engaging 
with and making use of pauses in our schedules, he suggests that we fall into digressions 
between deadlines. As such, he suggests, ‘Data then can be an honest accounting of what 
we fail to do, or how we hide’, laying bare those blank spaces that in everyday life we 
do not register.564 Goon Squad manifests Klein’s hypothesis that data narratives might 
knowingly employ gaps and silences in order to oppose the digital’s glossing over of 
indeterminacy and blank spaces. In doing so, it implements the logic of Klein’s 
computerised database novels in the traditional, bound book. 
 
Database Recombination 
 Although it is confined to the requirements of the bound codex and of linear 
language, Goon Squad also embraces the recombinant quality that Manovich uses to 
describe the database and oppose it to conventional narrative. Reviews of the novel 
frequently contemplate Goon Squad’s form, expressing uncertainty as to whether it is a 
novel, a collection of interconnected stories, or something else entirely.565 This ambiguity 
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arises from the relationship between its chapters: When serialised, do they form a 
continuous narrative? Could they be reordered? Is their present orientation authoritative? 
These questions are fundamental to understanding the text in terms of Manovich’s 
definitions of narrative and of database. Goon Squad mediates between these two poles, 
co-opting the database’s list form yet presenting that list as an ordered itinerary of 
chapters, albeit one that does not reflect what Manovich calls narrative’s typical ‘cause-
and-effect trajectory’.566  
 In its two futuristic chapters, Goon Squad points to the demise of traditional 
narrative and its antagonistic relationship with digitalism. I previously noted the rise of 
‘simultaneity’ and the demise of ‘story’ and ‘change’ in ‘Pure Language’. Alison’s 
PowerPoint journal enacts this transition, its laconic and fragmented structure 
eliminating the fluidity necessary to narrative development. In the previous section I 
suggested that Alison’s journal requires that the reader supply the unarticulated junctions 
between slides. Here, I note that when the slides are analysed within themselves, they 
betray a more confused temporal logic. Egan has noted the efficacy of employing multi-
linear PowerPoint slides, with configurations that support various reading trajectories, to 
capture complicated moments textually.567 Alison’s slides frequently animate this 
writerly advice, bearing no stable chronology or order, demanding, like Manovich’s 
database, to be approached in various ways.568 The slide ‘What is going on in here?’, for 
instance, can be read column by column, to illuminate the connections between Sasha’s 
bedtime routine and the thoughts it provokes for her daughter; it might also be read 
primarily along the connecting lines of Alison’s thoughts, at the expense of Sasha’s 
contextual comments (272). Similarly, the layout of ‘Rob Was Mom’s Best Friend’ 
might be read from left to right, according to its colour-coding, or by some other 
arrangement (281). The slideshow’s unusual formats, its use of diagrams, blocks, and 
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charts, resist any definitive order, requiring that readers investigate the slides in various 
formations to register the full scope of their information. 
 By evading stable arrangement, Alison’s slides boast the unordered quality that 
Manovich attaches to the database. Goon Squad as a whole, however, manifests the 
undoing of both ‘change’ and ‘story’ through a recombinant structure that lacks 
narrative conclusion. Moving from item to item, layer to layer, Klein’s database projects 
eschew typical linear trajectories that Manovich links to narrative. Klein supposes, ‘Data 
cannot “conclude” a story; they cannot deliver a “suspense” ending, like a murder 
mystery—not in the traditional way’.569 Each item in a database narrative appears to 
complicate rather than resolve the preoccupations of the previous items. They do not 
demonstrate progress or development but are, in Manovich’s account, ‘collections of 
individual items, with every item possessing the same significance as any other.’570 
While considering similar themes and following a network of interrelated characters, 
Goon Squad’s sequenced chapters do not follow an arc of narrative development. It is 
for this reason that Will Blyth struggles to summarise the novel comprehensively in his 
review. Egan, he decides, has written a text with as ‘wide a circumference’ as possible 
‘while still maintaining any sort of coherence and momentum.’571 As such, Goon Squad 
appears akin to database novels that, Klein writes, are ‘without an arc that requires a 
dramatic ending. Instead, they proceed by insinuation, by involution—toward a 
beginning, toward an aporia’.572 Indeed, Goon Squad concludes with such a beginning, 
Bennie and Alex searching the night for Sasha but finding instead ‘another girl, young 
and new to the city, fiddling with her keys’ (349). The novel, this final scene indicates, 
could continue indefinitely, introducing a yet unexplored character into its fold. Egan 
has even suggested that ‘Black Box’ could be considered a fourteenth chapter of the 
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book, fulfilling as it does her three compositional criteria by placing Lulu at its centre 
and embracing the Twitter form.573 
 Bound in a codex book, Goon Squad sacrifices the flexibility of the digital mode 
that in Klein’s computerised work allows his readers to determine their own narrative 
trajectories. While Klein insists that, in database narratives, the reader becomes author 
by imaginatively filling in its gaps, Alan Kirby identifies a new ‘cultural dominant’ in 
which Klein’s theory is intensified, whereby the audience tangibly creates the text.574 
Whereas postmodernism ‘fetishised [...] the author, even when the author chose to indict 
or pretended to abolish him or herself’, Kirby’s digimodernism sees the author’s final 
elimination in cultural products, such as Wikipedia and Big Brother, whose content is 
generated by their audiences.575 Reflecting the development of the reader-as-author, 
Manovich notes that databases are fluid and unordered—that is, users can order them 
according to various principles.576 In this sense, database literature is a form of what 
Epsen Aarseth terms ‘ergodic literature’, related but not confined to computerised 
writing, in which ‘nontrivial effort is required to allow the reader to traverse the text.’577 
Kirby and Aarseth both view as a precursor to their respective paradigms B.S. Johnson’s 
The Unfortunates, which invites readers to shuffle its chapters. Bound in place, Goon 
Squad enumerates its chapters in a stable and authorised arrangement. Can it still be 
considered in the realm of the ergodic, the digimodern, and the database? As I have 
already indicated, Goon Squad was composed such that each story could stand on its 
own, meaning that in theory its chapters can be jumbled without losing its already loose 
coherence. Goon Squad thus possesses the qualities necessary for a database novel, 
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although it does not materially permit its reordering nor does it call its readers to treat it 
as an unarranged entity.  
 The tension between its presented order and its possible reordering is expressed 
by the book’s resemblance to an analogue record, featuring an A- and a B-side. By 
aligning itself with this analogue medium, Goon Squad suggests that it ought to be 
consumed linearly, from beginning to end, like a traditional record.578 However, by 
presenting each of its chapters as tracks, as isolated songs, it allows readers to imagine 
them in the digital context of the Compact Disc or an iPod, which imitates the record’s 
form but corrupts its ordering mechanism. Whereas records, like traditional books, are 
consumed from beginning to end, Joseph Conte notes, ‘One is able to skip 
instantaneously from one location to another and shuffle the order of play in digitally 
recorded media’.579 Wolfgang Funk hints at the impulse, when reading Goon Squad, to 
reorder the chapters, to skip from song to song. Funk suggests that by having to discover 
the various interrelations between characters and moments, readers receive the text 
‘without an ordering, authoritative instance to guide [them] through the incongruity of 
this mortal coil.’580 The desire to rearrange Goon Squad’s chapters, which remains a 
latent possibility in the physical text, finds expression in its iPod/iPad application. 
Released by Egan’s UK publisher, Constable & Robinson, this version provides three 
ordering schemes under which the chapters can be presented: Egan’s original, the 
chronological, or a random arrangement. Although it presents this option to readers only 
after they have perused the text once in Egan’s intended order, the iPod/iPad version 
nevertheless undermines the stability of Goon Squad’s material text, rendering it one of 
many possible versions. The profound gaps between Goon Squad’s chapters leave them 
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unmoored, new combinations and new narratives lying dormant and unformed in the 
material text.  
 This database quality represents a new stage of Iser’s indeterminacy, a new 
intensity of textual gaps that leave readers not only to fill in their contents but to curate 
the events they separate. In a PMLA roundtable, Hayles asserts that, rather than 
Manovich’s ‘natural enemies’, narrative and database are ‘natural symbionts’: ‘If 
narrative often dissolves into database, [...] database catalyzes and indeed demands 
narrative’s reappearance as soon as meaning and interpretation are required.’581 Goon 
Squad is illustrative of this theory, its gaps forming sanctuaries of reflection where 
discrete chapters can be integrated into a congruent network. Each orientation of its 
chapters demands that the reader devise correspondences, conjuring relations and 
meaning out of the blank spaces between stories. But, of course, these arrangements are 
always provisional, the iPod/iPad application summoning up alternative and hidden 
schemas that elicit new correspondences. Yet, I want to suggest that the possibility of 
rearranging the novel’s chapters haunts any reading of the text, even outside of its app 
context. 
 By undermining the authorised order of the material text in its app context, Goon 
Squad stages the final death of the author that accompanies digitisation, eliminating the 
writer’s control over the appearance of his or her text.582 Indeed, despite its firm order, by 
approximating the database form, the material text engrains in its structure the very 
possibility of this undoing. While Goon Squad’s material text does not explicitly invite 
readers to shuffle its chapters, the possibilities of recombination continue to shadow it, 
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the novel’s roving chronology compromising the appearance of agency amongst its 
characters. If, as Barthes writes, ‘the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death 
of the Author’, the reader’s creative awakening in database novel strips not just the 
author of his or her jurisdiction over the text but the characters of their own self-
determination.583 Of Goon Squad’s structure, Pankaj Mishra writes: it ‘leaves us with a 
disturbing sense of their (and our) state of unfreedom: it shows us the full arc of their 
choiceless lives’.584 The scattered revelation of episodes, the reader’s awareness of 
conclusions before introductions, Mishra suggests, highlights the absence of real agency 
in Egan’s text. This feeling, I argue, is enhanced by a database structure where episodes 
and events can be rearranged. Such a text, where beginnings, middles, and ends can 
arrive at random, declares that all events have always already occurred, that no freedom 
exists amongst its inhabitants. Even if it remains unexpressed in the material book, the 
recombinant database structure that underlies Goon Squad’s composition nevertheless 
emphasises the sense of predetermination described by Mishra. Thus, we see in the 
database novel, the invigoration of the reader to create order and analyse indeterminacy 
at the expense of the author’s control and the characters’ freedom.585  
 Like Rotman, whose para-self is modelled after the flexible dynamics of digital 
writing, Hayles has suggested that with digital signification there arises a new subject-
formation that reflects the ‘the physics of virtual writing’.586 For Hayles and Rotman, the 
norms of signification are reflected in the architecture of the subjects that use them. If 
the ‘physics’ of the novel’s structure, the database’s symbolic form, strips subjects of 
their freedom, I argue in the next section that this too is reflected in the narrative’s 
content, where subjects forfeit self-ownership by transcribing themselves in corporate 
and government databases. Alex, who traces his self-alienation back to the database, 
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embodies the pinnacle of this theme in Goon Squad, but a similar trajectory is contained 
in Egan’s Look at Me. Here, as in the novel’s structure, power is transmitted from those 
delineated within the database to those who oversee its arrangement and its analysis. 
Sean Cubitt has asked whether a new form of freedom might be found in the flexibility 
of digital databases, facilitating ‘a new, statistical and distributed self, a deconstructed, 
fully textual, rewritable file.’587 Goon Squad repositions this argument negatively: Egan’s 
database subjects do, in the end, rewrite themselves, but always in response to a loss of 
self and its information. 
 
Databases and the Superpanopticon 
 In 2003, considering the cultural implications of online dating, Jennifer Egan 
imagined the future of social networking websites as:  
a virtual clearinghouse where potential lovers, friends, business associates, audience members and 
devotees of all forms of culture—invisible to one another in the shadowy cracks of cities around 
the world—are registered, profiled and findable. An alternate dimension where the randomness and 
confusion of urban life are at last sorted out.588 
Emphasised in Egan’s article is the Internet’s ability to collect and to archive users’ data, 
the chaos of social life made navigable by search engine. In the Internet’s early days, 
Goon Squad’s Bix similarly dreams of a future where everyone is findable: he states, ‘I 
picture it like Judgment Day [...] We’ll rise up out of our bodies and find each other 
again in spirit form. We’ll meet in that new place, all of us together, and first it’ll seem 
strange, and pretty soon it’ll seem strange that you could ever lose someone, or get lost’ 
(209). This characterisation of technological advancement echoes Cathleen Schine’s 
review of the novel, in which she identifies the characters’ temporal disorientation in 
terms of being lost: she writes, ‘The question of the novel, the question every character 
asks, is: How did I get lost? How did I get from there to here?’589 Schine explicitly 
recognises Jocelyn as one such figure, who sees her junkie past as ‘lost time’ in which 
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‘[e]verthing went past, without me’ (90). Alongside Jocelyn, we can position Sasha who 
optimistically differentiates herself and her suicidal friend Rob from the kids she knew 
in Italy ‘who were just lost. You knew they were never going to get back to what they’d 
been, or have a normal life’ (206). Again, Ted distances his sons from the teenaged 
Sasha, wild and irresponsible, because ‘[s]he was lost’ (221).  
 Against these bleak portraits of heedlessness, Bix’s premonition of a networked 
future of constant visibility appears, on the surface, to be nurturing and inclusive. I have 
already argued, however, that in Goon Squad lost and unseen moments form silences 
necessary for creative reflection. This oppression of vision is hinted at elsewhere in the 
novel: Sasha’s therapist speaks of the ‘burden of eye contact’, for instance, while the 
chapter ‘Goodbye, My Love’ reflects on the Orpheus myth, in which her lover’s gaze 
damns Eurydice to the underworld (4). Considered in the context of digital technologies, 
the near impossibility of disappearing becomes a sacrifice of freedom, Bix’s sentiments 
inverted into troubling and pervasive surveillance measures. The incidental mentions of 
Google and Facebook appear to support the efficacy of the Internet for reconnection. 
While Facebook is credited with Drew and Sasha’s reunion after years of separation, so 
too do reconnections on the Web lead to the marriage of two safari-goers (241, 75). 
When Lou is dying, Bennie tracks down Rhea and Jocelyn to say their final goodbyes. 
Jocelyn narrates: ‘It seems you can find almost anyone on a computer. He found Rhea 
all the way in Seattle, with a different last name’ (88). Just about everybody, excluding 
Scotty, is traceable by the Internet, but this capability to search and discover is darker 
than Bix’s utopianism initially suggests. His association of the Internet with the Last 
Judgement indicates a more disturbing side to his optimistic prediction, his posters of the 
biblical scene portraying ‘naked babyish humans getting separated into good and bad, 
the good ones rising into green fields and golden light, the bad ones vanishing into 
mouths of monsters’ (193).  
 If, in her 2004 essay, Egan saw dating websites as clarifying the disorganisation 
of the real world, this online stratification becomes a means of surveillance in Goon 
Squad, one which challenges the workings of typical models of power. While I have 




different lives on and offline, Goon Squad also twins digital technology with the 
expansion of the visible. I attribute this paradox to a shift in surveillance, moving from a 
Panopticon model premised on vision to what Mark Poster terms the Superpanopticon, 
which functions through the database. By allowing its users to veil their identities, a 
possibility that facilitates Alex’s ‘blind team’, the Internet dismays Michel Foucault’s 
Panopticon system of surveillance in which ‘[v]isibility is a trap.’590 Jeremy Benthem 
devised the Panopticon as a prison blueprint, which places convicts under the 
unwavering gaze of a central watchtower into which they cannot see. Prisoners live with 
the sense of being ceaselessly monitored without being able to tell when they are 
actually being observed and when the tower is empty. The result is a style of 
surveillance in which the prisoner self-monitors, internalising authority and exercising it 
on him or herself. Foucault extrapolates from this architectural design a more general 
theory of social conditioning. Foucault suggests that, ‘He who is subjected to a field of 
visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; [...] he 
becomes the principle of his own subjection.’591 Foucault further explains that in 
modernity the principles of the Panopticon telescope out beyond the walls of the prison, 
functioning as ‘a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of 
men.’592 It is a model for the coercive conditioning of subjects to monitor and normalise 
themselves.  
 The relevance of the Panopticon as a metaphor for discipline in the digitised 
world remains contested territory. Whereas David Lyons lists various scholars who 
apply facets of Panopticism to contemporary modes of surveillance, Bauman 
characterises the digital moment as ‘post-Panoptical’, signalling ‘the end of the era of 
mutual engagement.’593 Allan Sekula has suggested that ‘[g]iven the central optical 
metaphor in Foucault’s work,’ systems of surveillance must be considered in relation to 
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the rise of photography.594 The same can be said for digital technologies, which have 
both complicated the terrain of optics and, as a result, necessitate a reconsideration of 
surveillance. Sekula’s emphasis on the archive’s historical role in discipline, in 
diagramming the deviant’s body and developing an organised system for tracing 
convicts, is repeated in Mark Poster’s consideration of the database in the acceleration of 
Panopticism in the digital era. Poster’s work witnesses the transition from surveillance 
based on optics to what Richard Clarke calls ‘dataveillance’, employing data systems to 
monitor individuals or group.595 Gilles Deleuze views this shift as a move from 
‘disciplinary societies’ to ‘societies of control’ in which control is articulated by 
numerical code, ‘a password,’ which determines access to information.596  
 Poster argues that the digital age is pervaded by a logic of the Superpanopticon, 
manifest in digital databases. By making transactions online, by allowing personal 
details to enter computer databases, he argues, people have become ‘participants in the 
disciplining and surveillance of themselves as consumers.’597 As a collection of 
information, the database forms the locus for self-definition in the digital era. The 
database, he writes, stages ‘the constitution of an additional self, one that may be acted 
upon to the detriment of the “real” self without that “real” self ever being aware of what 
is happening.’598 Much of this damage Poster attributes to the reductive dialect of data, 
what he terms its ‘impoverished, limited language,’ articulating the self through a ‘non-
ambiguous grammatical structure’ composed of ‘information in rigidly defined 
categories or fields.’599  Poster charges the database with fabricating a version of the 
subject out of the simple language of data, reducing the complexity of the self by 
rendering information its definitive substance. The database enables its owners to play 
with and move around data, to reconstruct the subject according to its own parameters. 
Poster writes, ‘the structure or grammar of the database creates relationships among 
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pieces of information that do not exist in those relationships outside of the database.’600 
Thus Poster indicts the database as a technology of surveillance and subjection, for 
instituting the basic vocabulary of data into the process of self-fashioning and for 
helping institutions to manipulate personal information for their own purposes. 
 Egan’s scrutiny of the database emerges in her earlier novel Look at Me, 
mimicking the content and the language of Poster’s critique. In it, Moose, an academic, 
constructs a cultural history of vision, beginning with the invention of glass and the 
attendant development of windows, mirrors, eyeglasses, telescopes, and microscopes 
that made perceptible the previously inscrutable domains of the private, the distant, and 
the minuscule. This narrative of vision mirrors the movement Virilio sees from ‘the 
passive optics of the space of matter (glass, water, air) which, in the end, only covers 
man’s immediate proximity’, to an active, electronic visuality, whose speed disqualifies 
the notion of the horizon.601  For Moose, the extension of the possibilities of the visual 
together have created ‘a world constructed and lived from the outside’, experienced by 
Charlotte as a vigorous and insistent self-consciousness that manifests itself as she 
archives her life online. 602 This post-industrial information age, according to Moose, 
spawns ‘quicksilver’ subjects self-consciously ‘assembled for the eye from 
prototypes’.603 Charlotte’s foray into the burgeoning online world confirms that Moose’s 
suspicions are only intensified on the Internet, where Charlotte knowingly fashions 
herself for display as a consumer brand. 
 After a life-altering and image-transforming car accident, Charlotte is invited to 
be an early participant on ExtraOrdinary People, a website on which selected individuals 
are paid to diarise their experiences. It is significant that, when entrepreneur Thomas 
first describes the website, he specifies, ‘It’s not a magazine—it’s a database’.604 
ExtraOrdinaryPeople, while not strictly limiting the grammar with which Charlotte 
describes her history, does structure the categories through which she conceptualises and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
600 Ibid., p. 96. 
601 Virilio, Open, p. 35. 
602 Egan, Look, p. 484.  
603 Ibid., p. 483. 




displays it—categories which include, ‘Childhood Memories. Dreams. Diary Entries [...] 
Future Plans/Fantasies. Regrets/Missed Opportunities.’605 Just after her initial meeting 
with Thomas, Charlotte begins thinking of her life through these key terms: she narrates, 
‘the mercenary part of me was already pacing the confines of my life, taking 
measurements, briskly surveying the furniture, formatting my thoughts to Thomas 
Keene’s specifications and calculating their price.’606 This moment elucidates the 
database’s insidious framework, pushing Charlotte to reformat her memory to the 
archive’s schema in a bid to maximise her financial profits. Indeed, as Charlotte’s web 
presence becomes more popular, and Thomas dedicates more resources to its display, he 
attempts to recreate and tape the car accident that scarred her. In doing so, he refashions 
history for the sake of a consumer audience hungry for entertainment.  
 By the end of the novel, Charlotte’s past has become so wrenched from her own 
control and reformatted for its audience that she sells her identity to Thomas for a 
distinctly Panoptic reason: ‘Life can’t be sustained under the pressure of so many 
eyes.’607 In this moment of overexposure, the next stage of Moose's clear sight, the 
dictates of the Panopticon still resonate, the self consciously constructed for public 
display, for a manicured visibility. Charlotte’s creation of a database identity is 
ultimately self-destructive, confirming Poster’s assertion that though the database 
arranges a separate delineation of self its repercussions are still felt in the real world. 
Charlotte, abnegating her information to the database, can only reinvent herself, 
changing her hair colour and taking on a new name. The database, though a seemingly a 
technology of preservation, is thus paradoxically implicated in a mercurial postmodern 
temporality of stark change and subjective renovation. The danger of self-curation is the 
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Goon Squad: Panoptic to Superpanoptic Surveillance 
 In its peregrinations among decades between the 1970s and the near future, Goon 
Squad measures the augmentation of surveillance from the terrain of optics—from 
watching, observing, spying—to the database. At the terminus of this development, we 
find the possibilities of visualisation expanded and the social landscape comprehensively 
mapped, just as a new form of online secrecy has taken hold. In the chronologically 
earliest chapters, the gaze is the primary mode of security and self-scrutiny, sight being a 
dominant metaphor for and mode of surveillance. In the final chapter, the work of 
surveillance is augmented by the database, which obscures characters from themselves 
when, like Charlotte Swenson, their identities are stolen by the corporate system.  
 As in the Panopticon, Goon Squad portrays subjects whose behaviours are 
conditioned by the gazes of others. In ‘Safari’, the bird-watchers Mildred and Fiona 
covertly monitor the social happenings around them, young Rolph realising in its final 
line: ‘I don’t think those ladies were ever watching birds’ (87). The presence of the 
policing eye, however, is more effective for Sasha, in ‘Out of Body’, who derives 
comfort when abroad from imagining that her lost father is tracking her, ‘making sure I 
was okay’ (233). When she begins university, she tells Rob that her stepfather has 
‘hir[ed] a detective to make sure she “toed the line” on her own in New York’ (198). 
The detective, though likely fictitious, serves to regulate Sasha against her darker 
impulses. While Sasha attempts to streamline her behaviour through the projection of a 
make-believe observer, Rob, in the same chapter, internalises the Panoptic gaze, 
bifurcating into a person who acts in the world and a self-surveying critic who judges his 
illicit desires. The second-person narrative voice suggests that Rob is telling the story to 
himself, and this sense of division is confirmed when he notes in the chapter’s final 
scene, ‘your mind pulls away as it does so easily, so often, without your even noticing 
sometimes’ (213). This separation between the self that acts and the self that watches 
permits Rob simultaneously to carry out and to condemn his repressed desires. After 
revealing to Sasha his previous sexual encounter with a man, Rob narrates: ‘It wasn’t 
you in the car with James. You were somewhere else, looking down, thinking, That fag 




he live with himself?’ (200). Rob’s duality signals his incorporation of social stigma, 
registering in the visual terms of surveillance the subject monitoring and chastening its 
own yearnings.  
 Developing on Sasha’s and Rob’s strategies for self-regulation, Dolly’s chapter 
demonstrates the hyperbolic affect of the Internet on the Panoptic mode of surveillance. 
Hired to reform the image of B, a murderous dictator, Dolly manipulates the public’s 
perspective by having him photographed wearing a fuzzy hat and accompanied by the 
fallen celebrity Kitty Jackson. When the actress is taken hostage, Dolly emails ‘pictures 
of General B. nuzzling Kitty Jackson’ to newspapers, which leads to them ‘being posted 
and traded on the Web’ just hours later (172). This increased exposure ironically results 
in B’s policing by newspaper photographers, who find him where assassins never could. 
The paparazzi are ‘superb hiders, crouching like monkeys in the trees, burying 
themselves in shallow pits, camouflaging inside bunches of leaves’ (173). Unable to 
escape their attentive lens, B must amend his violent activities and transition his country 
to democracy. Here, as in Sasha’s case, the policing gaze is redemptive. The implication, 
nonetheless, remains that the watchful eyes of others result in the regulation of 
behaviour. In Dolly’s case, however, this surveillance is interpenetrated by corporate 
press agencies and by the Internet, exponentially increasing its scale and speed: Dolly 
emails the photos ‘[m]inutes later’, they are uploaded and exchanged online ‘[w]ithin a 
couple of hours’, the international press begins contacting her ‘[b]y nightfall’ (172), and 
photographers start canvassing the General after ‘three or four days’ (173). 
 With the rise of digital media, surveillance enters the purview of the database 
and its ability to categorise and to track subjects in ways that transcend typical 
observation. Jules Jones anticipates this shift in the fantasy surveillance system he 
recommends, tongue-in-cheek, for Central Park. In his dystopic vision, encoded 
checkpoints measure from a bank of records the trustworthiness of each person who 
wishes to gain entrance. These evaluations reduce individuals to a numbered ranking 
distilled from categories that include, ‘marriage or lack thereof, children or lack thereof, 
professional success or lack thereof, healthy bank account or lack thereof, contact with 




(189 n 4). Jules’s forecast animates Poster’s assertion that databases delimit their 
subjects through a symbolic system that ‘contains no ambiguity’, numerical grades being 
his primary example.608 Such rankings, he suggests, show the database to be shaped by 
the political associations of its owners, who assign the reductive number grades and 
thereby constitute subjects according to their own ideology. This allocation of rankings, 
while carried out online, creates real-world effects: Jules’s system, complemented by 
radar screens and security guards, regulates the movement of park-goers by ensuring that 
non-famous people do not bother those celebrities with higher profiles and, thus, higher 
rankings.  
 The database surveillance measures that Jules dreams up are just about realised 
by the novel’s end. Alongside its elderly birdwatchers, ‘Safari’ reveals the future 
invention of ‘a scanning device that becomes standard issue for crowd security’ (65). 
This security apparatus, which echoes Jules’s checkpoints, is seemingly in place by the 
final chapter, where Scotty’s concert venue is outfitted with ‘visual scanning devices 
affixed to cornices, lampposts, and trees’ (339).609 These security measures are not 
limited to checkpoints but include ubiquitous and noisy choppers whose ‘sound Alex 
hadn’t been able to bear in the early years—too loud, too loud—but over time he’d 
gotten used to it: the price of safety’ (338-39). Security in this post-war landscape is 
immense, stressed by ‘the density of police and security agents’ at the concert, and T 
devices are integral to this newfound surveillance (339). Not only do police have special 
T handsets, but the possibilities of their telescopic vision and its search function are 
available more widely; recall that Alex employs his handset to locate Rebecca in the 
concert’s crowd.   
 The topography of this social space has been almost wholly mapped through the 
widespread employment of digital devices. Scotty emerges as the antithesis of digitised 
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subjectivity due to his Luddite scepticism. He is the only member of the ‘old gang’ who 
cannot be located to visit Lou on his deathbed. Jocelyn notes, ‘only Scotty has 
disappeared. No computer can find him’ (89). Indeed, in the chapter that he narrates, 
Scotty expresses a fear of computers, because ‘if you can find Them, then They can find 
you, and I didn’t want to be found’ (102). Scotty is unique amongst the characters of 
‘Pure Language’ for dismaying the infallible search function that Bix presciently 
ascribes to the Internet. While others can be traced by police, their scanned handsets 
revealing their identities, Alex identifies Scotty as ‘a man you knew just by looking had 
never had a page or a profile or a handle or a handset, who was part of no one’s data, a 
guy who had lived in the cracks all these years, forgotten and full of rage, in a way that 
now registered as pure. Untouched’ (344). Whereas database surveillance has rendered 
human geography mappable and burdened the population with constant visibility, 
tracking and monitoring individuals through their handheld devices, Scotty remains 
uncharted and hidden. 
 Alex is emblematic of the first generation of digitised subjects, who handed their 
information over to corporate institutions almost without realising it, and for this reason 
he sets the database at the core of his self-estrangement. Alex ascribes his willingness to 
abandon his own idea of himself and organise the illegal ‘blind team’ advertising 
scheme to the institutional database:  
he never could quite forget that every byte of information he’d posted online (favorite color, 
vegetable, sexual position) was stored in the databases of multinationals who swore they would 
never, ever use it—that he was owned, in other words, having sold himself unthinkingly at the 
point in his life when he’d felt most subversive[.] (324, emphasis in original)   
Whereas Scotty escapes surveillance because he has never surrendered his information, 
Alex—representative of his peers—cannot retrieve his data and, thus, feels interminably 
possessed by institutions that hold it within their databanks. Alex’s inability to repossess 
his information illustrates a turn in capitalism after digitisation. Hayles argues that 
unlike the capitalism of material objects, where ownership is characterised by 




becomes defined by access.610 Unlike material objects, information cannot easily be 
reclaimed, stolen, or destroyed.  
 Alex’s profound alienation arises from the knowledge that his information is not 
simply lost but that it can never be reclaimed, that institutions control his data and, while 
they guarantee it is not being analysed, he cannot be certain of what use to which it is 
being put. Daniel Solove diagnoses this disaffection borne of our culture of ‘digital 
dossiers’, which allows institutions to make decisions and evaluations about people 
without accountability. Solove contends that the ‘bureaucratic ways of using our 
information have palpable effects on our lives because people use our dossiers to make 
important decisions about us to which we are not always privy.’611 As Solove notes, 
Alex feels disconnected from himself because his data is being parsed for details and 
used to draw conclusions in nebulous and bureaucratic ways. Unable to repossess his 
data and unsure of how it is being marshalled, Alex orchestrates Benny’s blind team to 
define himself against the picture of himself archived in the database, to render that 
information obsolete. Yet, in doing so, he becomes further enmeshed in corporate 
manipulation, gathering people who will sell their voice, their advocacy, and their 
opinion to advertise Scotty’s upcoming concert. In reacting against his previous 
optimism, the information gathered by institutions, and producing the blind team, Alex 
only re-inscribes institutional power and exploitation. 
 More than detecting the contemporary anxiety rooted in the veiled information 
practices of surveillance institutions, ‘Pure Language’ interrogates the ideology that 
underpins the language of data. Like Poster, who argues that the database delineates 
subjects in a limiting, reductive, and manipulable discourse, Goon Squad critiques the 
language of data for producing a cultural belief in its own transparency, for seeing in 
data’s clarity and the absence of ambiguity the revelation of unmediated truth. Alex’s 
précis of his database estrangement hints at the simplistic parameters from which the 
database captures its subjects: ‘favorite color, vegetable, sexual position’. The banality 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
610 Hayles, ‘The Condition’, p. 78. 
611 Daniel Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Digital Age (New York and 




of these keywords echoes the chapter’s more general critique of the language of 
information used on T devices and its effect on the younger generation. Walter 
Benjamin defines information as ‘lay[ing] claim to prompt verifiability’, suggesting that 
it assumes the appearance of being ‘“understandable in itself.”’612 It is just this quality of 
clarity that Lulu appreciates in the language of the T handset. Prototypical of the 
younger cohort, Lulu views the plain semiotics of the T as an aesthetic ideal, because for 
her, as stated earlier, it contains ‘no philosophy, no metaphors, no judgments’—that is, 
nothing hidden. For Lulu and her business-major peers, terms like ‘up front’ and ‘out in 
the open’ cease to possess meaning because they refuse to lend significance to the 
concealed or the veiled reasons behind speech (327). It is for this reason that Lulu has no 
ethical problem with purchasing opinions for the blind team: she contends, ‘if I believe, 
I believe. Who are you to judge my reasons?’ (327). The veneration of a clean aesthetic, 
of discourse rid of complexity, bodies cleaned of ‘piercings, tattoos or scarifications’, 
and vocabularies wiped of profanities, reveals a disregard for what is secreted behind 
representation (325). Like the social terrain, whose blank spaces seem to have been 
mapped, Lulu’s fully digitised generation seeks a symbolic system without 
indeterminacy in which all significance is immediately visible. Lulu believes they have 
discovered this clean symbolism in digital communication, which avoids interpretative 
intricacy and assumes its own certainty. 
 While Lulu believes in the stability and the clarity of the discourse of data, ‘Pure 
Langauge’ frequently criticises this idiom for the simplicity of its symbolism. Alex 
complicates Lulu’s sponsorship of this language when he notes ‘how easily baby talk 
fitted itself into the crawl space of a T’ (335). Like Poster, then, Alex critiques the non-
ambiguous patois of the data as a platform for communication and for delineating the 
self. This language, denuded of complexity, fails to capture the nuances or particularities 
of the individual, facilitating only juvenile communication. The chapter, furthermore, 
undermines the seeming clarity of data. Despite its assumed ability to illuminate wholly 
and quantify accurately, there remains meaningful wavers of the indistinct and 
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unquantifiable that confound data’s language. Alex, for instance, receives a message 
from Lulu that he reads as ‘nice’, an uncharacteristically sarcastic reply to his 
lamentations of the dwindling supply of air and light in his apartment—that is, until he 
understands that, though ‘nyc’ can be read as ‘nice’, what Lulu really means is New 
York City (335). A similar volatility in the reductive language of data emerges in Jules’s 
dream security system. Jules acerbically pleads that his own infamy for attacking Kitty 
be treated akin to other forms of fame, such that he will be rewarded a high ranking and 
afforded additional privilege. The numbered ranking system of dataveillance, Jules 
notes, contains its own kind of slippery indeterminacy where various types of notoriety 
collapse into each other. 
 While Lulu’s generation reaches out for a language that—like the space they 
occupy—is resistant to the hidden or the undisclosed, these moments insist on an 
undertow to data signification that transcends its surface simplicity. What is condemned 
in this chapter is not just the reductive discourse of the database but also the belief that 
this sparse language could achieve comprehensive transparency. Data becomes, then, a 
language that occludes its representational frailties by assuming the capacity to capture 
truth simplistically. The chapter thus reprimands the database for reducing subjects to its 
meagre language while naturalising its idiom as a transparent and clear discourse for 
analysing the world and the subject. Revealing the complexity elided by the language of 
information, the novel affiliates data with the aesthetic of the digital screen, the cleaned 
up version of reality that Bennie decries in digital music and art. This critique of data, 
then, is part of a larger dialectic sketched out by the novel, revolving around two 
conceptions of purity manifest in Scotty and in Lulu. 
 Scotty’s anti-technology stance and his acoustic music affiliate him with a purity 
of the natural world, of analogue muddiness. Both Bennie and Alex call Scotty’s music 
‘pure’ and ‘untouched’ (321, 344). Alex describes Scotty’s music in terms of its 
‘mournful vibrato; the jangly quaver of slide guitar’, emphasising modulation and 
irregularity (320). Scotty is more generally linked with a purity of indeterminacy, his 
vision marked by ‘permanent gray smudges’ that he considers ‘a visual enhancement’ 




uniformity and the elimination of dissonance. Refusing to acknowledge what is hidden 
behind representation, Lulu embraces data language—the ‘pure language’ of the 
chapter’s title—for its abdication of metaphor. Contrarily, we find in Scotty’s music 
‘double meanings and hidden layers’ (343).  
 Avery Gordon argues that, ‘In a culture seemingly ruled by technologies of 
hypervisibility, we are led to believe not only that everything can be seen, but also that 
everything is available and accessible for our consumption.’613 The language of 
information and the surveillance of the database work to shore up this belief in 
hypervisibility, to obscure those moments and meanings hidden outside of their systems 
of representation. While Lulu and her generation adhere to this meaning of purity, 
Scotty, hiding in the gaps, gestures back towards a previous notion of purity that rejects 
the aesthetic of the screen. Scotty advocates a return to a pre-digital notion of a purity 
based on aesthetic muddiness and real-world uncertainty, on gaps in representation and 
on the social map. We thus see in Scotty’s ‘pure’ aesthetic a mirror of the literary 
indeterminacy that the text structurally embraces in order to counteract the uniformity 
manufactured by the digital and revered by Lulu. In the final section, I extend the 
novel’s advocacy for the purity of symbolic uncertainty to the material collection.  
 
Return to the Material Archive  
 Against the visions of the digital archive, Goon Squad juxtaposes Sasha who 
consistently constructs material archives. An impulse to collect appears to track her 
history, first emerging as an obsession with shoplifting as an adolescent. When we 
encounter Sasha in Ted’s chapter, in her late teens and living in destitution in Naples, 
she relies on theft to remain financially afloat. In the first chapter, Sasha suffers a relapse 
of kleptomania, and her therapist attempts to link her condition with the disappearance 
of her father at age six. This suggested causation, which the text does not confirm, 
places the impulse to collect within the realm of family trauma. However, the text also 
implies that collecting is built into Sasha physically, a natural impulse. When Ted 
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encounters her in Naples, he describes her in archival terms: her adolescence was a 
‘catalog of woes’, her appearance now an ‘inventory of breasts and hips and gently 
indented waist’ (220, 224). Sasha’s archival affiliation is, in this chapter, strengthened 
by her remarkable recall: she says, ‘I remember everything’ (224). The novel discovers 
in the material collection two answers to the problematic functioning of the database. 
The first chapter, ‘Found Objects’, construes the material collection as an ultimately 
inscrutable form of biography, in comparison to the terse legibility and assumed 
transparency of the digital language of the database. In ‘Great Rock and Roll Pauses’, 
Sasha’s domestic sculptures and collages deteriorate over time, ensuring that the 
personal information they contain cannot be preserved in institutional databases.  
 In her reflections on the digitisation of the Le Corbusier archive, Susan Yee 
stresses the compromise of working with computer rather than material collections: she 
writes, ‘It allowed me to do things that I could not do before. I could search it, 
manipulate it, copy it, save it, share it. But what did it do to me? It made the drawings 
feel anonymous and it made me feel anonymous. I felt no connection to the digital 
drawings on the screen, no sense of the architect who drew it.’614 The database, because 
it eschews physical space for digital memory, is able to contain more information and 
make those details more easily accessible. Yet, Yee views the increased ability to 
manipulate the digital archive as a detriment to its analysis, forming a barrier against a 
material intimacy with the collected objects. Yee’s worry, Turkle suggests, expresses a 
more general ‘anxiety that digital objects will take us away from the body and its ways 
of understanding.’615 The historian Carolyn Steedman similarly wonders about the 
‘epistemological status’ of the digital archive and analyses of it. 616 If the ability to scan 
and, thus, to magnify documents allows Steedman to decipher words and names that 
would otherwise remain unintelligible, is she any longer reading history as it was 
written, as it would have been understood at the time? Steedman reasons, ‘I am reading 
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words that were never there in the first place, for they were never written as I read 
them.’617 The historical status of the archived object is thus thrown into crisis by its 
digitisation.  
 In these accounts, the digital archive paradoxically compromises readerly 
interpretation by making its contents more readable. Goon Squad, I want to suggest, 
mirrors these critiques by presenting the material archive in terms of intimacy and 
inscrutability. I have argued that the digital revolution in Goon Squad threatens the 
cultivation of intimacy specifically by processing interactions through the T device. 
Whereas the self is threatened by the language of the database and the cultural belief in 
its accuracy, the material archive witnesses eruptions of intimacy—of sexuality or 
romance—because it withholds its meaning. Here, materiality and inconclusiveness 
renews the intimacy that was compromised by digital technology and database certainty. 
Jean Baudrillard, as I have previously noted, argues that, alienated from social discourse, 
collectors found a personal language through their objects.618 Whereas Baudrillard 
condemns the collection because its signification can never communicate beyond the 
collector, Goon Squad celebrates this very impenetrability. We might consider Goon 
Squad alongside Susan Sontag’s ‘Against Interpretation’. Rather than probing the text’s 
hidden meaning, to force an interpretation it, Sontag advises a turn to ‘an erotics of 
art.’619 Likewise, the impossibility of outsiders fixing the material archive, of reading it 
definitively, provokes outbursts of temporary intimacy.620 
 In the introductory chapter, Sasha visits a therapist, Coz, in an attempt to cure her 
kleptomania. The objects she steals, always taken from people, never from stores, are 
collected on a table in Sasha’s apartment, isolated from her other possessions and never 
put to use. Coz analyses her desire to steal as ‘a way for Sasha to assert her toughness, 
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her individuality’ (4), and she later acknowledges the biographical nature of the archive: 
‘It contained years of her life compressed’ (15). Unlike her online dating profiles, where 
Sasha lies about her age, the archive of stolen objects contains ‘the raw, warped core of 
her life’ (16). During their date, she anxiously observes Alex examine her archive: 
‘Watching Alex move his eyes over the pile of objects stirred something in Sasha’ (16). 
At this intense moment, she pulls him to the carpet to sleep with him, resisting his 
attempt to lead her to the bedroom and away from the collection. Alex has not 
deciphered her secret, the biographical content encoded into the archive. As she 
previously noted, though the collection is ‘clearly not random’ it remains ‘illegible’ (15). 
Alex’s stare excavates no meaning from the archive but allows him to locate a packet of 
bath salts in the mess, to address the collection as useful objects rather than ones 
endowed with biographical meaning. Rather, Sasha’s arousal results from showcasing 
her biography with the knowledge that it cannot be interpreted, even by herself.  
 Whereas Alex felt owned by corporations, who databased his details in easily 
readable language, material and written collections provide a mechanism for displaying 
the self that vexes interpretation. The text locates a sensual power in displaying 
biography in a way that evades successful interpretation. In the next chapter, Sasha 
misinterprets the meanings of two of Bennie’s collections. On their car ride back into 
Manhattan, Bennie plays a series of songs that, for him, narrates the descent of music 
into the ‘lifeless and cold’ tracks of the digital era (38). Sasha, however, fails to notice 
its dormant diatribe, although her remark about the absent World Trade Centre seems to 
double as an apt commentary on his track list. Throughout the chapter, Bennie also 
compiles a list of personal events fraught with shame, denoted by keywords. When 
Sasha reads this list—‘Kissing Mother Superior, incompetent, hairball, poppy seeds, on 
the can’—she mistakes it for a compilation of potential song titles (39). By transgressing 
on his biographical archive and misinterpreting it, Sasha unknowingly causes Bennie to 
reconsider his past. After she recites it aloud, Bennie’s list of shameful events ‘sounded 
like titles to him, too. He felt peaceful, cleansed’ (39). Though the past is ‘neutralized’ 
by Sasha’s ‘scratchy voice’, her misreading fails to awaken Bennie sexually, his lost 




Sasha was love,’ readerly misapprehension again erupting in a form of momentary 
romance (39). 
 In her review of the text, Schine writes of Sasha’s collection and Bennie’s list as 
two archives of ‘shame’: she notes, ‘Instead of stolen wallets, he is weighted down with 
moments of humiliation from the past that he scribbles on scraps of paper when he 
recalls them.’ Yet, in both cases, the power with which the archives are imbued 
evaporates with the frisson of misinterpretation. While Sasha ‘take[s] a symbolic step’ 
by allowing Alex to use one of her previously safeguarded objects, Bennie feels purified 
by Sasha’s misapprehension (17). Although both of these misreadings manifest in erotic 
or romantic feelings, these emotions are markedly temporary: Sasha’s interest in Alex 
quickly wanes after their sexual encounter, and Sasha does not return Bennie’s 
expressions of love. These flickers of romance, however, also presage recollections of 
deeper but lost intimacies. The scent of the bath salts recalls for Sasha ‘the smell of 
Lizzie’s bathroom,’ provoking memories of the friend from whom she stole the salts and 
with whom she is no longer in contact (17). Likewise, Bennie’s feelings of love quickly 
turn into memories of his marriage to Stephanie, ‘before he’d let her down so many 
times that she couldn’t stop being mad’ (39-40). Thus, we witness in these archival 
misreadings not just fleeting flickers of romance but also evocations of powerful 
relationships of close friends and spouses. As such, they seemingly oppose the digital 
condition, which threatens to undermine intimate relationships, by tapping into 
recollections of deep bonds. 
 Whereas Alex loses his information by giving up access to it, his information 
reduced to simple database language, the material archive articulates itself in a personal 
code unavailable to spectators. Unlike the limiting digital language, these material 
collections operate through a mysterious discourse that disables the ability to decode 
their personal content and, as a result, produces ecstatic responses. The emphasis on the 
material archive is similarly the focus of Sasha’s final appearance in the novel, in her 
daughter’s PowerPoint journal. The setting of ‘Great Rock and Roll Pauses’ forms a 
fundamental contrast to Alex’s future, digitised chapter. Unlike the New York of ‘Pure 




Sasha’s desert environment is almost pure horizon. Indeed, Virilio writes that the 
horizon line ‘is the ideal symbol of the desert.’621 Despite this contrast, for Virilio the 
desert is still evocative of the digital condition, because its empty and flat landscape 
removes all distinction between physical distance. Since there are no clear markers in 
the desert, everything is always familiar, always nearby, and the idea of journey, 
narrative, and change lose significance. With images and information from around the 
globe immediately accessible online, Virilio thus views in the current digitised moment 
‘the “zero threshold” in which all distances cancel each other out, [...] the desertification 
of the dwarfing of the world.’622 Both desert and digital are, in his account, panoramas of 
sameness.  
 Whereas Virilio collapses the desert into the digital, Goon Squad maintains their 
distinction, based on the desert’s deep silence. Jean Baudrillard locates the American 
desert as ‘a natural extension of the inner silence of the body’, opposing it to technology, 
language, and humanity’s other ‘constructive faculties’.623 Alison’s journal likewise 
aligns the desert with silence and, more specifically, with the musical pauses over which 
her brother obsesses. In the concentric circles of her slide ‘Sounds’, Alison positions her 
sentiment, ‘The whole desert is a pause’ in the outermost ring: the desert’s pause 
contains, the image implies, ‘a hum like the pause in “Closing Time” by Semisonic’ and 
‘faint clicks like the scratchy pause in “Bernadette”’ (295). As a zone of silence, 
enclosing a landscape of aesthetic pauses, the desert appears as the embodiment of the 
text’s gaps. These textual silences, like Baudrillard’s silent desert, function as an 
antidote for the dearth of silence in the digital era, the desert landscape similarly 
emerging as the antithesis to the noisiness of the digital space embodied by Alex’s 
clamourous New York.  
 It is in this desert setting that Sasha fashions her final archive. Sasha makes 
sculptures out of the jetsam of her family’s everyday life that, she says, are ‘precious 
because they’re casual and meaningless’ (273). Like her kleptomania collection, this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
621 Paul Virilio, ‘The Twilight of the Grounds’, in The Desert, ed. by Wilfred Thesiger and others 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 2000), pp. 102-118 (p. 105). 
622 Ibid., p. 106. 




archive is biographical, revealing ‘the whole story if you really look’ (273). Rather than 
preserving these archives, however, her collages and sculptures are designed so that they 
degrade and disappear into the desert. When Alison and her father return from their 
stroll, they see one sculpture ‘fading into the dust’ (294). This is, writes Alison quoting 
her mother, ‘part of the process’ (250). Sasha’s desert sculptures elude Alex’s primary 
anxieties over the database through their materiality and their short lifespan. In contrast 
to data’s endless reproducibility, Sasha’s collages are meant to self-destruct, embracing 
the death drive that Derrida locates at the heart of the archive. Whereas Alex worried 
about how his databased information was being used, Sasha’s collages ensure that her 
biography cannot be interred indefinitely. By implanting her subjectivity in material 
designed to disintegrate, Sasha refuses to portray herself in a form that might be stolen 
from her. Whereas Alex can never change or, indeed, see the details that form his 
database identity, the material decay of the sculpture ensures that no one else can claim 
ownership over it. The comparison between Alex’s database and Sasha’s sculptures 
reveals an ultimate antagonism between the self and its archivisation. It is his knowledge 
that a database of his information exists that provokes Alex to act against his ethics, to 
reconfigure himself fundamentally. Sasha, on the other hand, consciously builds 
archives that will finally fade away, leaving no trace in the desert sands. This 
comparison suggests that Sasha’s self-destructive sculptures are precisely what allow her 
to survive, to escape the archive’s tyranny, which ultimately forces Alex to define 
himself against what feels authentic and true.  
 The corruptibility of the material collection, then, as well as its impenetrable 
form, signals a strategy for evading the increasingly insistent sprawl of the database.  
The desert sands, like the novel’s textual gaps, provide a destructive but necessary 
silence in a digital space suffused with noise. Against the tracking mechanisms of the 
database, its pervasive surveillance, the novel holds up the material archive as an 
inscrutable and evanescent option that holds the self’s contents while maintaining their 
secrecy. The database novel, though controlling its characters, implements gaps in 
contrast to the sheen of the digital screen, unmarked by textual indeterminacy. Goon 




reality and condemns the digital screen’s aesthetic of purity: simple, forthcoming, 
definite. Demonstrating the fallacy of this reading, the novel excavates precisely what 
the screen ignores and, in the process, finds new forms of resistance in a return to the 





Conclusion: The Personal Archive and the Death Drive 
  This dissertation has argued that the contemporary American novel persistently 
presents and contemplates the archive as a mechanism through which the self comes into 
being. In focusing on the personal archive, these novels address a cultural transformation 
in the ways people understand and fashion themselves as subjects. The widespread 
vogue for collecting and documenting in the late-twentieth century has coalesced, in 
recent years, around digital technologies and applications, which augment the amount of 
self-knowledge available for collection and the appearance that it takes. Baudrillard, 
alongside several others, has suggested that the latent content of the collection is always 
the subjectivity of the collector him or herself. Thus, we might position both the material 
and digital archives that abound in contemporary personal life within a related ecology 
of self-archivisation and as the flowering of an older tradition. Andreas Huyssen 
ensconces this accelerated culture of ‘self-musealization’ within a memory culture vital 
since the late 1970s.624 Personal digital technology is, in part, responsible for the growing 
possibilities of entwining the self around an archival network, the culture of social 
networking being a prime example. As danah boyd and Kate Crawford note, ‘Personal 
computing and the Internet have made it possible for a wider range of people—including 
scholars, marketers, governmental agencies, educational institutions, and motivated 
individuals—to produce, share, interact with, and organize data.’625 Acts of archiving 
have thereby become an accessible and common means for the subject to manage, enact, 
and ponder itself in contemporary American life, by curating material and digital objects 
into meaningful and expressive displays. Contemporary novels of the archive track this 
cultural shift towards archival self-fashioning through their overlapping concern with 
memory monumentalised in the material forms of goods and photographs and in the 
digital forms of network profiles and computer storage.  
 This dissertation has pointed to several opportunities and perils that 
contemporary novels locate within self-curation. While they frequently see the archive 
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engaged in stabilising psychoanalytically a humanist, integrated subjectivity, the novels 
also posit several dangers incited on the self through its archivisation. Though curation 
might buttress the subject, the archive, depending on the form it takes, also threatens to 
overwhelm systems of meaning or to jettison personal information to surveillance 
institutions. The archive, then, offers the subject a system through which to seek 
coherence while, simultaneously, threatening it with erasure. Though the novels warn of 
archival threats, they also answer these critiques with alternative forms of curation that 
neuter the very dangers they expose. As such, these novels do not advise the wholesale 
abandonment of the personal archive so much as the critical application of it to private 
and social life. The novels also demonstrate that there is far from a single archival 
subject: the subject that emerges—or fails to emerge—from the archive is contoured and 
conditioned by the form of curation it employs. In this sense, the novels reformulate the 
proposition made by Jacques Derrida that ‘the technical structure of the archiving 
archive also determines the structure of the archivable content even in its very coming 
into existence and in its relationship to the future.’626 If the content of the personal 
archive is the archivist’s own subjectivity, than, as these novels contend, the archive’s 
structure imprints itself on the subject it enacts. 
 There are many threads that weave through the preceding chapters, two of which 
I outlined in the Introduction. To review: all four novels, in their own ways, entangle the 
personal archive within systems of vision and domesticity. Consistently the novels 
envision the archive as compensating for a deficiency in visual knowledge: clarifying a 
past whose trauma has rendered it invisible (Auster), or illuminating a panoramic view 
of the subject in its entirety (Hustvedt). In doing so, the novels point to the frailty of 
visual knowledge, insisting that the archive can provide a perspective inaccessible to the 
eyes. It is precisely for this reason that Doctorow advocates the ‘blind’ form of narrative 
against an archival method that would seek to establish the terrain of history with 
certainty and singularity. In narrating without visual knowledge, Doctorow suggests that 
the past can be made accessible in its radical unknowability and contradiction. Egan, 
similarly, critiques the impulse to see and to seize the subject in its archivisation. Egan 
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charges the digital database with promoting and adhering to a cultural belief in the 
transparency of its information, adjoining the archive with the speculating lens of 
surveillance. Like Doctorow, Egan warns against archives that strive to see with too 
much precision, but she also finds, in a return to materiality, a counter-force that 
productively obscures the self. Thus these novels, in linking the work of archives with 
sight, simultaneously take note of the visual enhancements granted by curation and the 
shortcomings of visual knowledge.  
 The novels also conceive of their personal archives in relationship to the home, 
as either consolidating or destroying the domestic space. For Paul Auster, the personal 
archive forms a temporary anchor for the subject when the home’s stability, during the 
recent housing crisis, can no longer be taken for granted. Whereas Auster finds a stand-
in for domestic order within the archive, Hustvedt imbues personal artefacts, arranged 
inside the desk drawer, with the propensity to stamp their organisation on the house and 
the subject itself. Doctorow’s novel meanwhile portrays an unruly archive that 
terminates the brothers’ lives by overtaking and dismantling the home. This antagonism 
to the home repeats in the digital condition, which, in Egan’s novel, complicates 
traditional notions of familiarity and intimacy. Whereas the digital moment muddles 
relationships and the digital database alienates subjects, the material archive re-inscribes 
romance and self-ownership. For the most part, these novels situate the archive in 
contexts where the notion of the home or the house finds itself under threat by 
globalisation, financial collapse, urbanisation, and technological innovation. The 
archive, they suggest, might compensate for or participate in the hostility these 
transformations inflict upon the home.   
 Shadowing the home’s instability is the possible demolition of the archive and 
the archivist, nodding towards the Freudian death drive which Derrida instates within the 
archive. One of the goals of this dissertation has been to investigate how novels animate 
the sometimes-nebulous proposals articulated by theoretical writings. That is, I have 
attempted to employ archival novels as a threshold between conceptual writing and lived 
experience, pointing to the ways in which theory can inform and supplement the now-




which Derrida also calls the ‘anarchivic’ and ‘archiviolithic’ force, noting its presence 
in each of my analyses.627  
 Derrida, as I demonstrated at length in the third chapter, hard-wires the archive’s 
destruction into its very formation, linking structural repetition with a principle of 
violence. Of the archiviolithic force, he writes, ‘It will always have been archive-
destroying, by silent vocation.’628 Robert Rowland Smith, however, argues that Derrida 
deliberately misreads his source material, eliding certain of Freud’s hints and 
suggestions in order to strengthen his claims for the archive’s self-destructiveness.629 
Smith notes that this does not suggest that Derrida’s interpretation of the archive is 
invalid but rather that he is marshalling and transforming Freud’s ideas for his larger 
argument. One of the possibilities that Derrida ignores is, Smith observes, that the death 
drive can reroute itself as external violence: ‘For the death-drive, as Freud has said, can 
divert itself outwards as aggression, in which case it has done nothing if not preserve 
itself, even if in an alternative mode, and even if, as we have seen, some of its 
destructive power may have been tempered.’630 I note this other possible trajectory for 
the death drive, to enact external pressure instead of internal destruction, in order to 
gesture towards a critical danger that the novels address in several ways: that the 
archiviolithic force menaces not just the archive itself but the archivist who presides 
over it. The novels demonstrate that violence, stagnation, and collapse persistently stalk 
the archive, and that this violence can similarly imperil the archivist. Yet, the novels also 
propose ways that the subject might productively circumvent, channel, or even embrace 
this danger.  
 In the first two chapters, I suggested that the archive provides a means of re-
establishing a form of humanist subjectivity, re-instating equilibrium after a 
disorientating trauma. In Paul Auster’s Sunset Park, the archive provides an approach 
for working-through the traumatic past that can itself only provisionally withstand the 
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tumultuous outside world. The novel, by taking the archive’s eventual degradation as a 
given, highlights archiving as a process of re-establishing a vital and coherent humanist 
subjectivity. As an alternative mode of contending with the harsh shifts of contemporary 
capitalism, the novel also speculates about subjects becoming archive-like, weathering 
shock and change by emulating the archive’s resourcefulness. While Sunset Park 
accepts the archive’s destruction and repositions archiving as an activity focused on the 
present moment, Hustvedt’s What I Loved permits the personal collection to sidestep the 
death drive through an investment in play. The death drive is present most literally in 
Mark’s repetitive game, an iteration of the Fort-Da game that Freud initially used to 
outline the repetition compulsion. The novel contrasts Leo’s collection against this icon 
of the death drive for its economy of play, dodging repetition through its transformation 
of curation into a revealing game of self-analysis.  
 Whereas Auster and Hustvedt discover in the archive the possibility of erecting, 
at least provisionally, a coherent subjectivity, E.L. Doctorow and Jennifer Egan note 
various threats that archiving presents to the subject. Doctorow’s Homer and Langley, 
bearing out Derrida’s archiviolithic force, condemns the archive to collapse when it 
attempts to submit the past to a strict law and final categorisation. This logic overlaps 
with a contemporary anxiety over information overload, the wealth of historical 
materials overflowing any archival scheme that seeks to nail them down in an infallible 
and constant configuration. In Homer and Langley, then, Doctorow presents the threat of 
the death drive as a destructive force attendant to styles of archivisation that aim to 
provide a comprehensive and factual account of the past from a singular perspective. 
Here, though, the death drive condemns not just the archive but gets channeled on to the 
brothers, who perish as it collapses. To ward off this deadly fate, the novel advocates 
Homer’s ‘blind’ style of diarising that, by refusing to fix history with a final definition, 
permits addendum and addition, and thus enables a complicated and contradictory 
ecology of historical knowledge.  
 Whereas Homer and Langley views the death drive as a hazard to be evaded 
through free and imaginative forms of composition, Jennifer Egan posits the archive’s 




physical archive, Goon Squad locates material to invest with subjective meaning that 
refuses to be integrated into corporate databases and interpreted by surveillance 
institutions. By fashioning personal archives that are meant to melt back into the 
surrounding environment and whose mysterious discourse cannot be interpreted by 
outsiders, Sasha ensures that her information cannot be co-opted by corporate or state 
institutions. Sasha’s situation inverts Alex’s alienation. Knowing that his information 
has been claimed by the surveillance apparatus, Alex must re-constitute and re-invent 
himself against this archival portrait, the database’s sustenance energising and forcing 
his own transformation. Whereas the database steals Alex’s subjectivity, Sasha’s self-
conception can possess temporal longevity by ensuring that the archive’s meaning 
cannot be parsed. Whereas in Homer and Langley, the breakdown of the archive is 
coeval with the deaths of the brothers, Goon Squad imagines repurposing the destruction 
drive in such a way that permits the subject to remain in possession of themselves.  
 These four novels, thus, posit various interrelations between subjectivity, the 
archive, and the death drive. In the Introduction, I argued that the personal archive 
operates across a continuum of unity and fragmentation, permitting subjects to transition 
from posthumanist fragmentation to a neo-humanist form of integration. I also argued 
that the archive can threaten to overload the subject, eliminating the possibility of 
coherence and stability. Whereas Homer and Langley conceives of this overload as 
lethal, and reveals a form of curational that can balance its multiplicity, I want to 
conclude this dissertation by turning towards a novel that sees the death drive enabling a 
form of radical posthumanist freedom. Dana Spiotta’s Stone Arabia, like Goon Squad, 
posits a competitive relationship between the subject and its archive. In Stone Arabia, 
however, it is the personal collection that survives at the expense of the archivist 
himself. 
 The novels that I have thus far investigated, for the most past, invest the personal 
archive in the temporary or provisional assembly of a style of subjective stability and 
coherence. Stone Arabia, however, sees the endgame of self-curation not in the humanist 




Denise relays her brother Nik’s moniker: ‘Self-curate or disappear’.631 By the novel’s 
conclusion, the logic of this assertion flips, Nik disappearing precisely because of his 
obsessive archival work. Nik’s personal archive takes the form of his Chronicles, the 
meticulous rendering of his unlived rock-‘n’-roll stardom complete with recorded music, 
forged interviews, and fictional reviews. So comprehensive is its internal world that, Nik 
says, ‘If the Chronicles are dug up two hundred years from now, the readers would find 
them entirely plausible’ (206). When Nik vanishes the morning after his fiftieth 
birthday, Denise sets down her own Counter-Chronicles that adhere strictly to ‘reality 
and memory and ordinary facts’ (27). The novel Spiotta provides is largely composed of 
the Counter-Chronicles, Denise’s attempt to understand her sibling’s desertion through 
her own archival pursuit. Her narration links and contrasts Nik’s archive with her 
daughter Ada’s blog entries and an Amish philosophy of technological scepticism.  
 Meditating on the significance of the unlived-life to the constitution of the self, 
the psychoanalyst Adam Phillips proposes that ‘we may need to think of ourselves as 
always living a double life, the one that we wish for and the one that we practice; the one 
that never happens and the one that keeps happening.’632 The Chronicles unite this 
duplicity into a single document that merges biographical truth and flights of fancy. 
Denise narrates:  
Nik’s Chronicles adhered to the facts and then didn’t. When Nik’s dog died in real life, his dog 
died in the Chronicles. But in the Chronicles he got a big funeral and a tribute album. Fans sent 
thousands of condolence cards. But it wasn’t always clear what was conjured. The music for the 
tribute album for the dog actually exists, as does the cover art for it[.] [...] But the fan letters didn’t 
exist. In this way Nik chronicled his years in minute but twisted detail. (37) 
Rather than erecting a barrier between the real and the fantastic, Nik’s archive functions 
as a space of comingling, of creativity, and of play—notably of wordplay. Denise notes 
that Nik fills the Chronicles with puns and with allusions that even she cannot always 
understand. Earlier, Denise points out the role that word games and rhymes play in 
cultivating memory: ‘giving your brain little games of association to help it organize its 
input’ (32). Unlike more literal mnemonic representations—such as photography—
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which Denise charges with flattening memory, the Chronicles’ re-imagination of the 
facts of the past might, then, account for Nik’s particularly sharp recall.  
 The novel frequently considers the distinction between memory in the form of 
bodily gestures and memory fabricated into narratives and objects. In doing so, it echoes 
Jean-François Lyotard’s writing on the domus and the megalopolis. Lyotard contrasts 
the domus, where memory passes on through gestures and stories, with the violent 
mega-city, which relies on a public archive that subdivides space and corrupts the family 
idyll.633 In Stone Arabia, the titular Amish community, encountered by Denise on the 
news, represents a kind of domus. Denise notes the Amish and Mennonite suspicion of 
technological progress and, particularly, their belief that ‘photographs encourage vanity’ 
(118). Denise echoes this Amish conviction, deriding photography for destroying 
memory: ‘Every time we take a photograph, we forget to embed things in our minds, in 
our actual brain cells. The taking of the photograph gets us off the hook, in a way, from 
trying to remember’ (52). Denise observes the discrepancy between photos, which 
facilitate memories of the photographs themselves rather than the events they signify, 
and the deep memory contained within the body. While she requires a picture to conjure 
up a memory of her father’s face, she experiences a spontaneous surge of recall when 
she catches something familiar in the body and mannerisms of a stranger: ‘A deep, 
intimate body memory came over me; I could see him—somewhat—but I could feel 
him, or recall feeling him, completely. [...] [I]t made me remember my father in ways a 
picture never could’ (188-9). Similarly, Denise observes that, when her mother’s recall 
deteriorates, the two of them rediscover their somatic memories: ‘We lost the memories, 
and so the past collapsed and disappeared. We were back to the intimacy of our two 
bodies’ (187). 
 While Denise critiques photography as a mode of memorialisation, the culture 
around her, and specifically digital culture, appears enmeshed in its logic of display. 
Denise notes of her daughter Ada: ‘it is almost as if she believes the internet will be her 
memory. I want to warn her: I’ve been through this with photographs, it just isn’t the 
same as actually remembering’ (55-6). When Ada wishes Denise happy birthday, she 
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does so on her public blog: ‘Not “happy birthday, mom” but “to my mom” because it 
was really reportage to some audience beyond me. It wasn’t a personal message to me 
but a public announcement about me’ (44). The Internet, here, turns even familial 
correspondence into public event. Technologies like the television and the computer 
frequently position Denise in the role of an ineffectual spectator: she narrates, ‘I felt 
myself an observer of events more than a participant. But that isn’t accurate. I was an 
absorber of events’ (38). Witnessing distant events from her living room, Denise 
seemingly possesses no power to affect their outcomes but only monitor their progress. 
Whereas Nik obsessively documents, Denise fixates on stories of real-life tragedy, 
betraying the traumatic attention of what Geoffrey Hartman has termed ‘impotent 
involuntary spectators’.634 Indeed, much of her emotional life, Denise realises, is played 
out through viewing these news stories and tracking down information about them 
online: real life misfortune fashioned as image and information. Not only do these 
‘external events’ dominate her memory, but it is through them that her ‘deepest 
emotional moments happened vicariously’ (108, 112). 
 While Denise attributes to the culture an obsession with display and 
spectatorship, Nik appears to undermine this system by refusing a broad viewership for 
his work. Part of what sustains Nik’s ethos of creativity is his disavowal of an 
audience—there are no fans to send in letters, except perhaps Denise and Ada. Like 
Baudrillard, who, as I have recalled frequently in this dissertation, sees in the collection 
a self-enclosed language that cannot communicate beyond the collector him or herself, 
Denise calls Nik’s Chronicles ‘a private joke that he doesn’t want to explain to anyone’ 
(71). The insularity of Nik’s archival world resembles Denise’s description of the punk 
scene of her youth: ‘we just had this very contextual, specific aesthetic that was precious 
because it was only readable to those in the know’ (163). Nik’s Chronicles takes on 
another characteristic of the punk ethos in its negation of an audience. Denise describes 
the Sex Pistols’ aggression to their fans: ‘they insulted their audience, told their audience 
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they were being ripped off’ (161). The novel presents Nik’s absorption of this punk 
stance, his refusal of a viewership beyond his family, as a means for radical creativity.  
 Denise thinks of this move as a kind of purity, and when Ada confronts her uncle 
about it he responds in kind:  
I grew to like not having an audience. Imagine being freed from sense and only having to pursue 
pure sound. Imagine letting go of explanations, of misinterpretations, of commerce and receptions. 
Imagine doing whatever you want with everything that went before you. [...] Imagine total 
freedom. (211) 
For Nik, the artistic freedom of no audience is a freedom of creativity and of play, to 
reference without fear of being termed derivative and to court obscurity without fear of 
upsetting expectation. It is a freedom from the demands of the archive, from one’s own 
past work and from the work of others. It is precisely the freedom missing from the 
public music industry, manager Lee Lux advising Nik during his early attempt at 
mainstream success: ‘If you want to be successful, you have to get things to work in 
many, many ways to many, many people’ (171). Nik chooses to appease himself rather 
than defer to a diverse popular audience, gesturing towards a kind of asceticism made all 
the more appropriate considering his habitation on the outskirts of the desert. 
Asceticism, however, quickly slides into narcissism. With no audience, Nik really is his 
own biggest fan, pursuing an obsession with himself. While, in the Chronicles, Nik 
appears to have carved out a personal creative space, I suggest that the archive’s 
repetitive system ultimately undoes this imaginative freedom. 
 Denise notes that the temporality of the news cycle is one of intense repetition, a 
flare of the same images and videos, followed quickly by amnesia: ‘Over and over, but 
then it would fade to the next thing. Not fade, it really was all and then nothing’ (122). It 
is a fixation that plays itself out too quickly to satisfy her desire for knowledge and 
closure. This cycle of repetition and exhaustion recurs in the novel. Repetition, Denise 
suggests, creates a more intimate bond between viewer and object: ‘as it seeps deeper 
into familiarity, it begins to make a permanent claim on your sensibility, your aesthetic 
history’ (66). Yet the charm of the repetitive drive, we learn later, is doomed to failure. 
Her project of watching James Mason movies sours, because ‘in praxis, such obsessions 




to thematic repetition, or mere accumulation. [...] Instead it increases one’s intolerance 
and irritation’ (132). Similarly, when Denise searches online for a diagnosis that 
matches ailing Nik’s bodily symptoms, she becomes overwhelmed by the repetition of 
information: ‘It exhausted you because you got lost in the flow of endless data, and it 
exhausted you because you never stopped trying to find your way in it, to apply some 
little spit of personal agency to it’ (103). 
 This trajectory of repetition, from familiarity to collapse, recalls the Freudian 
death drive and underpins the logic of archival memory. Within the novel, the notorious 
Abu Ghraib photographs sit at the apex of the perverse and narcissistic drive to take 
pictures and to document: ‘It wasn’t just the smile on her face that unnerved, it was the 
repetition and the need to photograph and the easy indifference’ (179). If the Abu Ghraib 
incident demonstrates the desire, latent in all photography, for an event to recur, Nik’s 
own form of material memory is, I demonstrate, similarly implicated in this impulse to 
repeat and, eventually, to forget. Denise reacts to the cultural system of intense interest 
and sudden burnout at work in the news cycle by leapfrogging the screen. Travelling 
across the country to Stone Arabia, site of a news event that has preoccupied her, Denise 
offers assistance to the Amish woman whose child was abducted. In doing so, Denise 
refuses to follow the news cycle to the next story of tragedy, to forget about the lost 
child once the initial blaze of interest has burnt out. Denise’s trip occurs just after Nik’s 
disappearance, her rejoinder to the death drive seemingly inspired by her brother’s 
acceptance of it. 
 Nik’s archive, like the repetition of James Mason films and of the news telecast, 
is doomed to expend itself, but it also seems structurally to embrace this future. 
Baudrillard contends that collections are meant to remain incomplete: obtaining the final 
object in a series annihilates the hunt for the next item and thus enacts a kind of death.635 
Nik’s Chronicles is seemingly coded consciously to expire by embarking on a series of 
records with a fixed endpoint, a planned twenty-album compilation. And, indeed, not 
only does Nik vanish after rounding out this series (they are enumerated in descending 
order as if to countdown to his departure) but their album covers tessellate to form a 
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portrait of the artist that is completed with this final submission. Once that facsimile of 
the self comes into focus, Nik kills off his fictional rock-star doppelganger within the 
Chronicles and vanishes into the desert landscape. By embracing the death drive, Nik 
implicitly reformulates his previous moniker ‘self-curate or disappear’ as ‘self-curate 
AND disappear’. With the real Nik gone and the fictional Nik dead, only the Chronicles 
are permitted an afterlife, Derrida’s destruction drive transplanted from the archive and 
onto the subject itself. 
 Although founded to skirt the demands of history and the expectations of an 
audience, both of these qualities renew themselves and, in doing so, they portend the 
Chronicles’ completion and Nik’s flight. While Nik refuses an audience in order to free 
himself of the demands of public expectation and of artistic influence, the Chronicles 
accrues its own genealogy and style. Through its logic of repetition, Nik’s dedicated and 
continual production of his archive, the Chronicles develop an aesthetic and a past to 
which they become tethered. Denise note: ‘I knew his solipsism had become his work 
[...] but at some point there is the unyielding, the concentration, and the accumulation 
that becomes a body of work’ (97). Generating its own form of internal expectation, 
consistency, and rhythm, the Chronicles no longer provide an empty bastion of free play 
and creativity, even without the burden of appeasing an audience.  
 But the Chronicles do develop an audience, and the repetition compulsion is 
again responsible for this change. Ada’s ambition to produce a documentary about Nik 
threatens to establish a viewership, causing Denise to worry about the ‘alchemical 
potential of filmic attention’ (144). Denise, however, has already transformed into an 
audience member in a much more subtle way. Within the novel, we are reminded that, as 
Nik says, Denise ‘doesn’t count as my audience because she feels like an extension of 
me’ (210). Denise apparently concurs: ‘It is just... knowing someone your whole life—
no first impressions, no seductions, no getting to know each other. It is all know, at times 
too much know’ (224). Here, the family is figured as an embodied archive, a domus-like 
configuration where intimacy is built into the relationship rather than articulated. This 
status of familial fluency, however, makes Denise’s final misrecognition a telling 




attempt. It is not, however, the real Nik who commits suicide but the fictional Nik of the 
archive. As the record cases flesh out a portrait of the artist, the fictional Nik reaches a 
fullness through which he, in a hyperreal turn, replaces the real subject even for his most 
familiar follower. Denise narrates: ‘I had misread him, and that was hard to take’ (200). 
Thus, we see the familial apparatus overpowered by the archive, the real Nik obscured to 
Denise, whose intimate acquaintance now rests with his curated and fabricated persona. 
 In many ways, then, the novel repeats the critique of material and archival 
memory offered by Lyotard. While the Chronicles obscures Nik to his sister, the 
instances of spontaneous memory and somatic familiarity that I have already noted 
uphold the family domus by re-establishing Denise’s intimacy with her mother and with 
her dead father. The novel concludes with another such eruption of recall. Walking 
around their childhood home, Denise remembers an adolescent scene that predicts Nik’s 
desire to be photographed, a narcissistic instinct that he injects into the Chronicles. Yet, 
this scene also summons up the childhood freedom that Denise experienced within the 
Los Angeles punk scene: ‘It’s fun because we are made up—not just in makeup, but we 
are made-up, imaginary people. We are liberated because not only do we know we can 
pull it off (whatever it is) but we know everyone else is a fake, too’ (230). This 
revelation gestures towards the kind of freedom courted by Nik, the creativity borne of 
misrepresenting oneself and deflating any model or expectation of behaviour. When Nik 
leaves, Denise thinks of his desertion as a way of re-invoking this freedom: ‘He wanted 
to be rid of all of it. Maybe he wanted the freedom to be whatever he wanted to be now, 
and that required jettisoning all his past work, all his past. He wanted what it was like 
when he began, before all of it had piled up into a long life’ (225). Spiotta thus observes 
a strange potential within the archive to invoke a radical freedom that overturns all 
models of behaviour, the archivist tricking its intimates with an almost-true self-portrait 
in, to recall Denise’s formulation, ‘minute but twisted detail.’ Dismantling his real-world 
self by perfecting a fictional substitute, Nik harnesses archival repetition and the death 
drive in order to embrace posthumanist indeterminacy and fluidity. Disappearing into 




of engaging the death drive in emancipation from the past and from the ideal of a 
humanist subjectivity.  
 In this dissertation, I have suggested that the personal archive operates on a 
continuum from posthumanist fragmentation to humanist integration. The tension 
between these two extremes expresses itself variously within the novels under 
investigation: in What I Loved’s notion of artistic ‘plethora’, the excess of archival 
signification that demands to be cohered in narrative; in Homer and Langley’s treatment 
of information overload, which exhausts the archive that attempts too strictly to 
implement categories and control the past; and in Goon Squad’s database form, its 
unmoored chapters creating a shape-shifting novel that, in trying to represent 
simultaneity, disables the conventional development of story. The novels engage the 
archive in the project of self-formation in alternative ways: while Auster and Hustvedt 
see the potential for provisionally re-fashioning an integrated subject from archival 
activities, Doctorow and Egan both warn against engaging the archive to rigidly fix the 
past and the self. Spiotta’s novel accelerates this critique, locating in the archive that is 
convincing but counterfactual an opportunity to escape humanist models of coherence 
and, instead, realise discontinuity and embrace indeterminacy. 
 Contemporary novels of the archive, when taken as commentaries on 
contemporary life, reveal a rich assortment of pulls, motivations, possibilities, and risks 
that converge in the culture of personal archivisation and display. They endow the 
archive with the propensity to interact with our psychological structures, to elucidate the 
past and rehabilitate our traumas. They see archiving as a process geared at self-
knowledge and subjective vitality, discovering in personal artefacts the symbolism and 
the metonymies through which to compose a life story. Yet, they also counsel against 
believing naively in the lucidity of the archive, of calcifying the past too neatly or the 
self too clearly. The archive, they declare, presents the chance to integrate the self or to 
productively overhaul it, to envision the past ethically or to ensure protectively that our 
history cannot be stolen. Yet, the personal archive, though it proliferates today in homes 
and on digital platforms, when drained of creativity and fixated on certainty, can equally 
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